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FRANCES A. YATES

~~May 13~~

May 14th - 1906

THE LACHES OF PLATO.

THE LANCET & CO. PRINTERS

Classical Series

THE
LACHES OF PLATO

WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

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OF BALLIOL COLLEGE, OXFORD.

London

MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD.

NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN CO.

1896

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Classical Series

THE

TRIALS OF PILATO

WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

First Edition, 1888.

Reprinted, 1891, 1896.

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London

MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD.

NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN CO.

GLASGOW: PRINTED AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

BY ROBERT MACLEHOSE AND CO.

PREFACE.

THE text of Plato followed in this book is that of the Zurich edition of 1851. The points in which I have departed from it are not numerous, and are chiefly ones of punctuation and spelling. I have however added the references to the sections of Stephanus (which are not given in the Zurich text), and have verified from Stephanus' edition the references both to sections and pages. In quoting from or referring to other dialogues I have always used Stallbaum's text of 1850.

An essay on the text of the *Laches* by Dr. Michael Gitlbauer,* Professor at Vienna, suggested some disquieting ideas as to the genuineness of a considerable portion of the text. But I did not think it suitable to the character of my book to depart from my intention of abstaining as far as possible from textual criticism; and those who have read the Professor's treatise will, I think, allow that his suggestions, ingenious as they all are, and plausible as many of them seem, are at least not such as to be adopted in a school edition.

* In his *Philologische Streifzüge* (Freiburg, 1886).

In writing the Introduction and Notes I have consulted chiefly the Introductions of Jowett and Grote, the Notes of Stallbaum, and Riddell's 'Digest of Idioms' in his edition of Plato's *Apology*. In the first part of the note on the 'modes' of Greek music I have followed Gevaert (*Histoire et Théorie de la Musique de l'Antiquité*).

It is hoped that the book may be useful as an introduction to the study of Plato; but it is not meant for the lower forms of a public school, or for those who have not already some acquaintance with other Greek authors.

NORTHCOURT HOUSE,
ABINGDON, *April*, 1888.

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INTRODUCTION.

PLATO, the son of Ariston and Perictione, was born about B.C. 429.* His father is said to have traced his descent from Codrus, his mother was the great-grand-daughter of Dropides, brother of Solon. Plato was of an healthy and athletic frame, and gained some skill in the art of wrestling under an Argive trainer named Ariston. He was taught to read and write at the school of a Dionysius, and his education was continued by the lessons of Draco, a teacher of literature and music. The boy learnt readily, and is said to have developed a taste for writing poetry. We have a few epigrams ascribed to him, but it is not probable that any of them are genuine. There is a story that on hearing Socrates discourse, Plato burnt a tragedy that he had intended for the stage, exclaiming, presumably in self-derision—

"Ἡφαισ τε πρόμολ' ὄδε, Πλάτων νύ τι σεῖο χατίζειι.

‘Hephaestus, come. Plato hath need of thee.’

* This seems, on the whole, the most probable date. Our authorities do not enable us to fix the date of Plato's life with any certainty, and consequently the dates here given for his travels must be taken as being no better than approximations.

Plato's intimacy with Socrates dates from his twenty-first year, but his philosophical studies had begun before this, as he had already made acquaintance with the Heraclitean system under the guidance of Cratylus. But from the first year of his friendship with Socrates, to the day of his master's death, we may be sure that the two were as constantly together as the duties and dangers of those troubled times would allow. Plato indeed seems to have kept aloof from active political life at Athens, partly, it may be supposed, because he could not persuade himself to work under a democratical system which he disliked, partly because he had a weak voice, which must in great measure have disqualified him for public speaking in the Pnyx.

He was present at the trial of Socrates, and did all that he could in support of his friend, but was prevented by illness from being with him in the prison when he drank the hemlock.

After the death of Socrates, Plato withdrew to Megara, where he stayed with Euclides his fellow disciple, and became acquainted with the Megaric system, which was a combination of Socratic philosophy with the doctrines known as Eleatic. From Megara he went to Cyrene, a Greek colony in Africa, and from Cyrene he may have visited Egypt. He then—possibly after returning to Athens—travelled in Italy, where he made the acquaintance of the Pythagorean philosophers of Locri and Tarentum, and Sicily, where he became intimate with Dion, brother-in-law of the elder Dionysius. The elder Dionysius was

then on the throne (B.C. 388); he is said to have quarrelled with Plato, to have dismissed him in anger, and even to have contrived that he should be sold as a slave by Pollis the Spartan in whose ship he was returning to Greece. The story goes that he was ransomed by Anniceris of Cyrene.

However this may be, Plato twice again visited Sicily, once in B.C. 366 at the request of Dion, to guide the younger Dionysius, who had succeeded his father, in the government of Syracuse. Though Plato obtained some influence over the prince, the result was not satisfactory; his friend Dion was banished, and Plato returned to Greece shortly afterwards. Once more he went to the island (B.C. 363), this time at the request of Dionysius, but failing in his endeavours to procure Dion's recall, and having lost the favour of the tyrant, he gave up all idea of influencing him for good, and returned to Athens, where he lived until the time of his death (B.C. 347).

It was about the year B.C. 387, after his first visit to Sicily, that Plato began to teach philosophy at Athens. He discoursed and lectured first in the grove and gymnasium of Academus on the north-west of Athens, and afterwards in his own house and garden between that place and Colonus. The nature of his teaching can be in some measure inferred from his dialogues, and many of his distinctions and definitions have been preserved by Diogenes Laertius, who wrote lives of the philosophers about the end of the second century A.D. Aristotle (*Metaph.* i. 6) gives an account and criticism of Plato's philosophy, which is of great

value, but treats of questions beyond the scope of this book. For the *Laches* is one of the 'Socratic' dialogues, and Socrates considered questions of moral philosophy without ever attempting to construct a system dealing with nature as a whole (*Σωκράτους...περὶ μὲν τὰ ἠθικὰ πραγματευομένου, περὶ δὲ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως οὐδέν.* Aristotle *loc. cit.*).

We have the following anecdote on Aristotle's authority. Once Aristippus, when Plato as he thought had spoken with too much assurance, rebuked him by saying, "Our friend" (meaning Socrates) "never talked like that" (*Rhet.* ii. 23, 12). It is also said that his lectures were at times above the comprehension of most of his audience. He must however have made his teaching intelligible to his more select pupils.

Many eminent men of the time came to learn from Plato, but by far the most famous of his pupils are Aristotle and Demosthenes. The latter, Cicero tells us, was a diligent reader of Plato's works, as well as a hearer of his lectures, and he considers that Demosthenes by this means obtained much of the impressiveness of his style. Aristotle's debt to his master was of a different nature. The style of his extant works is as different as possible from that of the dialogues of Plato, but his great system of philosophy could never have attained half its development without Plato's teaching.

Plato was not popular at Athens. We have seen that on the death of Socrates he found it advisable to withdraw from his country, and we are told that on one occasion, when Chabrias the general was on his

trial for his life, and Plato was going up with him to the Acropolis to plead for him, Crobylus, the informer, who met them, said to the philosopher, "Have you come as another's advocate, when you know that the hemlock of Socrates is awaiting you?" Part of this unpopularity no doubt attached to these two men from their being at times confused with the Sophists, and something will be said on this subject in the notes to the Dialogue; but the restored democracy of Athens disliked everything not democratic, and neither Socrates nor Plato, though good citizens, approved of the Athenian democracy; and further, Socrates had taught Alcibiades, Critias, and Charmides, and the two latter were kinsmen of Plato. If we remember the deserved hatred in which those names were held, as well as the dislike so easily earned by clever men who taught sons to be wiser than their fathers, we shall not think it strange that Socrates—who besides made many men his enemies by exposing their ignorance—should have been accused upon a capital charge, or that Plato may have been in danger of the same fate. The condemnation of Socrates, it should be observed, was the direct result of his unbending and almost defiant attitude toward his judges, and this is distinctly insisted upon by Xenophon.

Anything like an account of Socrates, in spite of the deeply interesting nature of the subject, would be out of place here. In Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, an easy and fascinating book, the reader will find nearly all that is known about his life, and for his death he should read the end of Plato's *Phaedo*. The account

there given is no doubt authentic, and there are besides several pieces of information about the events in Socrates' life scattered through Plato's works. But that is all we can say. For though Socrates is the principal speaker in nearly all these dialogues, the thoughts are those of Plato, not those of Socrates. The Socratic manner is, however, more or less faithfully reproduced, and in some of the earlier dialogues, such as the *Charmides*, *Laches*, and *Lysis*, there is probably but little departure from Socrates' real teaching. In fact we possibly have here a side of Socrates, which Xenophon has merely hinted at. The Socrates of the earlier Platonic dialogues, if suggestive, is yet mainly critical, destructive, and negative. The Socrates of the *Memorabilia* is critical, but he is constructive and eminently practical. He would prove to mankind that there can be such a thing as moral and political science, and consequently an art of living and of ruling. Nobody, he said, dreamt of making a shoe or playing a harp without first learning how to do it; and it was absurd that any young gentleman of good birth and manners should consider himself—without any training—fit to guide the counsels of his country or command her armies. With an air of gentle deference to their superior wisdom he would put to such aspirants a few apparently innocent questions, their answers to which soon proved to them that they knew nothing of the subjects on which they thought themselves so well qualified to guide others. Many who had been thus exposed left Socrates in disgust and became his

bitter enemies, but the better sort would come back to him, and then he was most ready to help them with sound practical advice. Xenophon by no means ignores the fact that Socrates discussed the nature of the moral virtues, but he gives much greater prominence to the practical part of his teaching.*

Before passing to the *Laches* in particular, a few words should be said about Plato's dialogues in general. It is not unlikely that the earliest of them were published not long after Socrates' death; but it is not at all probable that any of them were composed, far less published, in his life-time. There is indeed a story told by Diogenes Laertius that Plato not only composed his *Lysis* while Socrates was living, but actually read it to him, when Socrates remarked, "Good heavens, what a number of lies that young man has been telling about me." (Ἡράκλεις, ὡς πολλά μου κατεψεύδεθ' ὁ νεανίσκος. Life of Plato, § 35). But the story is too improbable to be accepted on such authority. There seems, however, to be reason for supposing the *Lysis* to be the earliest of the dialogues.

In these works Plato treats of various subjects, but chiefly of those belonging to the sphere of moral, political, and mental philosophy. The *Charmides* seeks for a definition of temperance, the *Lysis* asks, "What is friendship?" the *Laches*, "What is courage?" the *Republic* discusses the nature of justice and the perfection of the individual in society, the *Phaedo* treats

* For the account given of courage—the subject of Plato's *Laches*—by Socrates in the *Memorabilia* see Appendix.

of the immortality of the soul, the *Theaetetus* of the nature of knowledge, the *Meno* of virtue, the *Symposium* of love, the *Philebus* of pleasure. These are but a few of Plato's dialogues, but they are some of the best known, and for the most part are concerned with a definite subject. Some of the others could not be so shortly described.

The style of Plato has been described by Aristotle as "midway between poetry and prose." This need not refer merely to the language, but probably alludes, in part at least, to the nature of the dialogues themselves, many of which for their dramatic force may well rank as excellent works of fiction; and Aristotle would have called fiction poetry.

The language itself is often poetical, but not more so than we consider allowable for prose. As Greek it is of course beyond praise, though a beginner might sometimes wish the sentences to be a little less long, and the constructions a little more free from colloquial irregularities.

The *Laches* is one of the earlier or Socratic dialogues of Plato; it is very dramatic. The characters of the dialogue are Lysimachus, son of Aristides the Just, and Melesias, son of Pericles' rival Thucydides; their two friends Nicias and Laches, Socrates (who is apparently represented as being quite a young man), and two boys, the sons of Lysimachus and Melesias, named respectively Aristides and Thucydides after their grandfathers.

The scene is a palaestra. Nicias and Laches have been with the two fathers to see a 'master of arms,'

named Stesilaus, fighting in heavy armour, and are to give their opinion on the performance. Lysimachus and Melesias want to know whether this exercise would be a suitable accomplishment for their sons, whom they wish to educate as well as possible. Nicias professes his readiness to give advice, but Laches suggests that the opinion of Socrates should be asked, as he is a man who is constantly considering the question of the education of the young. This makes Lysimachus think that this Socrates, the son of his old friend Sophroniscus, may be the man whom he has often heard the boys praising. One of them tells him that he is right in his conjecture, and, after a testimony from Laches to Socrates' good conduct in the retreat from Delium, Lysimachus presses Socrates for his opinion on the subject of "fighting in armour." Socrates modestly says that Nicias and Laches ought to speak first, and accordingly they give their opinions, Nicias in favour of the exercise as an useful addition to the art of warfare, Laches against it as an unprofitable innovation. Lysimachus is sorry to find that they differ, and an appeal is made to Socrates to settle the question by his casting vote. This Socrates will not do, "for," he says, "the question is not what do the majority think, but is there any among us who really knows about the matter we are considering, and if so, what is his opinion? The matter we are really considering is what are the requirements of the soul; and if any of us has scientific knowledge of the treatment proper for the soul, his opinion will be valuable; but to have it he must have studied the subject under

good masters ; if not, it is very unlikely that he will have any skill in the matter, and we shall not believe him, if he says that he has such skill, unless he can show us some practical results of it in the shape of the improvement of his fellow-men. I could not afford masters, and I have not been able to acquire the skill. But let us inquire if Nicias and Laches have it."

Nicias and Laches agree, but the question is not pursued any further in this form, Socrates suggesting that they shall substitute for the inquiry, "Do we know how to improve the soul?" the inquiry, "Do we know the nature of that which is best for the soul, namely, virtue?" And he further suggests that it will be enough for the present purpose to take one part of virtue, namely, courage, and see if they know what that is.

Laches thinks the question an easy one, and defines courage thus : "A man who was ready to keep his place in the rank and resist the enemy, and not run away, would be courageous" (190 E).

Socrates objects that this is at best only a definition of a hoplite's courage, and he explains that he wants a definition of courage in a much wider sense. Accordingly Laches now explains it as "an endurance (or resistance) of the soul." Socrates suggests that such endurance or resistance will be noble only when combined with prudence or wisdom ; otherwise it will be harmful ; and that as courage is noble, it will be only sensible endurance that can be called courage. Laches agrees (192 D). "Yet," says Socrates, "a man who is resolute in spending sensibly, or resolute

in refusing unsuitable food to an invalid, is not therefore called brave, nor is a man who resists in war thought more brave when all the advantage is on his side, and he knows it. Nay, when the advantage is on his opponent's side, and he knows it, then is he rather called brave for resisting. And in many like instances we find the greatest courage is the resistance which is combined with a want of prudence. Here, then, we have a contradiction, but we must not give up because of the check. So we will ask Nicias to help in the chase."

Nicias (194 C-D) says that *ἀνδρεία* had better be defined as a sort of wisdom, and suggests that this will be in accordance with Socrates' usual teaching. "What wisdom?" he is asked. He answers, "The wisdom to understand things to be dreaded and things not to be dreaded, both in war and in all other circumstances."

Laches objects that we do not call husbandmen brave for knowing about things to be dreaded in agriculture, or doctors brave for knowing about things to be dreaded in disease.

Nicias answers that doctors, *as such*, know only about health and disease. They may know whether their patient will recover or not, but their professional knowledge does not tell them which is most terrible to him, recovery or death.

"Oh," says Laches, "then your brave man is simply a prophet?"

"No," Nicias replies. "A prophet knows merely what will happen, not whether the future will be terrible or not."

Laches calls this shuffling, but Socrates is inclined to think there may be something in what Nicias says, and so proceeds to question him. "You think that no one can be brave without this knowledge?"

Nicias assents, and says that beasts and children may be fearless (*ἄφοβα*), but cannot be brave (*ἀνδρεία*).

Laches calls this sophistry; but Socrates still keeps up his judicial attitude. He proceeds:

SOC. Nicias, you call 'courage' a part of virtue, I suppose?

NIC. Yes.

SOC. What then are things to be dreaded, and the reverse? future evils and goods?

NIC. Yes.

SOC. Courage, then, is the knowledge or science of good and evil in the future. But can any science be of the future only? Must it not be just as much concerned with the present and the past?

NIC. It must.

SOC. Then courage will be the science of good and evil whether past, present, or future, and will therefore be the whole of virtue, and not a part only. So our definition was wrong after all, and we must go to school with the boys to learn.

Thus we have no definite answer given to the question, "What is courage?" Yet an answer is suggested in the conversation, which contains besides many points of interest and instruction. Attention will be called to these in the Notes; and the reader is referred to the Appendix for further remarks on the subject of the dialogue.

The date at which the conversation is supposed to take place must be between the autumn of B.C. 424, when the battle of Delium was fought, and the summer of B.C. 418, when Laches fell in the battle of Mantinea. Socrates was more than seventy (*Apology* 17 D) at the time of his trial (B.C. 399), so that he must have been at least forty-five in B.C. 424. Therefore he could hardly have been a young man at any time when the dialogue could have occurred. Plato, however, aims at plausibility rather than possibility in points of chronology.

THE LANGUAGE OF THE DIALOGUE.

SPECIAL difficulties occur in the interpretation of every author ; those in Plato are due chiefly to his endeavour to represent in his dialogues the characteristics of actual conversation ; yet from the frequency with which irregularities that we should call colloquial occur in all Greek literature, and from the fact that there was no sharp distinction in Attic Greek between the language of careless talk and that of literary prose, it is impossible to say with certainty that any given peculiarity in Plato is the result of a studied negligence. For an exhaustive treatise on these peculiarities the reader is referred to the 'Digest of Idioms' in Riddell's edition of Plato's *Apology* ; here it will be sufficient to give a short account of some typical points of interest or difficulty in the language of the *Laches*.

I. AS TO THE USE OF WORDS.

The following words are used in a somewhat unusual sense :—

πολλάκις, 'perhaps,' 179 B and 194 A.

χωρίς, 'different from,' 195 A.

αὐτίκα, 'for instance,' 195 B.

ἐπεικῶς, 'sufficiently,' 200 B.

II. AS TO THE ORDER OF WORDS.

Hyperbaton, the figure by which a word is for the sake of emphasis put out of its proper place in a sentence, is found in the following passages :—

- (α) ὥσπερ ἔτι τοῦ διακρινουῦντος δοκεῖ μοι δεῖν ἡμῖν ἢ βουλή, 184 C, where ἔτι belongs to δεῖν.
- (β) οὐκ ἐντετυχηκῶς τῷ ἀνδρὶ δηλὸς ἔτι εἰ, 187 E, where ἔτι belongs to οὐκ ἐντετυχηκῶς.
- (γ) πρὸς τί τοῦτ' εἶπες βλέψας ; 195 A, for πρὸς τί βλέψας τοῦτ' εἶπες ; and perhaps in
- (δ) εἰδότα μὲν ὅτι βοηθήσουσιν ἄλλοι αὐτῷ, πρὸς ἐλάττους δὲ καὶ φαυλοτέρους μαχεῖται, 193 A, where if μὲν is to correspond to δέ it should follow βοηθήσουσιν.

III. AS TO COMBINATIONS OF WORDS.

A remarkable combination of particles is that of *νῦν δὲ* ... *γάρ* used to introduce a clause contradicting a foregoing hypothesis that was contrary to fact. See note on 184 D, where the expression occurs, and compare 200 E.

Notice also the combination *εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις*, 179 B (where see note) and 194 A.

IV. AS TO IRREGULARITIES OF SYNTAX.

These result in general either (a) from a wish on the part of the speaker (or writer) to put before the mind of his hearers (or readers) more than the logic of grammar will allow; or (b) from the fact of his thoughts being so concentrated on a particular clause that he forgets its precise relation with the rest of the period.

The former tendency is shown in (i.) Irregular Anticipation, (ii.) Confusion of Clauses, (iii.) Irregular Recapitulation; the latter in (iv.) Irregular Apodosis, (v.) Anacoluthon. Instances of these irregularities will now be given in detail:—

(i.) *Irregular Anticipation.*

εἰσηγήσατο οὖν τις ἡμῖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα, ὅτι καλὸν εἶη τῷ νέῳ μαθεῖν ἐν ὄπλοις μάχεσθαι, 179 D.

Here *καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα* anticipates the *ὅτι* clause. This construction is, however, little more than an extension of the common figure by which the subject of a dependent sentence is taken out of it and made the subject or object of the principal sentence. (See note on *τὸ δὲ σόφισμα ... οἶον ἀπέβη*, 183 D.)

οἷς οὐδὲν ἄλλο μέλει ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἢ τοῦτο ζητεῖν καὶ ἐπιτηδεύειν, ὃ τι ἂν μαθόντες καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσαντες πλεονεκτοῖεν τῶν ἄλλων, κ.τ.λ., 182 E.

Here *καὶ ἐπιτηδεύειν* anticipates the relative clause and spoils the grammar of the sentence.

(ii.) *Confusion of Clauses.*

τίνος ὄντος τούτου οὐ ζητοῦμεν τοὺς διδασκάλους; 185 B, which is a combination of *τίνος ζητοῦμεν τοὺς διδασκάλους*; and *τί ἐστι τούτου οὐ ζητοῦμεν τοὺς διδασκάλους*;

(iii.) *Irregular Recapitulation.*

τούτο οὖν σου ἐγὼ ἀντιδέομαι, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, καθάπερ ἄρτι Λάχης μὴ ἀφίεσθαι σε ἐμοῦ διεκελεύετο ἀλλὰ ἐρωτᾶν, καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν παρακελεύομαί σοι μὴ ἀφίεσθαι Λάχητος μηδὲ Νικίου ἀλλ' ἐρωτᾶν, 186 D.

Here *καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν παρακελεύομαι σοι* is inserted to resume the idea of *ἀντιδέομαι* on account of the intervention of the clause *καθάπερ ... ἐρωτῶν*.

(iv.) *Irregular Apodosis.*

εἴαν τις αὐτοῖς συμβουλεύσῃται, οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν ἃ νοοῦσιν,
178 A. (See note on the passage.)

εἰ δὲ Νικίας ἢ Λάχης εὔρηκεν ἢ μεμάθηκεν, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι,
186 C.

(v.) *Anacoluthon.*

εἰδότες οὖν καὶ ὑμῖν υἱεῖς ὄντας ἡγησάμεθα μεμεληκέναι περὶ αὐτῶν ... εἰ δ' ἄρα πολλάκις μὴ προσεσχῆκατε τὸν νοῦν τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὑπομνήσοντες ὅτι οὐ χρὴ αὐτοῦ ἀμελεῖν, καὶ παρακαλοῦντες ὑμᾶς ἐπὶ τὸ ἐπιμελείαν τινα ποιήσασθαι τῶν υἱέων κοινῇ μεθ' ἡμῶν, 179 B.

Here there should properly be finite verbs in the place of *ὑπομνήσοντες* and *παρακαλοῦντες*.

ἦν δὲ γέλωσ καὶ κρότος ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ὀλκάδος ἐπὶ τε τῷ σχήματι αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐπειδὴ βαλόντος τινὸς λίθῳ παρὰ τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ κατάστρομα ἀφίεται τοῦ δόρατος. τότε ἤδη καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς τριήρους οὐκέτι οἰοί τ' ἦσαν τὸν γέλῳτα κατέχειν, 184 A.

Here *ἐπὶ τε τῷ σχήματι αὐτοῦ* suggests that another dative governed by *ἐπὶ* will follow. Instead of that we have a long clause with quite a different construction.

ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον οἶμαι τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι μηδενὸς θηρίου ἀποδέχεσθαι ἀνδρείαν, ἢ ξυγχωρεῖν θηρίῳ τι οὕτω σοφὸν εἶναι, ὥστε ἃ ὀλίγοι ἀνθρώπων ἴσασι ... ταῦτα λέοντα ἢ πάρδαλιν ἢ τινα κάπρον φάναι εἰδέναί, 196 E.

Here the insertion of the words *λέοντα ... φάναι* thrusts out the word *ξυγχωρεῖν* from its legitimate government of *εἰδέναί*, and their omission would make the sentence quite logical.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΛΑΧΗΣ.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΛΥΣΙΜΑΧΟΣ, ΜΕΛΗΣΙΑΣ, ΝΙΚΙΑΣ,
ΛΑΧΗΣ, ΠΑΙΔΕΣ ΛΥΣΙΜΑΧΟΥ
ΚΑΙ ΜΕΛΗΣΙΟΥ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΛΑΧΗΣ.

St. p.
178 A
 I. Τεθέασθε μὲν τὸν ἄνδρα μαχόμενον ἐν ὄπλοις, B
 ὦ Νικία τε καὶ Λάχης· οὐ δ' ἔνεκα ὑμᾶς ἐκελεύσαμεν
 συνθεάσασθαι ἐγώ τε καὶ Μελησίας ὅδε, τότε μὲν
 οὐκ εἶπομεν, νῦν δ' ἐροῦμεν. ἡγούμεθα γὰρ χρῆναι
 πρὸς γε ὑμᾶς παρρησιάζεσθαι. εἰσὶ γὰρ τινες οἱ
 τῶν τοιούτων καταγελωσι, καὶ ἐάν τις αὐτοῖς
 συμβουλεύσῃται, οὐκ ἂν εἶποιεν ἅ νοοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ
 στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ | συμβουλευομένου ἄλλα λέγουσι B
 παρὰ τὴν αὐτῶν δόξαν· ὑμᾶς δὲ ἡμεῖς ἡγησάμενοι
 καὶ ἰκανοὺς γινῶναι καὶ γνόντας ἀπλῶς ἂν εἰπεῖν ἅ
 δοκεῖ ὑμῖν, οὕτω παρελάβομεν ἐπὶ τὴν συμβουλήν
 περὶ ᾧν μέλλομεν ἀνακοινοῦσθαι. ἔστιν οὖν τοῦτο
 περὶ οὗ πάλαι τοσαῦτα προοιμιάζομαι, | τόδε. 179 A
 ἡμῖν εἰσὶν υἱεῖς οὗτοί, ὅδε μὲν τοῦδε, πάππου ἔχων
 ὄνομα, Θουκυδίδης, ἐμὸς δὲ αὐ ὅδε. παππῶν δὲ καὶ
 οὗτος ὄνομ' ἔχει τοῦμοῦ πατρός· Ἀριστείδην γὰρ
 αὐτὸν καλοῦμεν. ἡμῖν οὖν τούτων δέδοκται ἐπι-
 μεληθῆναι ὡς οἴόν τε μάλιστα, καὶ μὴ ποιῆσαι ὅπερ
 οἱ πολλοί, ἐπειδὴ μεράκια γέγονέν, ἀνεῖναι αὐτοὺς
 ὅ τι βούλονται ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ νῦν δὴ καὶ ἄρχεσθαι
 αὐτῶν ἐπιμελείσθαι καθ' ὅσον οἰοί τ' | ἐσμέν. B

179 B εἰδότες οὖν καὶ ὑμῖν υἱεῖς ὄντας ἠγησαμεθα με-
 μεληκέναι περὶ αὐτῶν, εἴπερ τισὶν ἄλλοις, πῶς ἂν
 θεραπευθέντες γένοιτο ἄριστοι· εἰ δ' ἄρα πολλάκις
 μὴ προσεσχίκατε τὸν νοῦν τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὑπομνήσον-
 τες ὅτι οὐ χρὴ αὐτοῦ ἀμελεῖν, καὶ παρακαλοῦντες
 ὑμᾶς ἐπὶ τὸ ἐπιμέλειάν τινά ποιήσασθαι τῶν υἱέων
 κοινῇ μεθ' ἡμῶν.

II. Ὅθεν δὲ ἡμῖν ταῦτ' ἔδοξεν, ὦ Νικία τε καὶ
 Λάχης, χρὴ ἀκοῦσαι, καὶ ἢ ὀλίγω μακρότερα.
 συσσιτοῦμεν γὰρ δὴ ἐγώ τε καὶ Μελησίας ὅδε,
C καὶ ἡμῖν τὰ μειράκια | παρασιτεῖ. ὅπερ οὖν καὶ
 ἀρχόμενος εἶπον τοῦ λόγου, παρρήσιασόμεθα πρὸς
 ὑμᾶς. ἡμῶν γὰρ ἑκάτερος περὶ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ πατρὸς
 πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἔργα ἔχει λέγειν πρὸς τοὺς νεανί-
 σκους, καὶ ὅσα ἐν πολέμῳ εἰργάσαντο καὶ ὅσα ἐν
 εἰρήνῃ, διοικοῦντες τὰ τε τῶν συμμάχων καὶ τὰ
 τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως· ἡμέτερα δ' αὐτῶν ἔργα οὐδέτερος
 ἔχει λέγειν. ταῦτα δὴ ὑπαισχυνόμεθά τε τούσδε
 καὶ αἰτιώμεθα τοὺς πατέρας ἡμῶν, ὅτι ἡμᾶς μὲν
D εἶων τρυφᾶν, ἐπειδὴ | μειράκια ἐγενόμεθα, τὰ δὲ
 τῶν ἄλλων πράγματα ἔπραττον· καὶ τοῖσδε τοῖς
 νεανίσκοις αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐνδεικνύμεθα, λέγοντες ὅτι,
 εἰ μὲν ἀμελήσουσιν ἑαυτῶν καὶ μὴ πείσονται ἡμῖν,
 ἀκλειεῖς γενήσονται, εἰ δ' ἐπιμελήσονται, τάχ' ἂν
 τῶν ὀνομάτων ἄξιοι γένοιτο ἃ ἔχουσιν. οὗτοι μὲν
 οὖν φασὶ πείσεσθαι· ἡμεῖς δὲ δὴ τοῦτο σκοποῦμεν,
E τί ἂν οὗτοι μαθόντες ἢ ἐπιτηδεύσαντες ὅ τι ἄριστοι
 γένοιτο. εἰσηγήσατο οὖν τις ἡμῖν | καὶ τοῦτο
 τὸ μάθημα, ὅτι καλὸν εἶη τῷ νέῳ μαθεῖν ἐν ὄπλοις

μάχεσθαι· καὶ ἐπῆνει τοῦτον ὃν νῦν ὑμεῖς ἐθεάσασθε 179 E
 ἐπιδεικνύμενον· κᾶτ' ἐκέλευε θεάσασθαι. ἔδοξε δὲ
 χρῆναι αὐτούς τε ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ θεάν τάνδρὸς καὶ ὑμᾶς
 συμπαραλαβεῖν ἅμα μὲν συνθεατάς, ἅμα δὲ συμ-
 βούλους τε καὶ κοινωνούς, ἐὰν βούλησθε, περὶ τῆς
 τῶν υἰέων ἐπιμελείας. ταῦτ' | ἐστὶν ἃ ἐβουλόμεθα 180 A
 ὑμῖν ἀνακοινώσασθαι. ἤδη οὖν ὑμέτερον μέρος
 συμβουλεύειν καὶ περὶ τούτου τοῦ μαθήματος,
 εἴτε δοκεῖ χρῆναι μανθάνειν εἴτε μή, καὶ περὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων, εἴ τι ἔχετε ἐπαινέσαι μάθημα νέῳ ἀνδρὶ ἢ
 ἐπιτήδευμα, καὶ περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας λέγειν ὁποῖόν
 τι ποιήσετε.

III. NI. Ἐγὼ μὲν, ὦ Λυσίμαχε καὶ Μελησία,
 ἐπαινῶ τε ὑμῶν τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ κοινωνεῖν ἔτοιμος,
 οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Λάχητα τόνδε.

| ΛΑ. Ἀληθῆ γὰρ οἶει, ὦ Νικία, ὡς ὁ γε ἔλεγεν B
 ὁ Λυσίμαχος ἄρτι περὶ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ τε
 καὶ τοῦ Μελησίου, πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ εὖ εἰρησθαι καὶ
 εἰς ἐκείνους καὶ εἰς ἡμᾶς καὶ εἰς ἅπαντας ὅσοι τὰ
 τῶν πόλεων πράττουσιν, ὅτι αὐτοῖς σχεδόν τι
 ταῦτα συμβαίνει ἃ οὗτος λέγει καὶ περὶ παῖδας
 καὶ περὶ τᾶλλα ἴδια, ὀλιγωρεῖσθαί τε καὶ ἀμελῶς
 διατίθεσθαι. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ Λυ-
 σίμαχε· ὅτι δ' ἡμᾶς μὲν συμβούλους παρακαλεῖς
 ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν νεανίσκων παιδείαν, Σωκράτη δὲ τόνδε
 οὐ | παρακαλεῖς, θαυμάζω, πρῶτον μὲν ὄντα δημότην, C
 ἔπειτα ἐνταῦθα ἀεὶ τὰς διατριβὰς ποιούμενον, ὅπου
 τί ἐστι τῶν τοιούτων ὧν σὺ ζητεῖς περὶ τοὺς νέους
 ἢ μάθημα ἢ ἐπιτήδευμα καλόν.

180 C ΛΥ. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Λάχης; Σωκράτης γὰρ ὄδε τινὸς τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιμέλειαν πεποιήται;

ΛΑ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Λυσίμαχε.

ΝΙ. Τοῦτο μὲν σοι κἂν ἐγὼ ἔχοιμι εἰπεῖν οὐ χεῖρον Λάχητος· καὶ γὰρ αὐτῷ μοι ἕναγχος ἄνδρα
D προῦξένησε τῷ υἱεῖ διδάσκαλον | μουσικῆς, Ἄγαθοκλέους μαθητὴν Δάμωνα, ἀνδρῶν χαριέστατον οὐ μόνον τὴν μουσικὴν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τᾶλλα ὀπόσου βούλει ἄξιον συνδιατρίβειν τηλικούτοις νεανίσκοις.

IV. ΛΥ. Οὔτοι τι, ὦ Σώκρατες τε καὶ Νικία καὶ Λάχης, οἱ ἡλίοκοι ἐγὼ ἔτι γιγνώσκομεν τοὺς νεωτέρους, ἅτε κατ' οἰκίαν τὰ πολλὰ διατρίβοντες ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας· ἀλλ' εἴ τι καὶ σύ, ὦ παῖ Σωφρονίσκου, ἔχεις τῷδε τῷ σαντοῦ δημότῃ ἀγαθὸν
E συμβουλευσαι, χρὴ συμβουλεύειν. | δίκαιος δ' εἶ· καὶ γὰρ πατρικὸς ἡμῖν φίλος τυγχάνεις ὢν· αἰεὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ σὸς πατὴρ ἑταίρω τε καὶ φίλω ἦμεν, καὶ πρότερον ἐκεῖνος ἐτελεύτησε πρὶν τι ἐμοὶ διενεχθῆναι. περιφέρει δέ τίς με καὶ μνήμη ἄρτι τῶνδε λεγόντων· τὰ γὰρ μειράκια τάδε πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἴκοι διαλεγόμενοι θαμὰ ἐπιμέμνηνται Σωκράτους καὶ σφόδρα ἐπαινοῦσιν· οὐ μέντοι πώποτε αὐτοὺς ἀνηρώτησα εἰ τὸν Σωφρονίσκου |

181 A λέγοιεν· ἀλλ', ὦ παῖδες, λέγετέ μοι, ὅδ' ἐστὶ Σωκράτης, περὶ οὗ ἐκάστοτε μέμνησθε;

ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ πάτερ, οὗτος.

ΛΥ. Εὐ γε νῆ τὴν Ἑραν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ὀρθοῖς τὸν πατέρα, ἄριστον ἀνδρῶν ὄντα καὶ

ἄλλως καὶ δὴ καὶ ὅτι οἰκεία τά τε σὰ ἡμῖν ὑπάρξει 181 A
καὶ σοὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα.

ΛΑ. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, μὴ ἀφίεσό γε τὰνδρός·
ὡς ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλοθί γε αὐτὸν ἐθεασάμην οὐ μόνον
τὸν πατέρα ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν | πατρίδα ὀρθοῦντα· ἐν B
γὰρ τῇ ἀπὸ Δηλίου φυγῇ μετ' ἐμοῦ ξυνανεχώρει,
κἀγὼ σοι λέγω ὅτι εἰ οἱ ἄλλοι ἤθελον τοιοῦτοι
εἶναι, ὀρθὴ ἂν ἡμῶν ἢ πόλις ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔπεσε
τότε τοιοῦτον πτώμα.

ΛΥ. ὦ Σώκρατες, οὔτος μέντοι ὁ ἔπαινός ἐστι
καλός, ὃν σὺ νῦν ἐπαινεῖ ὑπ' ἀνδρῶν ἀξίων πιστεῦε-
σθαι καὶ εἰς ταῦτα εἰς ἃ οὔτοι ἐπαινοῦσιν. εὐ οὖν
ἴσθι ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα ἀκούων χαίρω ὅτι εὐδοκιμεῖς.
καὶ σὺ δὲ ἡγοῦ με ἐν τοῖς γ' εὐνουστάτοις σοι εἶναι.
χρῆν μὲν οὖν καὶ πρότερόν | γε φοιτᾶν αὐτὸν παρ' C
ἡμᾶς καὶ οἰκείους ἡγεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ τὸ δίκαιον· νῦν
δ' οὖν ἀπὸ τῆσδε τῆς ἡμέρας, ἐπειδὴ ἀνεγνωρίσαμεν
ἀλλήλους, μὴ ἄλλως ποίει, ἀλλὰ σύμισθί τε καὶ
γνώριξε καὶ ἡμᾶς καὶ τούσδε τοὺς νεωτέρους, ὅπως
ἂν διασώζητε καὶ ὑμεῖς τὴν ἡμετέραν φιλίαν. ταῦτα
μὲν οὖν καὶ σὺ ποιήσεις καὶ ἡμεῖς σε καὶ αὐθις ὑπο-
μνήσομεν· περὶ δὲ ὧν ἠρξάμεθα τί φατε; τί δοκεῖ;
τὸ μάθημα τοῖς μειρακίοις ἐπιτήδειον εἶναι ἢ οὐ, τὸ
μαθεῖν ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι;

V. ΣΩ. | Ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων πέρι, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, D
ἔγωγε πειράσομαι συμβουλεύειν ἂν τι δύνωμαι, καὶ
αὐτὸ ἃ προκαλεῖ πάντα ποιεῖν. δικαιοτάτον μέντοι
μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἐμὲ νεώτερον ὄντα τῶνδε καὶ ἀπει-
ρότερον τούτων ἀκούειν πρότερον τί λέγουσι καὶ

181 D *μανθάνειν παρ' αὐτῶν· ἐὰν δ' ἔχω τι ἄλλο παρὰ τὰ ὑπὸ τούτων λεγόμενα, τότε ἤδη διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν καὶ σὲ καὶ τούτους. ἀλλ', ὦ Νικία, τί οὐ λέγει πότερος ὑμῶν ;*

ΝΙ. Ἄλλ' οὐδὲν κωλύει, ὦ Σώκρατες. δοκεῖ γὰρ
E *ἐμοὶ | τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα τοῖς νέοις ὠφέλιμον εἶναι ἐπίστασθαι πολλαχῆ. καὶ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἄλλοθι διατρίβειν, ἐν οἷς δὴ φιλοῦσιν οἱ νέοι τὰς διατριβὰς ποιεῖσθαι, ὅταν σχολὴν ἄγωσιν, ἀλλ' ἐν τούτῳ, εὐ ἔχει, ὅθεν καὶ τὸ σῶμα βέλτιον ἴσχειν ἀνάγκη*
182 A *—οὐδενὸς γὰρ τῶν γυμνασίων φαυλότερον | οὐδ' ἐλάττω πόνον ἔχει—, καὶ ἅμα προσήκει μάλιστ' ἐλευθέρῳ τοῦτό τε τὸ γυμνάσιον καὶ ἡ ἵππική· οὐ γὰρ ἀγῶνος ἀθληταὶ ἐσμεν καὶ ἐν οἷς ἡμῖν ὁ ἀγὼν πρόκειται, μόνοι οὗτοι γυμνάζονται οἱ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ὀργάνοις γυμναζόμενοι. ἔπειτα ὀνήσει μὲν τι τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα καὶ ἐν τῇ μάχῃ αὐτῇ, ὅταν ἐν τάξει δέῃ μάχεσθαι μετὰ πολλῶν ἄλλων· μέγιστον μέντοι αὐτοῦ ὄφελος, ὅταν λυθῶσιν αἱ τάξεις καὶ ἤδη τι δέῃ μόνον πρὸς μόνον ἢ διώκοντα ἀμυνομένῳ | τινὶ ἐπιθέσθαι ἢ καὶ ἐν φυγῇ ἐπιτιθεμένου ἄλλου ἀμύνασθαι αὐτόν· οὐτ' ἂν ὑπὸ γε ἐνὸς εἰς ὁ τοῦτ' ἐπιστάμενος οὐδὲν ἂν πάθοι, ἴσως δ' οὐδὲ ὑπὸ πλειόνων, ἀλλὰ πανταχῆ ἂν ταύτῃ πλεονεκτοῖ. ἔτι δὲ καὶ εἰς ἄλλου καλοῦ μαθήματος ἐπιθυμίαν παρακαλεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον· πᾶς γὰρ ἂν μαθὼν ἐν ὄπλοις μάχεσθαι ἐπιθυμήσειε καὶ τοῦ ἐξῆς μαθήματος τοῦ περὶ τὰς τάξεις, καὶ ταῦτα λαβῶν καὶ φιλοτιμηθεὶς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ πᾶν ἂν τὸ*

περὶ τὰς στρατηγίας | ὀρμήσειε· καὶ ἤδη δῆλον 182 C
 ὅτι τὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα καὶ μαθήματα πάντα καὶ
 ἐπιτηδεύματα πάντα καὶ καλὰ καὶ πολλοῦ ἄξια
 ἀνδρὶ μαθεῖν τε καὶ ἐπιτηθεῦσαι, ὧν καθηγήσαιτ'
 ἂν τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα. προσθήσομεν δ' αὐτῷ οὐ
 σμικρὰν προσθήκην, ὅτι πάντα ἄνδρα ἐν πολέμῳ
 καὶ θαρράλεώτερον καὶ ἀνδρειότερον ἂν ποιήσειεν
 αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ οὐκ ὀλίγῳ αὕτη ἢ ἐπιστήμη. μὴ
 ἀτιμάσωμεν δὲ εἰπεῖν, εἰ καὶ τῷ σμικρότερον
 δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὅτι καὶ εὐσχημονέστερον ἐνταῦθα οὐ
 χρὴ τὸν ἄνδρα | εὐσχημονέστερον φαίνεσθαι, οὐ D
 ἅμα καὶ δεινότερος τοῖς ἐχθροῖς φανείται διὰ τὴν
 εὐσχημοσύνην. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, ὥσπερ
 λέγω, δοκεῖ τε χρῆναι διδάσκειν τοὺς νεανίσκους
 ταῦτα, καὶ δι' ἃ δοκεῖ εἶρηκα· Λάχητος δ', εἴ τι
 παρὰ ταῦτα λέγει, κἂν αὐτὸς ἠδέως ἀκούσασαιμι.

VI. ΛΑ. Ἄλλ' ἔστι μὲν, ὦ Νικία, χαλεπὸν
 λέγειν περὶ ὄπου οὖν μαθήματος, ὡς οὐ χρὴ μαν-
 θάνειν· πάντα γὰρ ἐπίστασθαι ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι.
 καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ ὀπλιτικὸν τοῦτο, | εἰ μὲν ἔστι μά- E
 θημα, ὅπερ φασὶν οἱ διδάσκοντες, καὶ οἶον Νικίας
 λέγει, χρὴ αὐτὸ μανθάνειν· εἰ δ' ἔστι μὲν μὴ
 μάθημα, ἀλλ' ἐξαπατῶσιν οἱ ὑπισχνούμενοι, ἢ
 μάθημα μὲν τυγχάνει ὄν, μὴ μέντοι πάνυ σπουδαῖον,
 τί καὶ δέοι ἂν αὐτὸ μανθάνειν; λέγω δὲ ταῦτα περὶ
 αὐτοῦ εἰς τὰδε ἀποβλέψας, ὅτι οἶμαι ἐγὼ τοῦτο,
 εἴ τι ἦν, οὐκ ἂν λεληθέναι Λακεδαιμονίους, οἷς οὐδὲν
 ἄλλο μέλει ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἢ τοῦτο ζητεῖν καὶ ἐπι-
 τηδεύειν, ὅ τι ἂν μαθόντες καὶ | ἐπιτηδεύσαντες 183 A

- 183 A** πλεονεκτοῖεν τῶν ἄλλων περὶ τὸν πόλεμον. εἰ δ' ἐκείνους ἐλελήθει, ἀλλ' οὐ τούτους γε τοὺς διδασκάλους αὐτοῦ λέληθεν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὅτι ἐκείνοι μάλιστα τῶν Ἑλλήνων σπουδάξουσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, καὶ ὅτι παρ' ἐκείνοις ἂν τις τιμηθεῖς εἰς ταῦτα καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων πλείστ' ἂν ἐργάζοιτο χρήματα, ὥσπερ γε καὶ τραγωδίας ποιητῆς παρ' ἡμῖν τιμηθεῖς. τοιγάρτοι ὅς ἂν οἴηται τραγωδίαν καλῶς ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἔξωθεν κύκλῳ περὶ τὴν
- B** | Ἀττικὴν κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἐπιδεικνύμενος περιέρχεται, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς δεῦρο φέρεται καὶ τοῖσδ' ἐπιδείκνυσιν. εἰκότως. τοὺς δὲ ἐν ὄπλοις μαχομένους ἐγὼ τούτους ὀρῶ τὴν μὲν Λακεδαίμονα ἡγουμένους εἶναι ἄβατον ἱερὸν καὶ οὐδὲ ἄκρω ποδὶ ἐπιβαίνοντας, κύκλῳ δὲ περιμόντας αὐτὴν καὶ πᾶσι μᾶλλον ἐπιδεικνυμένους, καὶ μάλιστα τούτοις οἳ κἂν αὐτοὶ ὁμολογήσειαν πολλοὺς σφῶν προτέρους εἶναι πρὸς τὰ τοῦ πολέμου.
- C** VII. Ἐπειτα, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, οὐ πάνυ | ὀλίγοις ἐγὼ τούτων παραγέγονα ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἔργῳ, καὶ ὀρῶ οἰοί εἶσιν. ἔξεστι δὲ καὶ αὐτόθεν ἡμῖν σκέψασθαι ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐπίτηδες οὐδεὶς πώποτ' εὐδόκιμος γέγονεν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἀνὴρ τῶν τὰ ὀπλιτικὰ ἐπιτηδευσάντων. καίτοι εἰς γε τᾶλλα πάντα ἐκ τούτων οἱ ὀνομαστοὶ γίνονται, ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτηδευσάντων ἕκαστα· οὗτοι δ', ὡς ἔοικε, παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους οὕτω σφόδρα εἰς τοῦτο δεδυστυχήκασιν. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτον τὸν Στησίλεων, ὃν ὑμεῖς
- D** μετ' ἐμοῦ ἐν τοσοῦτῳ ὄχλῳ ἐθεάσασθε | ἐπιδεικ-

νύμενον καὶ τὰ μεγάλα περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγοντα ἃ 183 D
 ἔλεγεν, ἐτέρωθι ἐγὼ κάλλιον ἐθεασάμην ἐν τῇ
 ἀληθείᾳ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπιδεικνύμενον οὐχ ἐκόντα.
 προσβαλούσης γὰρ τῆς νεῶς ἐφ' ἣ ἐπεβάτευε,
 πρὸς ὀλκάδα τινά, ἐμάχετο ἔχων δορυδρέπανον,
 διαφέρον δὴ ὄπλον ἅτε καὶ αὐτὸς τῶν ἄλλων
 διαφέρων. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα οὐκ ἄξια λέγειν περὶ
 τὰνδρός, τὸ δὲ σόφισμα τὸ τοῦ δρεπάνου τοῦ
 πρὸς τῇ | λόγχῃ οἶον ἀπέβη. μαχομένου γὰρ E
 αὐτοῦ ἐνέσχετό που ἐν τοῖς τῆς νεῶς σκεύεσι
 καὶ ἀντελάβετο. εἶλκεν οὖν ὁ Στησίλεως βουλό-
 μενος ἀπολυῖσαι, καὶ οὐχ οἴός τ' ἦν· ἡ δὲ ναῦς
 τὴν ναῦν παρῆει. τέως μὲν οὖν παρέθει ἐν τῇ
 νηϊ ἀντεχόμενος τοῦ δόρατος. ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ παρ-
 ημείβετο ἡ ναῦς τὴν ναῦν καὶ ἐπέσπα αὐτὸν τοῦ
 δόρατος ἐχόμενον, ἠφίει τὸ δόρυ διὰ τῆς χειρός,
 ἕως ἄκρου τοῦ | στύρακος ἀντελάβετο. ἦν δὲ 184 A
 γέλως καὶ κρότος ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ὀλκάδος ἐπί-
 τε τῷ σχήματι αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐπειδὴ βαλόντος τινὸς
 λίθου παρὰ τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ κατάστρωμα
 ἀφίεται τοῦ δόρατος, τότε ἤδη καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς τρι-
 ἡρους οὐκέτι οἰοί τ' ἦσαν τὸν γέλωτα κατέχειν,
 ὀρῶντες αἰωρούμενον ἐκ τῆς ὀλκάδος τὸ δορυδρέ-
 πανον ἐκεῖνο. ἴσως μὲν οὖν εἴη ἂν τι ταῦτα, ὥσπερ
 Νικίας λέγει· οἷς δ' οὖν ἐγὼ ἐντετύχηκα, τοιαῦτ'
 ἅττα ἐστίν.

VIII. Ὁ οὖν καὶ ἐξ | ἀρχῆς εἶπον, ὅτι εἴτε B
 οὔτω σμικρὰς ὠφελείας ἔχει μάθημα ὄν, εἴτε μὴ
 ὄν φασὶ καὶ προσποιοῦνται αὐτὸ εἶναι μάθημα,

184 B οὐκ ἄξιον ἐπιχειρεῖν μανθάνειν. καὶ γὰρ οὖν μοι δοκεῖ, εἰ μὲν δειλὸς τις ὢν οἶοιτο αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαι, θρασύτερος ἂν δι' αὐτὸ γενόμενος ἐπιφανέστερος γένοιτο οἷος ἦν· εἰ δὲ ἀνδρείος, φυλαττόμενος ἂν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἰ καὶ σμικρὸν ἔξαμάρτοι, μεγάλας ἂν διαβολὰς ἴσχειν· ἐπίφθονος γὰρ ἢ **C** προσποιήσις τῆς τοιαύτης | ἐπιστήμης, ὥστ' εἰ μὴ τι θαυμαστὸν ὅσον διαφέρει τῇ ἀρετῇ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ἂν τις φύγοι τὸ καταγέλαστος γενέσθαι, φάσκων ἔχειν ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην. τοιαύτη τις ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, ἢ περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα εἶναι σπουδὴ· χρὴ δ' ὅπερ σοι ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλεγον, καὶ Σωκράτη τόνδε μὴ ἀφιέναι, ἀλλὰ δεῖσθαι συμβουλεύειν ὅπῃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ περὶ τοῦ προκειμένου.

D ΔΥ. Ἀλλὰ δέομαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἔτι τοῦ διακρινουῦντος δοκεῖ | μοι δεῖν ἡμῖν ἢ βουλή. εἰ μὲν γὰρ συνεφερέσθην τῷδε, ἦπτον ἂν τοῦ τοιούτου ἔδει· νῦν δὲ τὴν ἐναντίαν γάρ, ὡς ὀρᾶς, Λάχης Νικία ἔθετο· εὐ δὴ ἔχει ἀκούσαι καὶ σοῦ, ποτέρῳ τοῖν ἀνδροῖν σύμψηφος εἶ.

IΧ. ΣΩ. Τί δαί, ὦ Λυσίμαχε; ὀπότερ' ἂν οἱ πλείους ἐπαινῶσιν ἡμῶν, τούτοις μέλλεις χρῆσθαι;

ΔΥ. Τί γὰρ ἂν τις καὶ ποιοῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ σύ, ὦ Μελησία, οὕτως ἂν ποιοῖς;

E κὰν εἴ τις περὶ ἀγωνίας τοῦ | υἱέος σοι βουλή εἴη τί χρὴ ἀσκεῖν, ἄρα τοῖς πλείοσιν ἂν ἡμῶν πείθοιο, ἢ 'κείνῳ ὅστις τυγχάνει ὑπὸ παιδοτρίβῃ ἀγαθῷ πεπαιδευμένος καὶ ἡσκηκῶς;

ΜΕ. Ἐκείνω εἰκός γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Αὐτῷ ἄρ' ἂν μάλλον πείθιο ἢ τέτταρσιν οὔσιν ἡμῖν;

ΜΕ. Ἴσως.

184 E

ΣΩ. Ἐπιστήμη γάρ, οἶμαι, δεῖ κρίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ πλήθει, τὸ μέλλον καλῶς κριθήσεσθαι.

ΜΕ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν χρὴ πρῶτον αὐτὸ τοῦτο σκέψασθαι, εἰ ἔστι τις ἡμῶν τεχνικός περὶ οὗ | βουλευόμεθα, ἢ οὔ· καὶ εἰ μὲν ἔστιν, ἐκείνω 185 A πείθεσθαι ἐνὶ ὄντι, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους εἶαν· εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλον τινὰ ζητεῖν. ἢ περὶ σμικροῦ οἴεσθε νυνὶ κινδυνεύειν καὶ σὺ καὶ Λυσίμαχος, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ τούτου τοῦ κτήματος ὃ τῶν ὑμετέρων μέγιστον ὄν τυγχάνει; υἱέων γάρ που ἢ χρηστῶν ἢ τάναντία γενομένων καὶ πᾶς ὁ οἶκος ὁ τοῦ πατρὸς οὕτως οἰκῆσεται, ὁποῖοι ἂν τινες οἱ παῖδες γένωνται.

ΜΕ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Πολλὴν ἄρα δεῖ προμήθειαν αὐτοῦ ἔχειν.

ΜΕ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Πῶς | οὖν, ὃ ἐγὼ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ἐσκοποῦμεν B ἂν, εἰ ἐβουλόμεθα σκέψασθαι τίς ἡμῶν περὶ ἀγωνίαν τεχνικώτατος; ἄρ' οὐχ ὁ μαθὼν καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσας, ᾧ καὶ διδάσκαλοι ἀγαθοὶ γεγονότες ἦσαν αὐτοῦ τούτου;

ΜΕ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἔτι πρότερον, τίνος ὄντος τούτου οὗ ζητοῦμεν τοὺς διδασκάλους;

ΜΕ. Πῶς λέγεις;

185 B X. ΣΩ. ᾧδε ἴσως μᾶλλον κατάδηλον ἔσται. οὐ μοι δοκεῖ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἡμῖν ὠμολογήσθαι, τί ποτ' ἔστι περὶ οὗ βουλευόμεθα καὶ σκεπτόμεθα, ὅστις C ἡμῶν τεχνικός καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα διδασκάλους | ἐκ-
τήσατο, καὶ ὅστις μή.

ΝΙ. Οὐ γὰρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ τοῦ ἐν ὄπλοις μάχεσθαι σκοποῦμεν, εἴτε χρῆ αὐτὸ τοὺς νεανίσκους μαθάνειν εἴτε μή;

ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Νικία. ἀλλ' ὅταν περὶ φαρμάκου τις τοῦ πρὸς ὀφθαλμοὺς σκοπῆται, εἴτε χρῆ αὐτὸ ὑπαλείφεισθαι εἴτε μή, πότερον οἶε τότε εἶναι τὴν βουλήν περὶ τοῦ φαρμάκου ἢ περὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν;

ΝΙ. Περὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν.

D ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅταν ἵππῳ | χαλινον σκοπῆταιί
τις εἰ προσοιστέον ἢ μή, καὶ ὁπότε, τότε πού περὶ
τοῦ ἵππου βουλευέται ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ τοῦ χαλινού;

ΝΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐνὶ λόγῳ, ὅταν τίς τι ἕνεκά του σκοπῆ, περὶ ἐκείνου ἢ βουλή τυγχάνει οὕσα οὐ ἕνεκα ἐσκόπει, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ τοῦ ὃ ἕνεκα ἄλλου ἐξήτει.

ΝΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Δεῖ ἄρα καὶ τὸν σύμβουλον σκοπεῖν, ἅρα τεχνικός ἐστίν εἰς ἐκείνου θεραπείαν οὗ ἕνεκα σκοπούμενοι σκοποῦμεν.

ΝΙ. Πάνυ γε.

E ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν νῦν φάμεν | περι μαθήματος σκοπεῖν
τῆς ψυχῆς ἕνεκα τῆς τῶν νεανίσκων.

ΝΙ. Ναί.

185 E

ΣΩ. Εἴ τις ἄρα ἡμῶν τεχνικὸς περὶ ψυχῆς θεραπείαν καὶ οἴός τε καλῶς τοῦτο θεραπεῦσαι, καὶ ὅτῳ διδάσκαλοι ἀγαθοὶ γέγονασιν, τοῦτο σκεπτέον.

ΛΑ. Τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὔπω ἑώρακας ἄνευ διδασκάλων τεχνικωτέρους γεγονότας εἰς ἕνια ἢ μετὰ διδασκάλων;

ΣΩ. Ἐγωγε, ὦ Λάχης· οἷς γε σὺ οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοις πιστεῦσαι, εἰ φαῖεν ἀγαθοὶ εἶναι δημιουργοί, εἰ μὴ τί σοι τῆς αὐτῶν τέχνης ἔργον ἔχοιεν ἐπιδείξαι εὖ εἰργασμένον, | καὶ ἐν καὶ πλείω.

186 A

ΛΑ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

XI. ΣΩ. Καὶ ἡμᾶς ἄρα δεῖ, ὦ Λάχης τε καὶ Νικία, ἐπειδὴ Λυσίμαχος καὶ Μελησίας εἰς συμβουλήν παρεκαλεσάτην ἡμᾶς περὶ τοῖν υἱέοιν, προθυμούμενοι αὐτοῖν ὅ τι ἀρίστας γενέσθαι τὰς ψυχὰς, εἰ μὲν φάμεν ἔχειν, ἐπιδείξαι αὐτοῖς καὶ διδασκάλους οἵτινες ἡμῶν γέγονασιν, οἱ αὐτοὶ πρῶτοι ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες καὶ πολλῶν νέων τεθεραπευκότες ψυχὰς ἔπειτα καὶ ἡμᾶς διδάξαντες φαίνονται | ἢ εἴ τις ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἑαυτῷ διδάσκαλον μὲν **B** οὐ φησι γεγονέναι, ἀλλ' οὖν ἔργα αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ ἔχει εἰπεῖν, καὶ ἐπιδείξαι τίνες Ἀθηναίων ἢ τῶν ξένων, ἢ δοῦλοι ἢ ἐλεύθεροι, δι' ἐκείνον ὁμολογουμένως ἀγαθοὶ γέγονασιν· εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἡμῖν τούτων ὑπάρχει, ἄλλους κελεύειν ζητεῖν καὶ μὴ ἐν ἐταίρων ἀνδρῶν υἱέσι κινδυνεύειν διαφθείροντας τὴν μεγίστην αἰτίαν ἔχει ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκειοτάτων. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Λυσίμαχέ τε καὶ Μελησία, πρῶτος περὶ ἑμαντοῦ

- 186 C** λέγω ὅτι | διδάσκαλός μοι οὐ γέγονε τούτου περι-
καίτοι ἐπιθυμῶ γε τοῦ πράγματος ἐκ νέου ἀρξά-
μενος. ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν σοφισταῖς οὐκ ἔχω τελείν
μισθούς, οἵπερ μόνοι ἐπηγγέλλοντό με οἰοί τ'
εἶναι ποιῆσαι καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν· αὐτὸς δ' αὖ
εὐρεῖν τὴν τέχνην ἀδυνατῶ ἔτι νυνί. εἰ δὲ Νικίας
ἢ Λάχης εὗρηκεν ἢ μεμάθηκεν, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι·
καὶ γὰρ χρήμασιν ἐμοῦ δυνατώτεροι, ὥστε μαθεῖν
παρ' ἄλλων, καὶ ἅμα πρεσβύτεροι, ὥστε ἤδη εὐρη-
κέναι. δοκοῦσι δὴ μοι δυνατοὶ εἶναι παιδεῦσαι
- D** | ἄνθρωπον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε ἀδεῶς ἀπεφαίνοντο
περὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων νέῳ χρηστῶν τε καὶ πονηρῶν,
εἰ μὴ αὐτοῖς ἐπίστευον ἰκανῶς εἰδέναί. τὰ μὲν οὖν
ἄλλα ἔγωγε τούτοις πιστεύω· ὅτι δὲ διαφέρεσθον
ἀλλήλοιν, ἐθαύμασα. τοῦτο οὖν σου ἐγὼ ἀντιδέ-
ομαι, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, καθάπερ ἄρτι Λάχης μὴ
ἀφίεσθαί σε ἐμοῦ διεκελεύετο ἀλλὰ ἐρωτᾶν, καὶ
ἐγὼ νῦν παρακελεύομαί σοι μὴ ἀφίεσθαι Λάχηςτος
μηδὲ Νικίου, ἀλλ' ἐρωτᾶν, λέγοντα ὅτι Ὁ μὲν
- E** Σωκράτης | οὗ φησιν ἐπαίειν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος,
οὐδ' ἰκανὸς εἶναι διακρίναι ὁπότερος ὑμῶν ἀληθῆ
λέγει· οὔτε γὰρ εὐρετῆς οὔτε μαθητῆς οὐδενὸς περὶ
τῶν τοιούτων γεγονέναι· σὺ δ', ὦ Λάχης καὶ Νικία,
εἶπετον ἡμῖν ἑκάτερος, τίτι δὴ δεινοτάτῳ συγγεγό-
νατον περὶ τῆς τῶν νέων τροφῆς, καὶ πότερα
μαθόντε παρά του ἐπίστασθον ἢ αὐτῶ ἐξευρόντε,
καὶ εἰ μὲν μαθόντε, τίς ὁ διδάσκαλος ἑκατέρῳ καὶ
- 187 A** τίνες ἄλλοι | ὁμοτέχνοι αὐτοῖς, ἵν', ἂν μὴ ὑμῖν
σχολῆ ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων, ἐπ'

ἐκείνους ἴωμεν καὶ πείθωμεν ἢ δώροις ἢ χάρισιν ἢ 187 A
 ἀμφότερα ἐπιμεληθῆναι καὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων καὶ τῶν
 ὑμετέρων παίδων, ὅπως μὴ καταισχύνωσι τοὺς
 αὐτῶν προγόνους φαῦλοι γενόμενοι· εἰ δ' αὐτοὶ
 εὔρεταὶ γεγονότε τοῦ τοιούτου, δότε παράδειγμα,
 τίνων ἤδη ἄλλων ἐπιμεληθέντες ἐκ φαύλων καλοὺς
 τε κἀγαθοὺς ἐποιήσατε. εἰ γὰρ νῦν πρῶτον ἄρξε-
 σθε | παιδεύειν, σκοπεῖν χρὴ μὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ Καρὶ B
 ὑμῖν ὁ κίνδυνος κινδυνεύηται, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς υἷεσι τε
 καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῶν φίλων παισὶ, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὸ λεγό-
 μενον κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ὑμῖν συμβαίη, ἐν πίστῳ ἢ
 κεραμείᾳ γιγνομένη. λέγετε οὖν, τί τούτων ἢ φατὲ
 ὑμῖν ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ προσήκειν, ἢ οὐ φατε. Ταῦτ',
 ὦ Λυσίμαχε, παρ' αὐτῶν πυνθάνου τε καὶ μὴ μεθίει
 τοὺς ἄνδρας.

XII. ΛΥ. Καλῶς μὲν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ ἄνδρες,
 Σωκράτης λέγειν· εἰ δὲ βουλομένοις ὑμῖν ἐστὶ | περὶ C
 τῶν τοιούτων ἐρωτᾶσθαί τε καὶ διδόναι λόγον,
 αὐτοὺς δὴ χρὴ γινώσκειν, ὦ Νικία τε καὶ Λάχης.
 ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ Μελησία τῷδε δῆλον ὅτι ἠδομένοις
 ἂν εἴη, εἰ πάντα, ἃ Σωκράτης ἐρωτᾷ, ἐθέλοιτε
 λόγῳ διεξιέναι· καὶ γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐντεῦθεν ἠρχόμεν
 λέγων, ὅτι εἰς συμβουλήν διὰ ταῦτα ὑμᾶς παρακαλέ-
 σαιμεν, ὅτι μεμεληκέναι ὑμῖν ἠγούμεθα, ὡς εἰκός,
 περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ἄλλως καὶ ἐπειδὴ οἱ παῖδες
 ὑμῖν ὀλίγου, ὥσπερ οἱ ἡμέτεροι, ἠλικίαν | ἔχουσι D
 παιδεύεσθαι. εἰ οὖν ὑμῖν μὴ τι διαφέρει, εἶπατε
 καὶ κοινῇ μετὰ Σωκράτους σκέψασθε, διδόντες τε καὶ
 δεχόμενοι λόγον παρ' ἀλλήλων· εὐ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο

187 D λέγει ὁδε, ὅτι περὶ τοῦ μεγίστου νῦν βουλευόμεθα τῶν ἡμετέρων. ἀλλ' ὀράτε εἰ δοκεῖ χρῆναι οὕτω ποιεῖν.

E ΝΙ. ὦ Λυσίμαχε, δοκεῖς μοι ὡς ἀληθῶς Σωκράτη πατρόθεν γινώσκειν μόνον, αὐτῷ δ' οὐ συγγεγονέναι ἀλλ' ἢ παιδὶ ὄντι, εἴ που ἐν | τοῖς δημόταις μετὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκολουθῶν ἐπλησίασέ σοι ἢ ἐν ἱερῷ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ τῷ συλλόγῳ τῶν δημοτῶν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ πρεσβύτερος γέγονεν, οὐκ ἐντετυχηκῶς τῷ ἀνδρὶ δῆλος ἔτι εἶ.

ΔΥ. Τί μάλιστα, ὦ Νικία;

XIII. ΝΙ. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖς εἰδέναί ὅτι ὅς ἂν ἐγγύτατα Σωκράτους ἢ λόγῳ ὥσπερ γένοι καὶ πλησιάξῃ διαλεγόμενος, ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ, εἰ ἄρα καὶ περὶ ἄλλου του πρότερον ἄρξῃται διαλέγεσθαι, μὴ παύεσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου περιεγόμενον τῷ λόγῳ, πρὶν ἂν ἐμπέσῃ εἰς τὸ διδόναι περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγον, ὄντινα

188 A τρόπον νῦν τε ζῆ καὶ ὄντινα τὸν | παρεληλυθότα βίον βεβίωκεν· ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐμπέσῃ, ὅτι οὐ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀφήσει Σωκράτης, πρὶν ἂν βασανίσῃ ταῦτα εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς ἅπαντα. ἐγὼ δὲ συνήθης τέ εἰμι τῷδε καὶ οἶδ' ὅτι ἀνάγκη ὑπὸ τούτου πάσχειν ταῦτα, καὶ ἔτι γε αὐτὸς ὅτι πείσομαι ταῦτα εὖ οἶδα· χαίρω γάρ, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, τῷ ἀνδρὶ πλησιάξων, καὶ οὐδὲν οἶμαι κακὸν εἶναι τὸ ὑπομιμνήσκεσθαι ὅ τι

B μὴ καλῶς ἢ πεποιήκαμεν | ἢ ποιούμεν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα βίον προμηθέστερον ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸν ταῦτα μὴ φεύγοντα, ἀλλ' ἐθέλοντα κατὰ τὸ τοῦ Σόλωνος καὶ ἀξιούντα μαυθάνειν ἕωςπερ ἂν ζῆ, καὶ μὴ

οιόμενον αὐτῷ τὸ γῆρας νοῦν ἔχον προσίεσθαι. 188 B
 ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν ἀηθες οὐδ' αὐτὴ ἀηδὲς ὑπὸ Σωκρά-
 τους βασανίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάλαι σχεδόν τι
 ἠπιστάμην ὅτι οὐ περὶ τῶν μειρακίων ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος
 ἔσοιτο Σωκράτους παρόντος, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἡμῶν
 αὐτῶν. ὅπερ οὖν λέγω, | τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει C
 Σωκράτει συνδιατρίβειν ὅπως οὗτος βούλεται
 Λάχητα δὲ τόνδε ὄρα ὅπως ἔχει περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου.

XIV. ΛΑ. Ἀπλοῦν τό γ' ἐμόν, ὦ Νικία, περὶ
 λόγων ἐστίν· εἰ δὲ βούλει, οὐχ ἀπλοῦν, ἀλλὰ
 διπλοῦν. καὶ γὰρ ἂν δόξαιμί τῳ φιλόλογος εἶναι
 καὶ αὐτὸν μισόλογος. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἀκούω ἀνδρὸς
 περὶ ἀρετῆς διαλεγομένου ἢ περὶ τινος σοφίας ὡς
 ἀληθῶς ὄντος ἀνδρὸς καὶ ἀξίου τῶν λόγων ὧν λέγει,
 χαίρω ὑπερφυῶς, θεώμενος ἅμα | τὸν τε λέγοντα D
 καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα ὅτι πρέποντα ἀλλήλοις καὶ
 ἀρμόττοντά ἐστι καὶ κομιδῇ μοι δοκεῖ μουσικὸς
 ὁ τοιοῦτος εἶναι, ἀρμονίαν καλλίστην ἡρμωσμένος
 οὐ λύραν οὐδὲ παιδιᾶς ὄργανα, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ζῆν
 ἡρμωσμένος [οὔ] αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τὸν βίον σύμφωνον
 τοῖς λόγοις πρὸς τὰ ἔργα, ἀτεχνῶς δωριστὶ ἀλλ'
 οὐκ ἰαστὶ, οἴομαι δὲ οὐδὲ φρυγιστὶ οὐδὲ λυδιστὶ,
 ἀλλ' ἤπερ μόνη Ἑλληνικὴ ἐστὶν ἀρμονία. ὁ μὲν
 οὖν τοιοῦτος χαίρει με ποιεῖ φθεγγόμενος καὶ
 δοκεῖν | ὅτφουν φιλόλογον εἶναι· οὕτω σφόδρα E
 ἀποδέχομαι παρ' αὐτοῦ τὰ λεγόμενα· ὁ δὲ τὰ-
 ναντία τούτου πράττων λυπεῖ με, ὅσῳ ἂν δοκῇ
 ἄμεινον λέγειν, τοσοῦτῳ μᾶλλον, καὶ ποιεῖ αὐ-
 δοκεῖν εἶναι μισόλογον. Σωκράτους δ' ἐγὼ τῶν

188 E μὲν λογῶν οὐκ ἔμπειρός εἰμι, ἀλλὰ πρότερον, ὡς ἔοικε, τῶν ἔργων ἐπειράθην, καὶ ἐκεῖ αὐτὸν εὔρον

189 A ἄξιον ὄντα λόγων καλῶν καὶ πάσης | παρρήσιας. εἰ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ἔχει, συμβούλομαι τάνδρῃ, καὶ ἡδιστ' ἂν ἐξεταζοίμην ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀχθοίμην μανθάνων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐγὼ τῷ Σόλωνι, ἐν μόνον προσλαβὼν, ξυγχωρῶ· γηράσκων γὰρ πολλὰ διδάσκεσθαι ἐθέλω ὑπὸ χρηστῶν μόνον. τοῦτο γὰρ μοι συγχωρεῖτω, ἀγαθὸν καὶ αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν διδάσκαλον, ἵνα μὴ δυσμαθῆς φαίνωμαι ἀηδῶς μανθάνων. εἰ δὲ νεώτερος ὁ διδάσκων ἔσται ἢ μήπω ἐν δόξῃ ὧν

B ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων | ἔχων, οὐδέν μοι μέλει. σοὶ οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ ἐπαγγέλλομαι καὶ διδάσκειν καὶ ἐλέγχειν ἐμὲ ὅ τι ἂν βούλη, καὶ μανθάνειν γε ὅ τι αὐτὸ ἐγὼ οἶδα· οὕτω σὺ παρ' ἐμοὶ διάκεισαι ἀπ' ἐκείνης τῆς ἡμέρας, ἧ μετ' ἐμοῦ συνδιεκινδύνευσας καὶ ἔδωκας σαυτοῦ πείραν ἀρετῆς, ἣν χρὴ διδόναι τὸν μέλλοντα δικαίως δώσειν. λέγ' οὖν ὅ τί σοι φίλον, μηδὲν τὴν ἡμετέραν ἡλικίαν ὑπόλογον ποιούμενος.

C XV. ΣΩ. Οὐ τὰ ὑμέτερα, ὡς ἔοικεν, | αἰτιασόμεθα μὴ οὐχ ἔτοιμα εἶναι καὶ συμβουλεύειν καὶ συσκοπεῖν.

ΛΥ. Ἄλλ' ἡμέτερον δὴ ἔργον, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἕνα γάρ σε ἔγωγε ἡμῶν τίθημι· σκόπει οὖν ἀντ' ἐμοῦ ὑπὲρ τῶν νεανίσκων ὅ τι δεόμεθα παρὰ τῶνδε πυνθάνεσθαι, καὶ συμβούλευε διαλεγόμενος τούτοις. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιλανθάνομαι ἤδη τὰ πολλὰ διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ὧν ἂν διανοηθῶ ἐρέσθαι καὶ αὐτὰ ἂν ἀκούσω· εἰ δὲ μεταξὺ ἄλλοι λόγοι γένωνται, οὐ

πάνυ μέμνημαι. ὑμεῖς οὖν λέγετε καὶ διέξιτε πρὸς 189 C
 ὑμᾶς | αὐτοὺς περὶ ὧν προϋθέμεθα· ἐγὼ δ' ἀκούσομαι D
 καὶ ἀκούσας αὐτὰ μετὰ Μελησίου τοῦδε ποιήσω τοῦτο
 ὅ τι ἂν καὶ ὑμῖν δοκῇ.

ΣΩ. Πειστέον, ὦ Νικία τε καὶ Λάχης, Λυσιμάχῳ
 καὶ Μελησίᾳ. ἃ μὲν οὖν νῦν δὴ ἐπεχειρήσαμεν
 σκοπεῖν, τίνες οἱ διδάσκαλοι ἡμῖν τῆς τοιαύτης
 παιδείας γεγόνασιν ἢ τίνας ἄλλους βελτίους
 πεποιήκαμεν, ἴσως μὲν οὐ κακῶς ἔχει ἐξετάζειν καὶ
 τὰ τοιαῦτα | ἡμᾶς αὐτούς· ἀλλ' οἶμαι, καὶ ἡ τοιάδε E
 σκέψις εἰς ταῦτόν φέρει, σχεδὸν δέ τι καὶ μᾶλλον
 ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἶη ἂν. εἰ γὰρ τυγχάνομεν ἐπιστάμενοι
 ὅτουοῦν πέρι, ὅτι παραγενομένον τῷ βέλτιον ποιεῖ
 ἐκείνο ὃ παρεγένετο, καὶ προσέτι οἰοί τέ εἶμεν
 αὐτὸ ποιεῖν παραγίγεσθαι ἐκείνῳ, δῆλον ὅτι αὐτό
 γε ἴσμεν τοῦτο, οὐ πέρι σύμβουλοι ἂν γενοίμεθα
 ὡς ἂν τις αὐτὸ ῥᾶστα καὶ ἄριστ' ἂν κτήσαιοτο.
 ἴσως οὖν οὐ μανθάνετε μου ὅ τι λέγω, ἀλλ' ὦδε
 ῥᾶον μαθήσεσθε. εἰ τυγχάνομεν ἐπιστάμενοι ὅτι
 ὄψις παραγενομένη | ὀφθαλμοῖς βελτίους ποιεῖ 190 A
 ἐκείνους οἷς παρεγένετο, καὶ προσέτι οἰοί τέ εἶμεν
 ποιεῖν αὐτὴν παραγίγεσθαι ὄμμασι, δῆλον ὅτι
 ὄψιν γε ἴσμεν αὐτὴν ὅ τί ποτ' ἔστιν, ἧς πέρι
 σύμβουλοι ἂν γενοίμεθα ὡς ἂν τις αὐτὴν ῥᾶστα
 καὶ ἄριστα κτήσαιοτο. εἰ γὰρ μηδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο
 εἰδείημεν ὅ τί ποτ' ἔστιν ὄψις ἢ ὅ τι ἔστιν ἀκοή,
 σχολῇ ἂν σύμβουλοί γε ἄξιοι λόγου γενοίμεθα
 καὶ ἰατροὶ ἢ περὶ ὀφθαλμῶν ἢ περὶ ὠτῶν, ὄντινα
 τρόπον ἀκοὴν ἢ ὄψιν | κάλλιστ' ἂν κτήσαιοτό τις. B

190 B ΛΑ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

XVI. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Λάχης, καὶ νῦν ἡμᾶς τώδε παρακαλείτον εἰς συμβουλήν, τίν' ἂν τρόπον τοῖς υἱέσιν αὐτῶν ἀρετὴ παραγενομένη ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἀμείνους ποιήσειεν ;

ΛΑ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν τοῦτό γ' ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, τὸ εἰδέναί ὃ τί ποτ' ἔστιν ἀρετὴ ; εἰ γὰρ που μὴδ' ἀρετὴν εἰδεῖμεν τὸ παράπαν ὃ τί ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν, τίν' ἂν τρόπον τούτου σύμβουλοι γεινοίμεθα ὄτῳ οὖν,

C | ὅπως ἂν αὐτὸ κάλλιστα κτήσαιο ;

ΛΑ. Οὐδένα, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Φαμέν ἄρα, ὦ Λάχης, εἰδέναί αὐτὸ ὃ τι ἔστιν.

ΛΑ. Φαμέν μέντοι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὃ γε ἴσμεν, καὶ εἴπομεν δῆπου τί ἔστιν.

ΛΑ. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ ;

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄριστε, περὶ ὅλης ἀρετῆς εὐθέως σκοπώμεθα—πλέον γὰρ ἴσως ἔργον—, ἀλλὰ μέρους τινὸς πέρι πρῶτον ἰδῶμεν, εἰ ἱκανῶς ἔχομεν
D πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναί· καὶ ἡμῖν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, | ῥάων ἢ σκέψεις ἔσται.

ΛΑ. Ἀλλ' οὕτω ποιῶμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς σὺ βούλει.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ἂν προελοίμεθα τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μερῶν ; ἢ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι τοῦτο εἰς ὃ τείνειν δοκεῖ ἢ ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις μάθησις ; δοκεῖ δέ που τοῖς πολλοῖς εἰς ἀνδρείαν. ἢ γάρ ;

ΛΑ. Καὶ μάλα δὴ οὕτω δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοῖνυν πρῶτον ἐπιχειρήσωμεν, ὦ **190 D**
 Λάχης, εἰπεῖν, ἀνδρεία τί ποτ' ἐστίν· ἔπειτα μετὰ
 τοῦτο σκεψόμεθα καὶ ὅτῳ ἂν τρόπῳ τοῖς νεανίσκοις
 | παραγένοιτο, καθ' ὅσον οἶόν τε ἐξ ἐπιτηδευμάτων **E**
 τε καὶ μαθημάτων παραγενέσθαι. ἄλλα πειρῶ
 εἰπεῖν ὃ λέγω, τί ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία.

XVII. ΛΑ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ
 χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν· εἰ γάρ τις ἐθέλοι ἐν τῇ τάξει
 μένων ἀμύνεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ μὴ φεύγει, εὖ
 ἴσθι ὅτι ἀνδρείος ἂν εἴη.

ΣΩ. Εὖ μὲν λέγεις, ὦ Λάχης· ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐγὼ
 αἴτιος, οὐ σαφῶς εἰπὼν, τὸ σὲ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὴ
 τοῦτο ὃ διανοούμενος ἠρόμην, ἀλλ' ἕτερον.

ΛΑ. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ φράσω, | ἐὰν οἶός τε γένωμαι. ἀνδρείός **191 A**
 που οὗτος ὢν καὶ σὺ λέγεις, ὃς ἂν ἐν τῇ τάξει μένων
 μάχηται τοῖς πολεμίοις.

ΛΑ. Ἐγὼ γοῦν φημί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ τί αὐτὸ ὅδε, ὃς ἂν
 φεύγων μάχηται τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀλλὰ μὴ μένων;

ΛΑ. Πῶς φεύγων;

ΣΩ. Ὡσπερ που καὶ Σκύθαι λέγονται οὐχ ἦττον
 φεύγοντες ἢ διώκοντες μάχεσθαι, καὶ Ὅμηρός που
 ἐπαινῶν τοὺς τοῦ Αἰνείου ἵππους κραιπνὰ μάλ'
 ἔνθα καὶ | ἔνθα ἔφη αὐτοὺς ἐπίστασθαι διώ- **B**
 κειν ἢ δὲ φέβεσθαι. καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν Αἰνεῖαν
 κατὰ τοῦτ' ἐνεκωμίασε, κατὰ τὴν τοῦ φόβου
 ἐπιστήμην, καὶ εἶπεν αὐτὸν εἶναι μήστῳρα
 φόβοιο.

191 B ΛΑ. Καὶ καλῶς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες· περὶ ἀρμάτων γὰρ ἔλεγε. καὶ σὺ τὸ τῶν Σκυθῶν ἰππέων πέρι λέγεις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἰππικὸν τὸ ἐκείνων οὕτω μάχεται, τὸ δὲ ὀπλιτικὸν τό γε τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω.

ΣΩ. Πλήν γ' ἴσως, ὦ Λάχης, τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων
C Λακεδαιμονίους | γὰρ φασιν ἐν Πλαταιαῖς, ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τοῖς γεβρόφοροις ἐγένοντο, οὐκ ἐθέλειν μένοντας πρὸς αὐτοὺς μάχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ φεύγειν, ἐπειδὴ ὁ ἐλύθησαν αἱ τάξεις τῶν Περσῶν, ἀναστρεφόμενους ὥσπερ ἰππέας μάχεσθαι καὶ οὕτω νικῆσαι τὴν ἐκεῖ μάχην.

ΛΑ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

XVIII. ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν αἴτιον ἔλεγον, ὅτι ἐγὼ αἴτιος μὴ καλῶς σε ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι οὐ καλῶς ἠρόμην. βουλόμενος γὰρ σου πυθέσθαι μὴ
D μόνον | τοὺς ἐν τῷ ὀπλιτικῷ ἀνδρείους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ ἰππικῷ καὶ ἐν ξύμπαντι τῷ πολεμικῷ εἶδει, καὶ μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν κινδύνοις ἀνδρείους ὄντας, καὶ ὅσοι γε πρὸς νόσους καὶ ὅσοι πρὸς πείνας ἢ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ ἀνδρείοί εἰσι, καὶ ἔτι αὖ μὴ μόνον ὅσοι πρὸς λύπας ἀνδρείοί εἰσιν ἢ φόβους, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας ἢ ἡδονὰς δεινοὶ μάχεσθαι, καὶ μένοντες ἢ ἀναστρέφοντες—
E εἰσὶ γὰρ πού | τινες, ὦ Λάχης, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνδρείοι.

ΛΑ. Καὶ σφόδρα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνδρείοι μὲν πάντες οὗτοί εἰσιν, ἀλλ'

οἱ μὲν ἐν ἡδοναῖς, οἱ δ' ἐν λύπαις, οἱ δ' ἐν ἐπιθυμίαις, 191 E
οἱ δ' ἐν φόβοις τὴν ἀνδρείαν κέκτηνται· οἱ δέ γ',
οἶμαι, δειλίαν ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις.

ΛΑ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί ποτε ὄν ἐκάτερον τούτων, τοῦτο ἐπυνθαν-
νόμην. πάλιν οὖν πειρῶ εἰπεῖν ἀνδρείαν πρῶτον, τί
ὄν ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ταῦτόν ἐστιν. ἢ οὐπω κατα-
μανθάνεις ὃ λέγω;

ΛΑ. Οὐ πάνυ τι.

XIX. ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ὧδε λέγω, | ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ 192 A
τάχος ἡρώτων τί ποτ' ἐστίν, ὃ καὶ ἐν τῷ τρέχειν
τυγχάνει ὄν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ κιθαρίζειν καὶ ἐν τῷ
λέγειν καὶ ἐν τῷ μανθάνειν καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις πολλοῖς,
καὶ σχεδόν τι αὐτὸ κекτήμεθα, οὐ καὶ πέρι ἄξιον
λέγειν, ἢ ἐν ταῖς τῶν χειρῶν πράξεσιν ἢ σκελῶν ἢ
στόματός τε καὶ φωνῆς ἢ διανοίας. ἢ οὐχ οὕτω καὶ
σὺ λέγεις;

ΛΑ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Εἰ τοίνυν τίς με ἔροιτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, τί
λέγεις τοῦτο ὃ ἐν πᾶσιν ὀνομάζεις ταχυτῆτα εἶναι;
εἵπομ' ἂν | αὐτῷ ὅτι τὴν ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ πολλὰ B
διαπραπτομένην δύναμιν ταχυτῆτα ἔγωγε καλῶ
καὶ περὶ φωνὴν καὶ περὶ δρόμον καὶ περὶ τᾶλλα
πάντα.

ΛΑ. Ὅρθῶς γε σὺ λέγων.

ΣΩ. Πειρῶ δὴ καὶ σύ, ὦ Λάχης, τὴν ἀνδρείαν οὕ-
τως εἰπεῖν, τίς οὐσα δύναμις ἢ αὐτὴ ἐν ἡδονῇ καὶ ἐν
λύπῃ καὶ ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν αὐτὴν εἶναι,
ἔπειτα ἀνδρεία κέκληται.

192 B ΛΑ. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι καρτερία τις εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, εἰ τό γε διὰ πάντων περὶ ἀνδρείας πεφυκὸς δεῖ εἰπεῖν.

C ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ | μὴν δεῖ, εἴ γε τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρινόμεθα ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔμοιγε φαίνεται· οὐ τι πᾶσά γε, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, καρτερία ἀνδρεία σοι φαίνεται. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐνθένδ᾽· σχεδὸν γάρ τι οἶδα, ὧ Λάχης, ὅτι τῶν πάνυ καλῶν πραγμάτων ἡγεῖ σὺ ἀνδρείαν εἶναι.

ΛΑ. Εὖ μὲν οὖν ἴσθι ὅτι τῶν καλλίστων.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ μὲν μετὰ φρονήσεως καρτερια καλὴ καγαθῆ.

ΛΑ. Πάνυ γε.

D ΣΩ. Τί δ' | ἢ μετ' ἀφροσύνης; οὐ τούναντίον ταύτῃ βλαβερά καὶ κακοῦργος;

ΛΑ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καλὸν οὖν τι φήσεις σὺ εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὃν κακοῦργόν τε καὶ βλαβερόν;

ΛΑ. Οὐκοῦν δίκαιόν γε; ὧ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα τήν γε τοιαύτην καρτερίαν ἀνδρείαν ὁμολογήσεις εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ περ οὐ καλὴ ἐστίν, ἢ δὲ ἀνδρεία καλὸν ἐστίν.

ΛΑ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἡ φρόνιμος ἄρα καρτερία κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον ἀνδρεία ἂν εἴη.

ΛΑ. Ἐοικεν.

E ΧΧ. ΣΩ. Ἴδωμεν | δὴ, ἢ εἰς τί φρόνιμος; ἢ ἢ εἰς ἅπαντα καὶ τὰ μεγάλα καὶ τὰ σμικρά; οἷον εἴ τις καρτερεῖ ἀναλίσκων ἀργύριον φρονίμως, εἰδὼς

ὅτι ἀναλώσας πλεονεκτήσεται, τοῦτον ἀνδρείον 192 Ε
καλοῖς ἄν.

ΛΑ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οἶον εἴ τις ἰατρὸς ὢν, περιπλευμονίᾳ
τοῦ υἱέος ἐχομένου ἢ ἄλλου τινός καὶ δεομένου πιεῖν
ἢ φαγεῖν δοῦναι, μὴ κάμπτοιτο ἀλλὰ | καρτεροῖ; 193 Α

ΛΑ. Οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν οὐδ' αὐτή.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐν πολέμῳ καρτεροῦντα ἄνδρα καὶ
ἐθέλοντα μάχεσθαι, φρονίμως λογιζόμενον, εἰδότα
μὲν ὅτι βοηθήσουσιν ἄλλοι αὐτῷ, πρὸς ἐλάττους δὲ
καὶ φαυλοτέρους μαχεῖται ἢ μεθ' ὧν αὐτός ἐστιν,
ἔτι δὲ χωρία ἔχει κρείττω —, τοῦτον τὸν μετὰ τῆς
τοιαύτης φρονήσεως καὶ παρασκευῆς καρτεροῦντα
ἀνδρειότερον ἂν φαίης ἢ τὸν ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ στρατο-
πέδῳ ἐθέλοντα ὑπομένειν τε καὶ καρτερεῖν;

| ΛΑ. Τὸν ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώ- Β
κρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ μὴν ἀφρονεστέρα γε ἢ τούτου ἢ ἢ
τοῦ ἑτέρου καρτερία.

ΛΑ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τὸν μετ' ἐπιστήμης ἄρ' ἰππικῆς καρτε-
ροῦντα ἐν ἰππομαχίᾳ ἠττον φήσεις ἀνδρείον εἶναι ἢ
τὸν ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης.

ΛΑ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τὸν μετὰ σφενδονητικῆς ἢ τοξικῆς ἢ
ἄλλης τινὸς τέχνης καρτεροῦντα.

| ΛΑ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅσοι ἂν ἐθέλωσιν εἰς φρέαρ κατα-
βαίνοντες καὶ κολυμβῶντες καρτερεῖν ἐν τούτῳ

of the immortality of the soul, the *Theaetetus* of the nature of knowledge, the *Meno* of virtue, the *Symposium* of love, the *Philebus* of pleasure. These are but a few of Plato's dialogues, but they are some of the best known, and for the most part are concerned with a definite subject. Some of the others could not be so shortly described.

The style of Plato has been described by Aristotle as "midway between poetry and prose." This need not refer merely to the language, but probably alludes, in part at least, to the nature of the dialogues themselves, many of which for their dramatic force may well rank as excellent works of fiction; and Aristotle would have called fiction poetry.

The language itself is often poetical, but not more so than we consider allowable for prose. As Greek it is of course beyond praise, though a beginner might sometimes wish the sentences to be a little less long, and the constructions a little more free from colloquial irregularities.

The *Laches* is one of the earlier or Socratic dialogues of Plato; it is very dramatic. The characters of the dialogue are Lysimachus, son of Aristides the Just, and Melesias, son of Pericles' rival Thucydides; their two friends Nicias and Laches, Socrates (who is apparently represented as being quite a young man), and two boys, the sons of Lysimachus and Melesias, named respectively Aristides and Thucydides after their grandfathers.

The scene is a palaestra. Nicias and Laches have been with the two fathers to see a 'master of arms,'

named Stesilaus, fighting in heavy armour, and are to give their opinion on the performance. Lysimachus and Melesias want to know whether this exercise would be a suitable accomplishment for their sons, whom they wish to educate as well as possible. Nicias professes his readiness to give advice, but Laches suggests that the opinion of Socrates should be asked, as he is a man who is constantly considering the question of the education of the young. This makes Lysimachus think that this Socrates, the son of his old friend Sophroniscus, may be the man whom he has often heard the boys praising. One of them tells him that he is right in his conjecture, and, after a testimony from Laches to Socrates' good conduct in the retreat from Delium, Lysimachus presses Socrates for his opinion on the subject of "fighting in armour." Socrates modestly says that Nicias and Laches ought to speak first, and accordingly they give their opinions, Nicias in favour of the exercise as an useful addition to the art of warfare, Laches against it as an unprofitable innovation. Lysimachus is sorry to find that they differ, and an appeal is made to Socrates to settle the question by his casting vote. This Socrates will not do, "for," he says, "the question is not what do the majority think, but is there any among us who really knows about the matter we are considering, and if so, what is his opinion? The matter we are really considering is what are the requirements of the soul; and if any of us has scientific knowledge of the treatment proper for the soul, his opinion will be valuable; but to have it he must have studied the subject under

good masters ; if not, it is very unlikely that he will have any skill in the matter, and we shall not believe him, if he says that he has such skill, unless he can show us some practical results of it in the shape of the improvement of his fellow-men. I could not afford masters, and I have not been able to acquire the skill. But let us inquire if Nicias and Laches have it."

Nicias and Laches agree, but the question is not pursued any further in this form, Socrates suggesting that they shall substitute for the inquiry, "Do we know how to improve the soul?" the inquiry, "Do we know the nature of that which is best for the soul, namely, virtue?" And he further suggests that it will be enough for the present purpose to take one part of virtue, namely, courage, and see if they know what that is.

Laches thinks the question an easy one, and defines courage thus: "A man who was ready to keep his place in the rank and resist the enemy, and not run away, would be courageous" (190 E).

Socrates objects that this is at best only a definition of a hoplite's courage, and he explains that he wants a definition of courage in a much wider sense. Accordingly Laches now explains it as "an endurance (or resistance) of the soul." Socrates suggests that such endurance or resistance will be noble only when combined with prudence or wisdom; otherwise it will be harmful; and that as courage is noble, it will be only sensible endurance that can be called courage. Laches agrees (192 D). "Yet," says Socrates, "a man who is resolute in spending sensibly, or resolute

in refusing unsuitable food to an invalid, is not therefore called brave, nor is a man who resists in war thought more brave when all the advantage is on his side, and he knows it. Nay, when the advantage is on his opponent's side, and he knows it, then is he rather called brave for resisting. And in many like instances we find the greatest courage is the resistance which is combined with a want of prudence. Here, then, we have a contradiction, but we must not give up because of the check. So we will ask Nicias to help in the chase."

Nicias (194 C-D) says that *ἀνδρεία* had better be defined as a sort of wisdom, and suggests that this will be in accordance with Socrates' usual teaching. "What wisdom?" he is asked. He answers, "The wisdom to understand things to be dreaded and things not to be dreaded, both in war and in all other circumstances."

Laches objects that we do not call husbandmen brave for knowing about things to be dreaded in agriculture, or doctors brave for knowing about things to be dreaded in disease.

Nicias answers that doctors, *as such*, know only about health and disease. They may know whether their patient will recover or not, but their professional knowledge does not tell them which is most terrible to him, recovery or death.

"Oh," says Laches, "then your brave man is simply a prophet?"

"No," Nicias replies. "A prophet knows merely what will happen, not whether the future will be terrible or not."

Laches calls this shuffling, but Socrates is inclined to think there may be something in what Nicias says, and so proceeds to question him. "You think that no one can be brave without this knowledge?"

Nicias assents, and says that beasts and children may be fearless (*ἄφοβα*), but cannot be brave (*ἀνδρεῖα*).

Laches calls this sophistry; but Socrates still keeps up his judicial attitude. He proceeds:

SOC. Nicias, you call 'courage' a part of virtue, I suppose?

NIC. Yes.

SOC. What then are things to be dreaded, and the reverse? future evils and goods?

NIC. Yes.

SOC. Courage, then, is the knowledge or science of good and evil in the future. But can any science be of the future only? Must it not be just as much concerned with the present and the past?

NIC. It must.

SOC. Then courage will be the science of good and evil whether past, present, or future, and will therefore be the whole of virtue, and not a part only. So our definition was wrong after all, and we must go to school with the boys to learn.

Thus we have no definite answer given to the question, "What is courage?" Yet an answer is suggested in the conversation, which contains besides many points of interest and instruction. Attention will be called to these in the Notes; and the reader is referred to the Appendix for further remarks on the subject of the dialogue.

The date at which the conversation is supposed to take place must be between the autumn of B.C. 424, when the battle of Delium was fought, and the summer of B.C. 418, when Laches fell in the battle of Mantinea. Socrates was more than seventy (*Apology* 17 D) at the time of his trial (B.C. 399), so that he must have been at least forty-five in B.C. 424. Therefore he could hardly have been a young man at any time when the dialogue could have occurred. Plato, however, aims at plausibility rather than possibility in points of chronology.

THE LANGUAGE OF THE DIALOGUE.

SPECIAL difficulties occur in the interpretation of every author ; those in Plato are due chiefly to his endeavour to represent in his dialogues the characteristics of actual conversation ; yet from the frequency with which irregularities that we should call colloquial occur in all Greek literature, and from the fact that there was no sharp distinction in Attic Greek between the language of careless talk and that of literary prose, it is impossible to say with certainty that any given peculiarity in Plato is the result of a studied negligence. For an exhaustive treatise on these peculiarities the reader is referred to the 'Digest of Idioms' in Riddell's edition of Plato's *Apology* ; here it will be sufficient to give a short account of some typical points of interest or difficulty in the language of the *Laches*.

I. AS TO THE USE OF WORDS.

The following words are used in a somewhat unusual sense :—

πολλάκις, 'perhaps,' 179 B and 194 A.

χωρίς, 'different from,' 195 A.

αὐτίκα, 'for instance,' 195 B.

ἐπιεικῶς, 'sufficiently,' 200 B.

II. AS TO THE ORDER OF WORDS.

Hyperbaton, the figure by which a word is for the sake of emphasis put out of its proper place in a sentence, is found in the following passages :—

- (α) ὡσπερ **ἔτι** τοῦ διακρινούντος δοκεῖ μοι δεῖν ἡμῖν ἢ βουλή, 184 C, where **ἔτι** belongs to **δεῖν**.
- (β) οὐκ ἐντετυχηκῶς τῷ ἀνδρὶ δῆλος **ἔτι** εἶ, 187 E, where **ἔτι** belongs to οὐκ ἐντετυχηκῶς.
- (γ) πρὸς τί τοῦτ' εἶπες βλέψας ; 195 A, for πρὸς τί βλέψας τοῦτ' εἶπες ; and perhaps in
- (δ) εἶδοτα μὲν ὅτι βοηθήσουσιν ἄλλοι αὐτῷ, πρὸς ἐλάττους δὲ καὶ φαυλοτέρους μαχεῖται, 193 A, where if μὲν is to correspond to δὲ it should follow βοηθήσουσιν.

III. AS TO COMBINATIONS OF WORDS.

A remarkable combination of particles is that of **νῦν δὲ ... γάρ** used to introduce a clause contradicting a foregoing hypothesis that was contrary to fact. See note on 184 D, where the expression occurs, and compare 200 E.

Notice also the combination **εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις**, 179 B (where see note) and 194 A.

IV. AS TO IRREGULARITIES OF SYNTAX.

These result in general either (a) from a wish on the part of the speaker (or writer) to put before the mind of his hearers (or readers) more than the logic of grammar will allow; or (b) from the fact of his thoughts being so concentrated on a particular clause that he forgets its precise relation with the rest of the period.

The former tendency is shown in (i.) Irregular Anticipation, (ii.) Confusion of Clauses, (iii.) Irregular Recapitulation; the latter in (iv.) Irregular Apodosis, (v.) Anacoluthon. Instances of these irregularities will now be given in detail:—

(i.) *Irregular Anticipation.*

εἰσηγήσατο οὖν τις ἡμῖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα, ὅτι καλὸν εἶη τῷ νέῳ μαθεῖν ἐν ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι, 179 D.

Here **καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα** anticipates the **ὅτι** clause. This construction is, however, little more than an extension of the common figure by which the subject of a dependent sentence is taken out of it and made the subject or object of the principal sentence. (See note on τὸ δὲ σβφισμα ... οἶον ἀπέβη, 183 D.)

οἷς οὐδὲν ἄλλο μέλει ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἢ τοῦτο ζητεῖν καὶ ἐπιτηδεύειν, ὃ τι ἂν μαθόντες καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσαντες πλεονεκτοῖεν τῶν ἄλλων, κ.τ.λ., 182 E.

Here **καὶ ἐπιτηδεύειν** anticipates the relative clause and spoils the grammar of the sentence.

(ii.) *Confusion of Clauses.*

τίνος ὄντος τούτου οὐ ζητοῦμεν τοὺς διδασκάλους; 185 B, which is a combination of **τίνος ζητοῦμεν τοὺς διδασκάλους**; and **τί ἐστι τούτου οὐ ζητοῦμεν τοὺς διδασκάλους**;

(iii.) *Irregular Recapitulation.*

τοῦτο οὖν σου ἐγὼ ἀντιδέομαι, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, καθάπερ ἄρτι Λάχης μὴ ἀφίεσθαι σε ἐμοῦ διεκελεύετο ἀλλὰ ἐρωτᾶν, καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν παρακελεύομαί σοι μὴ ἀφίεσθαι Λάχηςτος μηδὲ Νικίου ἀλλ' ἐρωτᾶν, 186 D.

Here *καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν παρακελεύομαι σοι* is inserted to resume the idea of *ἀντιδέομαι* on account of the intervention of the clause *καθάπερ ... ἐρωτᾶν*.

(iv.) *Irregular Apodosis.*

εἴαν τις αὐτοῖς συμβουλευέσθαι, οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν ἃ νοοῦσιν,
178 A. (See note on the passage.)

εἰ δὲ Νικίας ἢ Λάχης εὔρηκεν ἢ μεμάθηκεν, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι,
186 C.

(v.) *Anacoluthon.*

εἰδότες οὖν καὶ ὑμῖν υἱεῖς ὄντας ἡγησάμεθα μεμεληκέναι περὶ αὐτῶν ... εἰ δ' ἄρα πολλάκις μὴ προσεσχέκατε τὸν νοῦν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ, ὑπομνήσοντες ὅτι οὐ χρὴ αὐτοῦ ἀμελεῖν, καὶ παρακαλοῦντες ὑμᾶς ἐπὶ τὸ ἐπιμελείαν τινα ποιήσασθαι τῶν υἱέων κοινῇ μεθ' ἡμῶν, 179 B.

Here there should properly be finite verbs in the place of *ὑπομνήσοντες* and *παρακαλοῦντες*.

ἦν δὲ γέλως καὶ κρότος ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ὀλκάδος ἐπὶ τε τῷ σχήματι αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐπειδὴ βαλόντος τινὸς λίθῳ παρὰ τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ κατάστρωμα ἀφίεται τοῦ δόρατος. τότε ἤδη καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς τριήρους οὐκέτι οἰοί τ' ἦσαν τὸν γέλῳτα κατέχειν, 184 A.

Here *ἐπὶ τε τῷ σχήματι αὐτοῦ* suggests that another dative governed by *ἐπὶ* will follow. Instead of that we have a long clause with quite a different construction.

ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον οἶμαι τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι μηδενὸς θηρίου ἀποδέχεσθαι ἀνδρείαν, ἢ ξυγχωρεῖν θηρίον τι οὕτω σοφὸν εἶναι, ὥστε ἃ ὀλίγοι ἀνθρώπων ἴσασι ... ταῦτα λέοντα ἢ πάρδαλιν ἢ τινα κάπρον φάναι εἰδέναί, 196 E.

Here the insertion of the words *λέοντα ... φάναι* thrusts out the word *ξυγχωρεῖν* from its legitimate government of *εἰδέναί*, and their omission would make the sentence quite logical.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΛΑΧΗΣ.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ

ΛΥΣΙΜΑΧΟΣ, ΜΕΛΗΣΙΑΣ, ΝΙΚΙΑΣ,
ΛΑΧΗΣ, ΠΑΙΔΕΣ ΛΥΣΙΜΑΧΟΥ
ΚΑΙ ΜΕΛΗΣΙΟΥ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΛΑΧΗΣ.

St. p.
178 A
 I. Τεθέασθε μὲν τὸν ἄνδρα μαχόμενον ἐν ὄπλοις, ὦ Νικία τε καὶ Λάχης· οὐδ' ἔνεκα ὑμᾶς ἐκελεύσαμεν
 συνθεάσασθαι ἐγὼ τε καὶ Μελησίας ὅδε, τότε μὲν
 οὐκ εἶπομεν, νῦν δ' ἐροῦμεν. ἠγούμεθα γὰρ χρῆναι
 πρὸς γε ὑμᾶς παρρήσιάζεσθαι. εἰσὶ γὰρ τινες οἱ
 τῶν τοιούτων καταγελῶσι, καὶ εἰάν τις αὐτοῖς
 συμβουλευσῆται, οὐκ ἂν εἶποιεν ἅ νοοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ
 στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ | συμβουλευομένου ἄλλα λέγουσι **B**
 παρὰ τὴν αὐτῶν δόξαν· ὑμᾶς δὲ ἡμεῖς ἠγησάμενοι
 καὶ ἰκανοὺς γνῶναι καὶ γνόντας ἀπλῶς ἂν εἰπεῖν ἅ
 δοκεῖ ὑμῖν, οὕτω παρελάβομεν ἐπὶ τὴν συμβουλήν
 περὶ ᾧν μέλλομεν ἀνακοινοῦσθαι. ἔστιν οὖν τοῦτο
 περὶ οὗ πάλαι τοσαῦτα προοιμιιάζομαι, | τόδε. **179 A**
 ἡμῖν εἰσὶν υἱεῖς οὗτοί, ὅδε μὲν τοῦδε, πάππου ἔχων
 ὄνομα, Θουκυδίδης, ἐμὸς δὲ αὐ ὅδε. παππῶν δὲ καὶ
 οὗτος ὄνομ' ἔχει τούμου πατρός· Ἀριστείδην γὰρ
 αὐτὸν καλοῦμεν. ἡμῖν οὖν τούτων δέδοκται ἐπι-
 μεληθῆναι ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, καὶ μὴ ποιῆσαι ὅπερ
 οἱ πολλοί, ἐπειδὴ μεράκια γέγονέν, ἀνεῖναι αὐτοὺς
 ὅ τι βούλονται ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ νῦν δὴ καὶ ἄρχεσθαι
 αὐτῶν ἐπιμελείσθαι καθ' ὅσον οἰοί τ' | ἐσμέν. **B**

179 B εἰδότες οὖν καὶ ὑμῖν υἱεῖς ὄντας ἡγήσαμεθα με-
 μεληκέναι περὶ αὐτῶν, εἶπερ τισὶν ἄλλοις, πῶς ἂν
 θεραπευθέντες γένοιτο ἄριστοι· εἰ δ' ἄρα πολλάκις
 μὴ προσεσχέκατε τὸν νοῦν τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὑπομνήσον-
 τες ὅτι οὐ χρὴ αὐτοῦ ἀμελεῖν, καὶ παρακαλοῦντες
 ὑμᾶς ἐπὶ τὸ ἐπιμέλειάν τινα ποιήσασθαι τῶν υἱέων
 κοινῇ μεθ' ἡμῶν.

II. Ὅθεν δὲ ἡμῖν ταῦτ' ἔδοξεν, ᾧ Νικία τε καὶ
 Λάχης, χρὴ ἀκοῦσαι, κἂν ἢ ὀλίγῳ μακρότερα.
 συσσιτοῦμεν γὰρ δὴ ἐγώ τε καὶ Μελησίας ὅδε,
C καὶ ἡμῖν τὰ μειράκια | παρασιτεῖ. ὅπερ οὖν καὶ
 ἀρχόμενος εἶπον τοῦ λόγου, παρῤῥησιασόμεθα πρὸς
 ὑμᾶς. ἡμῶν γὰρ ἑκάτερος περὶ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ πατρὸς
 πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἔργα ἔχει λέγειν πρὸς τοὺς νεανί-
 σκους, καὶ ὅσα ἐν πολέμῳ εἰργάσαντο καὶ ὅσα ἐν
 εἰρήνῃ, διοικοῦντες τὰ τε τῶν συμμαχῶν καὶ τὰ
 τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως· ἡμέτερα δ' αὐτῶν ἔργα οὐδέτερος
 ἔχει λέγειν. ταῦτα δὴ ὑπαισχυνόμεθά τε τούσδε
 καὶ αἰτιώμεθα τοὺς πατέρας ἡμῶν, ὅτι ἡμᾶς μὲν
D εἶων τρυφᾶν, ἐπειδὴ | μειράκια ἐγενόμεθα, τὰ δὲ
 τῶν ἄλλων πράγματα ἔπραττον· καὶ τοῖσδε τοῖς
 νεανίσκοις αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐνδεικνύμεθα, λέγοντες ὅτι,
 εἰ μὲν ἀμελήσουσιν ἑαυτῶν καὶ μὴ πείσονται ἡμῖν,
 ἀκλειεῖς γενήσονται, εἰ δ' ἐπιμελήσονται, τάχ' ἂν
 τῶν ὀνομάτων ἄξιοι γένοιτο ἃ ἔχουσιν. οὔτοι μὲν
 οὖν φασὶ πείσεσθαι· ἡμεῖς δὲ δὴ τοῦτο σκοποῦμεν,
 τί ἂν οὔτοι μαθόντες ἢ ἐπιτηδεύσαντες ὅ τι ἄριστοι
E γένοιτο. εἰσηγήσατο οὖν τις ἡμῖν | καὶ τοῦτο
 τὸ μάθημα, ὅτι κυλὸν εἶη τῷ νέῳ μαθεῖν ἐν ὄπλοις

μάχεσθαι· καὶ ἐπῆνει τούτων ὃν νῦν ὑμεῖς ἐθεάσασθε 179 E
 ἐπιδεικνύμενον· κᾶτ' ἐκέλευε θεάσασθαι. ἔδοξε δὲ
 χρῆναι αὐτούς τε ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ θεάν τ' ἀνδρὸς καὶ ὑμᾶς
 συμπαραλαβεῖν ἅμα μὲν συνθεατάς, ἅμα δὲ συμ-
 βούλους τε καὶ κοινωνούς, ἐὰν βούλησθε, περὶ τῆς
 τῶν υἱέων ἐπιμελείας. ταῦτ' | ἐστὶν ἂ ἐβουλόμεθα 180 A
 ὑμῖν ἀνακοινώσασθαι. ἤδη οὖν ὑμέτερον μέρος
 συμβουλεύειν καὶ περὶ τούτου τοῦ μαθήματος,
 εἴτε δοκεῖ χρῆναι μανθάνειν εἴτε μή, καὶ περὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων, εἴ τι ἔχετε ἐπαινέσαι μάθημα νέῳ ἀνδρὶ ἢ
 ἐπιτήδευμα, καὶ περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας λέγειν ὁποῖόν
 τι ποιήσετε.

III. NI. Ἐγὼ μὲν, ὦ Λυσίμαχε καὶ Μελησία,
 ἐπαινῶ τε ὑμῶν τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ κοινωνεῖν ἕτοιμος,
 οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Λάχητα τόνδε.

| ΛΑ. Ἀληθῆ γὰρ οἶει, ὦ Νικία, ὡς ὁ γε ἔλεγεν B
 ὁ Λυσίμαχος ἄρτι περὶ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ τε
 καὶ τοῦ Μελησίου, πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ εὖ εἰρησθαι καὶ
 εἰς ἐκείνους καὶ εἰς ἡμᾶς καὶ εἰς ἅπαντας ὅσοι τὰ
 τῶν πόλεων πράττουσιν, ὅτι αὐτοῖς σχεδόν τι
 ταῦτα συμβαίνει ἂ οὗτος λέγει καὶ περὶ παῖδας
 καὶ περὶ τᾶλλα ἴδια, ὀλιγωρεῖσθαί τε καὶ ἀμελῶς
 διατίθεσθαι. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ Λυ-
 σίμαχε· ὅτι δ' ἡμᾶς μὲν συμβούλους παρακαλεῖς
 ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν νεανίσκων παιδείαν, Σωκράτη δὲ τόνδε
 οὐ | παρακαλεῖς, θαυμάζω, πρῶτον μὲν ὄντα δημότην, C
 ἔπειτα ἐνταῦθα ἀεὶ τὰς διατριβὰς ποιούμενον, ὅπου
 τί ἐστὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὧν σὺ ζητεῖς περὶ τοὺς νέους
 ἢ μάθημα ἢ ἐπιτήδευμα καλόν.

180 C ΛΥ. Πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Λάχης; Σωκράτης γὰρ ὄδε τινὸς τῶν τοιούτων ἐπιμέλειαν πεποιήται;

ΛΑ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Λυσίμαχε.

ΝΙ. Τοῦτο μὲν σοι καὶ ἐγὼ ἔχοιμι εἰπεῖν οὐ χεῖρον Λάχητος· καὶ γὰρ αὐτῷ μοι ἕναγχος ἄνδρα
D προῦξένησε τῷ υἱεῖ διδάσκαλον | μουσικῆς, Ἄγαθοκλέους μαθητὴν Δάμωνα, ἀνδρῶν χαριέστατον οὐ μόνον τὴν μουσικὴν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰλλα ὀπόσου βούλει ἄξιον συνδιατρίβειν τηλικούτοις νεανίσκοις.

IV. ΛΥ. Οὗτοι τι, ὦ Σώκρατες τε καὶ Νικία καὶ Λάχης, οἱ ἡλίκοι ἐγὼ ἔτι γιγνώσκομεν τοὺς νεωτέρους, ἅτε κατ' οἰκίαν τὰ πολλὰ διατρίβοντες ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας· ἀλλ' εἴ τι καὶ σύ, ὦ παῖ Σωφρονίσκου, ἔχεις τῷδε τῷ σαυτοῦ δημότῃ ἀγαθὸν
E συμβουλευσαι, χρὴ συμβουλεύειν. | δίκαιος δ' εἶ· καὶ γὰρ πατρικὸς ἡμῖν φίλος τυγχάνεις ὢν· αἰεὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ σὸς πατήρ ἐταίρω τε καὶ φίλῳ ἦμεν, καὶ πρότερον ἐκεῖνος ἐτελεύτησε πρὶν τι ἐμοὶ διενεχθῆναι. περιφέρει δέ τίς με καὶ μνήμη ἄρτι τῶνδε λεγόντων· τὰ γὰρ μεράκια τάδε πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἴκοι διαλεγόμενοι θαμὰ ἐπιμέμνηνται Σωκράτους καὶ σφόδρα ἐπαινοῦσιν· οὐ μέντοι πώποτε αὐτοὺς ἀνηρώτησα εἰ τὸν Σωφρονίσκου |
181 A λέγοιεν· ἀλλ', ὦ παῖδες, λέγετέ μοι, ὅδ' ἐστὶ Σωκράτης, περὶ οὗ ἐκάστοτε μέμνησθε;

ΠΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ πάτερ, οὗτος.

ΛΥ. Εὐ γε νῆ τὴν Ἥραν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι ὀρθοῖς τὸν πατέρα, ἄριστον ἀνδρῶν ὄντα καὶ

ἄλλως καὶ δὴ καὶ ὅτι οἰκεία τά τε σὰ ἡμῖν ὑπάρξει 181 A
καὶ σοὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα.

ΛΑ. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, μὴ ἀφίεσό γε τὰνδρός·
ὡς ἐγὼ καὶ ἄλλοθί γε αὐτὸν ἐθεασάμην οὐ μόνον
τὸν πατέρα ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν | πατρίδα ὀρθοῦντα· ἐν B
γὰρ τῇ ἀπὸ Δηλίου φυγῇ μετ' ἐμοῦ ξυνανεχώρει,
καὶ γὰρ σοὶ λέγω ὅτι εἰ οἱ ἄλλοι ἤθελον τοιοῦτοι
εἶναι, ὀρθὴ ἂν ἡμῶν ἢ πόλις ἦν καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔπεσε
τότε τοιοῦτον πτώμα.

ΛΥ. ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗτος μέντοι ὁ ἔπαινός ἐστι
καλός, ὃν σὺ νῦν ἐπαινεῖ ὑπ' ἀνδρῶν ἀξίων πιστεύε-
σθαι καὶ εἰς ταῦτα εἰς ἃ οὗτοι ἐπαινοῦσιν. εὐ οὖν
ἴσθι ὅτι ἐγὼ ταῦτα ἀκούων χαίρω ὅτι εὐδοκιμεῖς.
καὶ σὺ δὲ ἡγοῦ με ἐν τοῖς γ' εὐνουστάτοις σοὶ εἶναι.
χρῆν μὲν οὖν καὶ πρότερόν | γε φοιτᾶν αὐτὸν παρ' C
ἡμᾶς καὶ οἰκείους ἡγεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ τὸ δίκαιον· νῦν
δ' οὖν ἀπὸ τῆσδε τῆς ἡμέρας, ἐπειδὴ ἀνεγνωρίσαμεν
ἀλλήλους, μὴ ἄλλως ποίει, ἀλλὰ σύμισθί τε καὶ
γνώριζε καὶ ἡμᾶς καὶ τούσδε τοὺς νεωτέρους, ὅπως
ἂν διασώζητε καὶ ὑμεῖς τὴν ἡμετέραν φιλίαν. ταῦτα
μὲν οὖν καὶ σὺ ποιήσεις καὶ ἡμεῖς σε καὶ αὐθις ὑπο-
μνήσομεν· περὶ δὲ ὧν ἠρξάμεθα τί φατε; τί δοκεῖ;
τὸ μάθημα τοῖς μειρακίοις ἐπιτήδειον εἶναι ἢ οὐ, τὸ
μαθεῖν ἐν ὄπλοις μάχεσθαι;

V. ΣΩ. | Ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων πέρι, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, D
ἔγωγε πειράσομαι συμβουλεύειν ἂν τι δύνωμαι, καὶ
αὐτὰ ἃ προκαλεῖ πάντα ποιεῖν. δικαιοτάτον μέντοι
μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἐμὲ νεώτερον ὄντα τῶνδε καὶ ἀπει-
ρότερον τούτων ἀκούειν πρότερον τί λέγουσι καὶ

181 D μανθάνειν παρ' αὐτῶν· ἐὰν δ' ἔχω τι ἄλλο παρὰ τὰ ὑπὸ τούτων λεγόμενα, τότε ἤδη διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν καὶ σὲ καὶ τούτους. ἀλλ', ὦ Νικία, τί οὐ λέγει πότερος ὑμῶν ;

NI. Ἄλλ' οὐδὲν κωλύει, ὦ Σώκρατες. δοκεῖ γὰρ **E** ἐμοὶ | τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα τοῖς νέοις ὠφέλιμον εἶναι ἐπίστασθαι πολλαχῆ. καὶ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἄλλοθι διατρίβειν, ἐν οἷς δὴ φιλοῦσιν οἱ νέοι τὰς διατριβὰς ποιεῖσθαι, ὅταν σχολὴν ἄγωσιν, ἀλλ' ἐν τούτῳ, εὖ ἔχει, ὅθεν καὶ τὸ σῶμα βέλτιον ἴσχειν ἀνάγκη **182 A** —οὐδενὸς γὰρ τῶν γυμνασίων φανλότερον | οὐδ' ἐλάττω πόνον ἔχει—, καὶ ἅμα προσήκει μάλιστ' ἐλευθέρῳ τούτῳ τε τὸ γυμνάσιον καὶ ἡ ἵππική· οὐ γὰρ ἀγῶνος ἀθληταί ἐσμεν καὶ ἐν οἷς ἡμῖν ὁ ἀγὼν πρόκειται, μόνοι οὗτοι γυμνάζονται οἱ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς περὶ τὸν πόλεμον ὀργάνοις γυμναζόμενοι. ἔπειτα ὀνήσει μὲν τι τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα καὶ ἐν τῇ μάχῃ αὐτῇ, ὅταν ἐν τάξει δέῃ μάχεσθαι μετὰ πολλῶν ἄλλων· μέγιστον μέντοι αὐτοῦ ὄφελος, ὅταν λυθῶσιν αἱ τάξεις καὶ ἤδη τι δέῃ μόνον πρὸς **B** μόνον ἢ διώκοντα ἀμυνομένῳ | τινὶ ἐπιθέσθαι ἢ καὶ ἐν φυγῇ ἐπιτιθεμένου ἄλλου ἀμύνασθαι αὐτόν· οὗτ' ἂν ὑπό γε ἐνὸς εἰς ὁ τοῦτ' ἐπιστάμενος οὐδὲν ἂν πάθοι, ἴσως δ' οὐδὲ ὑπὸ πλειόνων, ἀλλὰ πανταχῆ ἂν ταύτῃ πλεονεκτοῖ. ἔτι δὲ καὶ εἰς ἄλλου καλοῦ μαθήματος ἐπιθυμίαν παρακαλεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον· πᾶς γὰρ ἂν μαθὼν ἐν ὄπλοις μάχεσθαι ἐπιθυμήσειε καὶ τοῦ ἐξῆς μαθήματος τοῦ περὶ τὰς τάξεις, καὶ ταῦτα λαβὼν καὶ φιλοτιμηθεὶς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ πάν ἂν τὸ

περὶ τὰς στρατηγίας | ὀρμήσειε· καὶ ἤδη δῆλον 182 C
 ὅτι τὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα καὶ μαθήματα πάντα καὶ
 ἐπιτηδεύματα πάντα καὶ καλὰ καὶ πολλοῦ ἄξια
 ἀνδρὶ μαθεῖν τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεῦσαι, ὧν καθηγήσασθαι
 ἂν τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα. προσθήσομεν δ' αὐτῷ οὐ
 σμικρὰν προσθήκην, ὅτι πάντα ἄνδρα ἐν πολέμῳ
 καὶ θαρράλεώτερον καὶ ἀνδρειότερον ἂν ποιήσειεν
 αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ οὐκ ὀλίγῳ αὕτη ἢ ἐπιστήμη. μὴ
 ἀτιμάσωμεν δὲ εἰπεῖν, εἰ καὶ τῷ σμικρότερον
 δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὅτι καὶ εὐσχημονέστερον ἐνταῦθα οὐ
 χρὴ τὸν ἄνδρα | εὐσχημονέστερον φαίνεσθαι, οὐ D
 ἅμα καὶ δεινότερος τοῖς ἐχθροῖς φανείται διὰ τὴν
 εὐσχημοσύνην. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, ὥσπερ
 λέγω, δοκεῖ τε χρῆναι διδάσκειν τοὺς νεανίσκους
 ταῦτα, καὶ δι' ἃ δοκεῖ εἶρηκα· Λάχητος δ', εἴ τι
 παρὰ ταῦτα λέγει, κἂν αὐτὸς ἠδέως ἀκούσασαιμι.

VI. ΛΑ. Ἄλλ' ἔστι μὲν, ὦ Νικία, χαλεπὸν
 λέγειν περὶ ὄπου οὖν μαθήματος, ὡς οὐ χρὴ μα-
 θάνειν· πάντα γὰρ ἐπίστασθαι ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι.
 καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ ὀπλιτικὸν τοῦτο, | εἰ μὲν ἔστι μάθημα, ὅπερ φασὶν οἱ διδάσκοντες, καὶ οἶον Νικίας E
 λέγει, χρὴ αὐτὸ μαθάνειν· εἰ δ' ἔστι μὲν μὴ
 μάθημα, ἀλλ' ἐξαπατῶσιν οἱ ὑπισχνούμενοι, ἢ
 μάθημα μὲν τυγχάνει ὄν, μὴ μέντοι πάνυ σπουδαῖον,
 τί καὶ δέοι ἂν αὐτὸ μαθάνειν; λέγω δὲ ταῦτα περὶ
 αὐτοῦ εἰς τὰδε ἀποβλέψας, ὅτι οἶμαι ἐγὼ τοῦτο,
 εἴ τι ἦν, οὐκ ἂν λεληθέναι Λακεδαιμονίους, οἷς οὐδὲν
 ἄλλο μέλει ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἢ τοῦτο ζητεῖν καὶ ἐπι-
 τηδεύειν, ὅ τι ἂν μαθόντες καὶ | ἐπιτηδεύσαντες 183 A

- 183 A** πλεονεκτοῖεν τῶν ἄλλων περὶ τὸν πόλεμον. εἰ δ' ἐκείνους ἐλελήθει, ἀλλ' οὐ τούτους γε τοὺς διδασκάλους αὐτοῦ λέληθεν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὅτι ἐκείνοι μάλιστα τῶν Ἑλλήνων σπουδάζουσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, καὶ ὅτι παρ' ἐκείνοις ἂν τις τιμηθεῖς εἰς ταῦτα καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων πλεῖστ' ἂν ἐργάζοιτο χρήματα, ὥσπερ γε καὶ τραγωδίας ποιητῆς παρ' ἡμῖν τιμηθεῖς. τοιγάρτοι ὅς ἂν οἴηται τραγωδίαν καλῶς ποιεῖν, οὐκ ἔξωθεν κύκλω περὶ τὴν
- B** | Ἀττικὴν κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἐπιδεικνύμενος περιέρχεται, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς δεῦρο φέρεται καὶ τοῖσδ' ἐπιδείκνυσιν. εἰκότως. τοὺς δὲ ἐν ὅπλοις μαχομένους ἐγὼ τούτους ὀρῶ τὴν μὲν Λακεδαίμονα ἡγουμένους εἶναι ἄβατον ἱερὸν καὶ οὐδὲ ἄκρω ποδὶ ἐπιβαίνοντας, κύκλω δὲ περιμόντας αὐτὴν καὶ πᾶσι μᾶλλον ἐπιδεικνυμένους, καὶ μάλιστα τούτοις οἳ κὰν αὐτοὶ ὁμολογήσειαν πολλοὺς σφῶν προτέρους εἶναι πρὸς τὰ τοῦ πολέμου.
- C** VII. Ἐπειτα, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, οὐ πάνυ | ὀλίγοις ἐγὼ τούτων παραγέγονα ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἔργῳ, καὶ ὀρῶ οἰοί εἶσιν. ἔξεστι δὲ καὶ αὐτόθεν ἡμῖν σκέψασθαι ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐπίτηδες οὐδεὶς πώποτ' εὐδόκιμος γέγονεν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἀνὴρ τῶν τὰ ὀπλιτικὰ ἐπιτηδευσάντων. καίτοι εἰς γε τᾶλλα πάντα ἐκ τούτων οἱ ὀνομαστοὶ γίνονται, ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτηδευσάντων ἕκαστα οὗτοι δ', ὡς ἔοικε, παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους οὕτω σφόδρα εἰς τοῦτο δεδυστυχήκασιν. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτον τὸν Στησίλεων, ὃν ὑμεῖς
- D** μετ' ἐμοῦ ἐν τοσοῦτῳ ὄχλῳ ἐθεάσασθε | ἐπιδεικ-

νύμενον καὶ τὰ μεγάλα περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγοντα ἃ **183 D**
 ἔλεγεν, ἐτέρωθι ἐγὼ κάλλιον ἐθεασάμην ἐν τῇ
 ἀληθείᾳ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπιδεικνύμενον οὐχ ἐκόντα.
 προσβαλούσης γὰρ τῆς νεῶς ἐφ' ἣ ἐπεβάτετε,
 πρὸς ὀλκάδα τινά, ἐμάχετο ἔχων δορυδρέπανον,
 διαφέρον δὴ ὄπλον ἅτε καὶ αὐτὸς τῶν ἄλλων
 διαφέρων. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα οὐκ ἄξια λέγειν περὶ
 τὰνδρός, τὸ δὲ σόφισμα τὸ τοῦ δρεπάνου τοῦ
 πρὸς τῇ | λόγχῃ οἶον ἀπέβη. μαχομένου γὰρ **E**
 αὐτοῦ ἐνέσχετό που ἐν τοῖς τῆς νεῶς σκεύεσι
 καὶ ἀντελάβετο. εἶλκεν οὖν ὁ Στησίλειος βουλό-
 μενος ἀπολυῆσαι, καὶ οὐχ οἶός τ' ἦν· ἡ δὲ ναῦς
 τὴν ναῦν παρήει. τέως μὲν οὖν παρέθει ἐν τῇ
 νηϊ ἀντεχόμενος τοῦ δόρατος. ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ παρ-
 ημείβετο ἡ ναῦς τὴν ναῦν καὶ ἐπέσπα αὐτὸν τοῦ
 δόρατος ἐχόμενον, ἠφίει τὸ δόρυ διὰ τῆς χειρός,
 ἕως ἄκρου τοῦ | στύρακος ἀντελάβετο. ἦν δὲ **184 A**
 γέλως καὶ κρότος ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ὀλκάδος ἐπί-
 τε τῷ σχήματι αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐπειδὴ βαλόντος τινὸς
 λίθῳ παρὰ τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ κατάστρωμα
 ἀφίεται τοῦ δόρατος, τότε ἤδη καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς τρι-
 ἡρους οὐκέτι οἰοί τ' ἦσαν τὸν γέλωτα κατέχειν,
 ὀρῶντες αἰωρούμενον ἐκ τῆς ὀλκάδος τὸ δορυδρέ-
 πανον ἐκεῖνο. ἴσως μὲν οὖν εἴη ἄν τι ταῦτα, ὥσπερ
 Νικίας λέγει· οἷς δ' οὖν ἐγὼ ἐντετύχηκα, τοιαῦτ'
 ἅττα ἐστίν.

VIII. Ὁ οὖν καὶ ἐξ | ἀρχῆς εἶπον, ὅτι εἴτε **B**
 οὕτω σμικρὰς ὠφελείας ἔχει μάθημα ὄν, εἴτε μὴ
 ὄν φασὶ καὶ προσποιοῦνται αὐτὸ εἶναι μάθημα,

184 B οὐκ ἄξιον ἐπιχειρεῖν μανθάνειν. καὶ γὰρ οὖν μοι δοκεῖ, εἰ μὲν δειλὸς τις ὢν οἶοιτο αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαι, θρασύτερος ἂν δι' αὐτὸ γενόμενος ἐπιφανέστερος γένοιτο οἷος ἦν· εἰ δὲ ἀνδρείος, φυλαττόμενος ἂν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἰ καὶ σμικρὸν ἐξαμάρτοι, μεγάλας ἂν διαβολὰς ἴσχειν· ἐπίφθονος γὰρ ἢ **C** προσποίησις τῆς τοιαύτης | ἐπιστήμης, ὥστ' εἰ μὴ τι θαυμαστὸν ὅσον διαφέρει τῇ ἀρετῇ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ἂν τις φύγοι τὸ καταγέλαστος γενέσθαι, φάσκων ἔχειν ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην. τοιαύτη τις ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, ἢ περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα εἶναι σπουδὴ· χρὴ δ' ὅπερ σοι ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλεγον, καὶ Σωκράτη τόνδε μὴ ἀφιέναι, ἀλλὰ δεῖσθαι συμβουλεύειν ὅπῃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ περὶ τοῦ προκειμένου.

D ΛΥ. Ἄλλὰ δέομαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ ἔτι τοῦ διακρινοῦντος δοκεῖ | μοι δεῖν ἡμῖν ἢ βουλή. εἰ μὲν γὰρ συνεφερέσθην τώδε, ἦττον ἂν τοῦ τοιούτου ἔδει· νῦν δὲ τὴν ἐναντίαν γάρ, ὡς ὀρᾶς, Λάχης Νικία ἔθετο· εὐ δὴ ἔχει ἀκούσαι καὶ σοῦ, ποτέρῳ τοῖν ἀνδροῖν σύμψηφος εἶ.

IX. ΣΩ. Τί δαί, ὦ Λυσίμαχε; ὁπότερ' ἂν οἱ πλείους ἐπαινώσιν ἡμῶν, τούτοις μέλλεις χρῆσθαι;

ΛΥ. Τί γὰρ ἂν τις καὶ ποιοί, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ σύ, ὦ Μελησία, οὕτως ἂν ποιοῖς; **E** καὶν εἴ τις περὶ ἀγωνίας τοῦ | υἱέος σοι βουλή εἴη τί χρὴ ἀσκεῖν, ἄρα τοῖς πλείοσιν ἂν ἡμῶν πείθοιο, ἢ κείνῳ ὅστις τυγχάνει ὑπὸ παιδοτρίβῃ ἀγαθῷ πεπαιδευμένος καὶ ἡσκηκώς;

ΜΕ. Ἐκείνω εἰκός γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Αὐτῷ ἄρ' ἂν μᾶλλον πείθοιο ἢ τέτταρσιν οὖσιν ἡμῖν;

184 E

ΜΕ. Ἴσως.

ΣΩ. Ἐπιστήμη γάρ, οἶμαι, δεῖ κρίνεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ πλῆθει, τὸ μέλλον καλῶς κριθήσεσθαι.

ΜΕ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν χρὴ πρῶτον αὐτὸ τοῦτο σκέψασθαι, εἰ ἔστι τις ἡμῶν τεχνικός περὶ οὗ | βουλευόμεθα, ἢ οὐ· καὶ εἰ μὲν ἔστιν, ἐκείνω 185 A πείθεσθαι ἐνὶ ὄντι, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους εἶαν· εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλον τινὰ ζητεῖν. ἢ περὶ σμικροῦ οἴεσθε νυνὶ κινδυνεύειν καὶ σὺ καὶ Λυσίμαχος, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ τούτου τοῦ κτήματος ὃ τῶν ὑμετέρων μέγιστον ὄν τυγχάνει; υἱέων γάρ που ἢ χρηστῶν ἢ τάναντία γενομένων καὶ πᾶς ὁ οἶκος ὁ τοῦ πατρὸς οὕτως οἰκῆσεται, ὅποιοι ἂν τινες οἱ παῖδες γένωνται.

ΜΕ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Πολλὴν ἄρα δεῖ προμήθειαν αὐτοῦ ἔχειν.

ΜΕ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Πῶς | οὖν, ὃ ἐγὼ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ἐσκοποῦμεν B ἂν, εἰ ἐβουλόμεθα σκέψασθαι τίς ἡμῶν περὶ ἀγωνίαν τεχνικώτατος; ἂρ' οὐχ ὁ μαθὼν καὶ ἐπιτηδέυσας, ᾧ καὶ διδάσκαλοι ἀγαθοὶ γεγονότες ἦσαν αὐτοῦ τούτου;

ΜΕ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἔτι πρότερον, τίνος ὄντος τούτου οὗ ζητοῦμεν τοὺς διδασκάλους;

ΜΕ. Πῶς λέγεις;

185 B X. ΣΩ. ὦδε ἴσως μᾶλλον κατάδηλον ἔσται. οὐ μοι δοκεῖ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἡμῖν ὠμολογηῖσθαι, τί ποτ' ἔστι περὶ οὗ βουλευόμεθα καὶ σκεπτόμεθα, ὅστις
C ἡμῶν τεχνικός καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα διδασκάλους | ἐκ-
τήσατο, καὶ ὅστις μή.

ΝΙ. Οὐ γὰρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ τοῦ ἐν ὄπλοις μάχεσθαι σκοποῦμεν, εἴτε χρὴ αὐτὸ τοὺς νεανίσκους μαθάνειν εἴτε μή;

ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Νικία. ἀλλ' ὅταν περὶ φαρμάκου τις τοῦ πρὸς ὀφθαλμοὺς σκοπῆται, εἴτε χρὴ αὐτὸ ὑπαλείφεισθαι εἴτε μή, πότερον οἶει τότε εἶναι τὴν βουλήν περὶ τοῦ φαρμάκου ἢ περὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν;

ΝΙ. Περὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν.

D ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅταν ἵππῳ | χαλινον σκοπῆται
τις εἰ προσοιστέον ἢ μή, καὶ ὅποτε, τότε πού περὶ
τοῦ ἵππου βουλεύεται ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ τοῦ χαλινού;

ΝΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐνὶ λόγῳ, ὅταν τις τι ἕνεκά του σκοπῆ, περὶ ἐκείνου ἢ βουλή τυγχάνει οὔσα οὐ ἕνεκα ἐσκόπει, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ τοῦ ὃ ἕνεκα ἄλλου ἐξίτηι.

ΝΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Δεῖ ἄρα καὶ τὸν σύμβουλον σκοπεῖν, ἄρα τεχνικός ἐστίν εἰς ἐκείνου θεραπείαν οὐ ἕνεκα σκοπούμενοι σκοποῦμεν.

ΝΙ. Πάνυ γε.

E ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν νῦν φάμεν | περι μαθήματος σκοπεῖν
τῆς ψυχῆς ἕνεκα τῆς τῶν νεανίσκων.

ΝΙ. Ναί.

185 E

ΣΩ. Εἴ τις ἄρα ἡμῶν τεχνικὸς περὶ ψυχῆς θεραπείαν καὶ οἶός τε καλῶς τοῦτο θεραπεύσαι, καὶ ὅτῳ διδάσκαλοι ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν, τοῦτο σκεπτέον.

ΛΑ. Τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὔπω ἑώρακας ἄνευ διδασκάλων τεχνικωτέρους γεγονότας εἰς ἕνα ἢ μετὰ διδασκάλων;

ΣΩ. Ἐγωγε, ὦ Λάχης· οἷς γε σὺ οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοις πιστεῦσαι, εἰ φαίεν ἀγαθοὶ εἶναι δημιουργοί, εἰ μὴ τί σοι τῆς αὐτῶν τέχνης ἔργον ἔχοιεν ἐπιδείξαι εὖ εἰργασμένον, | καὶ ἐν καὶ πλείω.

186 A

ΛΑ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

XI. ΣΩ. Καὶ ἡμᾶς ἄρα δεῖ, ὦ Λάχης τε καὶ Νικία, ἐπειδὴ Λυσίμαχος καὶ Μελησίας εἰς συμβουλήν παρεκαλεσάτην ἡμᾶς περὶ τοῖν υἱέοιν, προθυμούμενοι αὐτοῖν ὅ τι ἀρίστας γενέσθαι τὰς ψυχὰς, εἰ μὲν φαμεν ἔχειν, ἐπιδείξαι αὐτοῖς καὶ διδασκάλους οἵτινες ἡμῶν γεγόνασιν, οἱ αὐτοὶ πρῶτοι ἀγαθοὶ ὄντες καὶ πολλῶν νέων τεθεραπευκότες ψυχὰς ἔπειτα καὶ ἡμᾶς διδάξαντες φαίνονται | ἢ εἴ τις ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἑαυτῷ διδάσκαλον μὲν οὔ φησι γεγονέναι, ἀλλ' οὖν ἔργα αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ ἔχει εἰπεῖν, καὶ ἐπιδείξαι τίνες Ἀθηναίων ἢ τῶν ξένων, ἢ δούλοι ἢ ἐλεύθεροι, δι' ἐκείνον ὁμολογούμενως ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν· εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἡμῖν τούτων ὑπάρχει, ἄλλους κελεύειν ζητεῖν καὶ μὴ ἐν ἑταίρων ἀνδρῶν υἱέσι κινδυνεύειν διαφθείροντας τὴν μεγίστην αἰτίαν ἔχει ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκειοτάτων. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Λυσίμαχέ τε καὶ Μελησία, πρῶτος περὶ ἑμαυτοῦ

B

- 186 C** λέγω ὅτι | διδάσκαλός μοι οὐ γέγονε τούτου περι-
 καίτοι ἐπιθυμῶ γε τοῦ πράγματος ἐκ νέου ἀρξά-
 μενος. ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν σοφισταῖς οὐκ ἔχω τελεῖν
 μισθούς, οἵπερ μόνοι ἐπηγγέλλοντό με οἰοί τ'
 εἶναι ποιῆσαι καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν· αὐτὸς δ' αὖ
 εὐρεῖν τὴν τέχνην ἀδυνατῶ ἔτι νυνί. εἰ δὲ Νικίας
 ἢ Δάχης εὗρηκεν ἢ μεμάθηκεν, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι
 καὶ γὰρ χρήμασιν ἐμοῦ δυνατώτεροι, ὥστε μαθεῖν
 παρ' ἄλλων, καὶ ἅμα πρεσβύτεροι, ὥστε ἤδη εὐρη-
 κέναι. δοκοῦσι δὴ μοι δυνατοὶ εἶναι παιδεῦσαι
- D** | ἄνθρωπον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε ἀδεῶς ἀπεφαίνοντο
 περὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων νέῳ χρηστῶν τε καὶ πονηρῶν,
 εἰ μὴ αὐτοῖς ἐπίστευον ἰκανῶς εἰδέναί. τὰ μὲν οὖν
 ἄλλα ἔγωγε τούτοις πιστεύω· ὅτι δὲ διαφέρεσθον
 ἀλλήλοιν, ἐθαύμασα. τοῦτο οὖν σου ἐγὼ ἀντιδέ-
 ομαι, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, καθάπερ ἄρτι Δάχης μὴ
 ἀφίεσθαί σε ἐμοῦ διεκελεύετο ἀλλὰ ἐρωτᾶν, καὶ
 ἐγὼ νῦν παρακελεύομαί σοι μὴ ἀφίεσθαι Δάχηςτος
 μηδὲ Νικίου, ἀλλ' ἐρωτᾶν, λέγοντα ὅτι Ὁ μὲν
- E** Σωκράτης | οὗ φησιν ἐπαίειν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος,
 οὐδ' ἰκανὸς εἶναι διακρίναι ὁπότερος ὑμῶν ἀληθῆ
 λέγει· οὔτε γὰρ εὐρετῆς οὔτε μαθητῆς οὐδενὸς περὶ
 τῶν τοιούτων γεγονέναι· σὺ δ', ὦ Δάχης καὶ Νικία,
 εἶπετον ἡμῖν ἑκάτερος, τίτι δὴ δεινοτάτῳ συγγεγό-
 νατον περὶ τῆς τῶν νέων τροφῆς, καὶ πότερα
 μαθόντε παρά του ἐπίστασθον ἢ αὐτῶ ἐξευρόντε,
 καὶ εἰ μὲν μαθόντε, τίς ὁ διδάσκαλος ἑκατέρῳ καὶ
- 187 A** τίνες ἄλλοι | ὁμότεχνοι αὐτοῖς, ἵν', ἂν μὴ ὑμῖν
 σχολὴ ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων, ἐπ'

ἐκείνους ἴωμεν καὶ πείθωμεν ἢ δώροισι ἢ χάρισιν ἢ 187 A
 ἀμφότερα ἐπιμεληθῆναι καὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων καὶ τῶν
 ὑμετέρων παίδων, ὅπως μὴ καταισχύνωσι τοὺς
 αὐτῶν προγόνους φαῦλοι γενόμενοι· εἰ δ' αὐτοὶ
 εὔρεται γεγονότε τοῦ τοιούτου, δότε παράδειγμα,
 τίνων ἤδη ἄλλων ἐπιμεληθέντες ἐκ φαύλων καλοὺς
 τε κάγαθοὺς ἐποιήσατε. εἰ γὰρ νῦν πρῶτον ἄρξε-
 σθε | παιδεύειν, σκοπεῖν χρὴ μὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ Καρὶ B
 ὑμῖν ὁ κίνδυνος κινδυνεύηται, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς υἷεσι τε
 καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῶν φίλων παισὶ, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὸ λεγό-
 μενον κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ὑμῖν συμβαίη, ἐν πίστῳ ἢ
 κεραμείᾳ γιγνομένη. λέγετε οὖν, τί τούτων ἢ φατέ
 ὑμῖν ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ προσήκειν, ἢ οὐ φατέ. Ταῦτ',
 ὦ Λυσίμαχε, παρ' αὐτῶν πυνθάνου τε καὶ μὴ μεθίει
 τοὺς ἄνδρας.

XII. ΛΥ. Καλῶς μὲν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ ἄνδρες,
 Σωκράτης λέγειν· εἰ δὲ βουλομένοις ὑμῖν ἐστὶ | περὶ C
 τῶν τοιούτων ἐρωτᾶσθαι τε καὶ διδόναι λόγον,
 αὐτοὺς δὴ χρὴ γινώσκειν, ὦ Νικία τε καὶ Λάχης.
 ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ Μελησία τῷδε δῆλον ὅτι ἠδομένοις
 ἂν εἴη, εἰ πάντα, ἃ Σωκράτης ἐρωτᾷ, ἐθέλοιτε
 λόγῳ διεξιέναι· καὶ γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐντεῦθεν ἠρχόμεν
 λέγων, ὅτι εἰς συμβουλήν διὰ ταῦτα ὑμᾶς παρακαλέ-
 σαιμεν, ὅτι μεμεληκέναι ὑμῖν ἠγούμεθα, ὡς εἰκός,
 περὶ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ἄλλως καὶ ἐπειδὴ οἱ παῖδες
 ὑμῖν ὀλίγου, ὥσπερ οἱ ἡμέτεροι, ἡλικίαν | ἔχουσι D
 παιδεύεσθαι. εἰ οὖν ὑμῖν μὴ τι διαφέρει, εἶπατε
 καὶ κοινῇ μετὰ Σωκράτους σκέψασθε, διδόντες τε καὶ
 δεχόμενοι λόγον παρ' ἀλλήλων· εὐ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο

187 D λέγει ὁδε, ὅτι περὶ τοῦ μεγίστου νῦν βουλευόμεθα τῶν ἡμετέρων. ἀλλ' ὁρᾶτε εἰ δοκεῖ χρῆναι οὕτω ποιεῖν.

E ΝΙ. ὦ Λυσίμαχε, δοκεῖς μοι ὡς ἀληθῶς Σωκράτη πατρόθεν γιγνώσκειν μόνον, αὐτῷ δ' οὐ συγγεγονέναι ἀλλ' ἢ παιδὶ ὄντι, εἴ που ἐν | τοῖς δημόταις μετὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκολουθῶν ἐπλησίασέ σοι ἢ ἐν ἱερῷ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ τῷ συλλόγῳ τῶν δημοτῶν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ πρεσβύτερος γέγονεν, οὐκ ἐντετυχηκῶς τῷ ἀνδρὶ δῆλος ἔτι εἶ.

ΔΥ. Τί μάλιστα, ὦ Νικία;

XIII. ΝΙ. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖς εἰδέναι ὅτι ὅς ἂν ἐγγύτατα Σωκράτους ἢ λόγῳ ὥσπερ γένει καὶ πλησιάξῃ διαλεγόμενος, ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ, εἰ ἄρα καὶ περὶ ἄλλου του πρότερον ἄρξῃται διαλέγεσθαι, μὴ παύεσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου περιαιγόμενον τῷ λόγῳ, πρὶν ἂν ἐμπέσῃ εἰς τὸ διδόναι περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγον, ὄντινα **188 A** τρόπον νῦν τε ζῆ καὶ ὄντινα τὸν | παρεληλυθότα βίον βεβίωκεν· ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐμπέσῃ, ὅτι οὐ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀφήσει Σωκράτης, πρὶν ἂν βασανίσῃ ταῦτα εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς ἅπαντα. ἐγὼ δὲ συνήθης τέ εἰμι τῷδε καὶ οἶδ' ὅτι ἀνάγκη ὑπὸ τούτου πάσχειν ταῦτα, καὶ ἔτι γε αὐτὸς ὅτι πείσομαι ταῦτα εὖ οἶδα· χαίρω γάρ, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, τῷ ἀνδρὶ πλησιάξων, καὶ οὐδὲν οἶμαι κακὸν εἶναι τὸ ὑπομιμνήσκεσθαι ὅ τι **B** μὴ καλῶς ἢ πεποιήκαμεν | ἢ ποιούμεν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα βίον προμηθέστερον ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸν ταῦτα μὴ φεύγοντα, ἀλλ' ἐθέλοντα κατὰ τὸ τοῦ Σόλωνος καὶ ἀξιούντα μανθάνειν ἕωςπερ ἂν ζῆ, καὶ μὴ

οιόμενον αὐτῷ τὸ γήρας νοῦν ἔχον προσιέναι. 188 B
 ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν ἄηθες οὐδ' αὖ ἀηδὲς ὑπὸ Σωκρά-
 τους βασανίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάλαι σχεδόν τι
 ἠπιστάμην ὅτι οὐ περὶ τῶν μειρακίων ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος
 ἔσοιτο Σωκράτους παρόντος, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἡμῶν
 αὐτῶν. ὅπερ οὖν λέγω, | τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει C
 Σωκράτει συνδιατρίβειν ὅπως οὗτος βούλεται
 Λάχητα δὲ τόνδε ὄρα ὅπως ἔχει περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου.

XIV. ΛΑ. Ἀπλοῦν τό γ' ἐμόν, ὦ Νικία, περὶ
 λόγων ἐστίν· εἰ δὲ βούλει, οὐχ ἀπλοῦν, ἀλλὰ
 διπλοῦν. καὶ γὰρ ἂν δόξαιμί τῳ φιλόλογος εἶναι
 καὶ αὐτὸν μισόλογος. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἀκούω ἀνδρὸς
 περὶ ἀρετῆς διαλεγομένου ἢ περὶ τινος σοφίας ὡς
 ἀληθῶς ὄντος ἀνδρὸς καὶ ἀξίου τῶν λόγων ὧν λέγει,
 χαίρω ὑπερφυῶς, θεώμενος ἅμα | τὸν τε λέγοντα D
 καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα ὅτι πρέποντα ἀλλήλοις καὶ
 ἀρμόττοντά ἐστι· καὶ κομιδῇ μοι δοκεῖ μουσικὸς
 ὁ τοιοῦτος εἶναι, ἀρμονίαν καλλίστην ἡρμωσμένος
 οὐ λύραν οὐδὲ παιδιᾶς ὄργανα, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ζῆν
 ἡρμωσμένος [οὔ] αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τὸν βίον σύμφωνον
 τοῖς λόγοις πρὸς τὰ ἔργα, ἀτεχνῶς δωριστὶ ἀλλ'
 οὐκ ἰαστί, οἴομαι δὲ οὐδὲ φρυγιστὶ οὐδὲ λυδιστί,
 ἀλλ' ἤπερ μόνῃ Ἑλληνικῇ ἐστὶν ἀρμονία. ὁ μὲν
 οὖν τοιοῦτος χαίρειν με ποιεῖ φθεγγόμενος καὶ
 δοκεῖν | ὄτῳ οὖν φιλόλογον εἶναι· οὕτω σφόδρα E
 ἀποδέχομαι παρ' αὐτοῦ τὰ λεγόμενα· ὁ δὲ τὰ-
 ναντία τούτου πράττων λυπεῖ με, ὅσῳ ἂν δοκῇ
 ἄμεινον λέγειν, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον, καὶ ποιεῖ αὐτὸν
 δοκεῖν εἶναι μισόλογον. Σωκράτους δ' ἐγὼ τῶν

188 E μὲν λογῶν οὐκ ἔμπειρός εἰμι, ἀλλὰ πρότερον, ὡς ἔοικε, τῶν ἔργων ἐπειράθην, καὶ ἐκεῖ αὐτὸν εὗρον

189 A ἄξιον ὄντα λόγων καλῶν καὶ πάσης | παρρήσιας. εἰ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ἔχει, συμβούλομαι τάνδρι, καὶ ἡδιστ' ἂν ἐξεταζοίμην ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀχθοίμην μαθάνων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐγὼ τῷ Σόλωνι, ἐν μόνον προσλαβὼν, ξυγχωρῶ· γηράσκων γὰρ πολλὰ διδάσκεσθαι ἐθέλω ὑπὸ χρηστῶν μόνον. τοῦτο γάρ μοι συγχωρεῖτω, ἀγαθὸν καὶ αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν διδάσκαλον, ἵνα μὴ δυσμαθῆς φαίνομαι ἀηδῶς μαθάνων. εἰ δὲ νεώτερος ὁ διδάσκων ἔσται ἢ μήπω ἐν δόξῃ ὧν

B ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων | ἔχων, οὐδέν μοι μέλει. σοὶ οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ ἐπαγγέλλομαι καὶ διδάσκειν καὶ ἐλέγχειν ἐμὲ ὅ τι ἂν βούλη, καὶ μαθάνειν γε ὅ τι αὐτὸς ἐγὼ οἶδα· οὕτω σὺ παρ' ἐμοὶ διάκεισαι ἀπ' ἐκείνης τῆς ἡμέρας, ἢ μετ' ἐμοῦ συνδιεκινδύνευσας καὶ ἔδωκας σαυτοῦ πείραν ἀρετῆς, ἣν χρὴ διδόναι τὸν μέλλοντα δικαίως δώσειν. λέγ' οὖν ὅ τί σοι φίλον, μηδὲν τὴν ἡμετέραν ἡλικίαν ὑπόλογον ποιούμενος.

C XV. ΣΩ. Οὐ τὰ ὑμέτερα, ὡς ἔοικεν, | αἰτιασόμεθα μὴ οὐχ ἔτοιμα εἶναι καὶ συμβουλεύειν καὶ συσκοπεῖν.

ΔΥ. Ἄλλ' ἡμέτερον δὴ ἔργον, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἕνα γάρ σε ἔγωγε ἡμῶν τίθημι σκόπει οὖν ἀντ' ἐμοῦ ὑπὲρ τῶν νεανίσκων ὅ τι δεόμεθα παρὰ τῶνδε πυνθάνεσθαι, καὶ συμβούλευε διαλεγόμενος τούτοις. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιλανθάνομαι ἤδη τὰ πολλὰ διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ὧν ἂν διανοηθῶ ἐρέσθαι καὶ αὐτὸς ἂν ἀκούσω· εἰ δὲ μεταξὺ ἄλλοι λόγοι γένωνται, οὐ

πάνν μέμνημαι. ὑμεῖς οὖν λέγετε καὶ διέξιτε πρὸς 189 C
 ὑμᾶς | αὐτοὺς περὶ ὧν προϋθέμεθα· ἐγὼ δ' ἀκούσομαι D
 καὶ ἀκούσας αὐτῆ μετὰ Μελησίου τοῦδε ποιήσω τοῦτο
 ὅ τι ἂν καὶ ὑμῖν δοκῇ.

ΣΩ. Πειστέον, ὦ Νικία τε καὶ Λάχης, Λυσιμάχῳ
 καὶ Μελησίᾳ. ἃ μὲν οὖν νῦν δὴ ἐπεχειρήσαμεν
 σκοπεῖν, τίνες οἱ διδάσκαλοι ἡμῖν τῆς τοιαύτης
 παιδείας γεγόνασιν ἢ τίνας ἄλλους βελτίους
 πεποιήκαμεν, ἴσως μὲν οὐ κακῶς ἔχει ἐξετάζειν καὶ
 τὰ τοιαῦτα | ἡμᾶς αὐτούς· ἄλλ' οἶμαι, καὶ ἡ τοιάδε E
 σκέψις εἰς ταῦτόν φέρει, σχεδὸν δέ τι καὶ μᾶλλον
 ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἶη ἂν. εἰ γὰρ τυγχάνομεν ἐπιστάμενοι
 ὅτουοῦν πέρι, ὅτι παραγενομένον τῷ βέλτιον ποιεῖ
 ἐκείνο ὃ παρεγένετο, καὶ προσέτι οἰοί τέ ἐσμεν
 αὐτὸ ποιεῖν παραγίγνεσθαι ἐκείνῳ, δῆλον ὅτι αὐτό
 γε ἴσμεν τοῦτο, οὐ πέρι σύμβουλοι ἂν γενοίμεθα
 ὡς ἂν τις αὐτὸ ῥᾶστα καὶ ἄριστ' ἂν κτήσαιοτο.
 ἴσως οὖν οὐ μανθάνετε μου ὅ τι λέγω, ἀλλ' ὦδε
 ῥᾶον μαθήσεσθε. εἰ τυγχάνομεν ἐπιστάμενοι ὅτι
 ὄψις παραγενομένη | ὀφθαλμοῖς βελτίους ποιεῖ 190 A
 ἐκείνους οἷς παρεγένετο, καὶ προσέτι οἰοί τέ ἐσμεν
 ποιεῖν αὐτὴν παραγίγνεσθαι ὄμμασι, δῆλον ὅτι
 ὄψιν γε ἴσμεν αὐτὴν ὅ τί ποτ' ἔστιν, ἧς πέρι
 σύμβουλοι ἂν γενοίμεθα ὡς ἂν τις αὐτὴν ῥᾶστα
 καὶ ἄριστα κτήσαιοτο. εἰ γὰρ μηδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο
 εἰδείημεν ὅ τί ποτ' ἔστιν ὄψις ἢ ὅ τι ἔστιν ἀκοή,
 σχολῇ ἂν σύμβουλοί γε ἄξιοι λόγου γενοίμεθα
 καὶ ἰατροὶ ἢ περὶ ὀφθαλμῶν ἢ περὶ ὠτῶν, ὄντινα
 τρόπον ἀκοὴν ἢ ὄψιν | κάλλιστ' ἂν κτήσαιοτό τις. B

190 B ΛΑ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

XVI. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Λάχης, καὶ νῦν ἡμᾶς τώδε παρακαλείτον εἰς συμβουλήν, τίν' ἂν τρόπον τοῖς υἱέσιν αὐτῶν ἀρετὴ παραγενομένη ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἀμείνους ποιήσειεν;

ΛΑ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν τοῦτό γ' ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, τὸ εἰδέναι ὅ τί ποτ' ἔστιν ἀρετῆ; εἰ γάρ που μηδ' ἀρετὴν εἰδεῖμεν τὸ παράπαν ὅ τί ποτε τυγχάνει ὄν, τίν' ἂν τρόπον τούτου σύμβουλοι γενοίμεθα ὄψωϋν,

C | ὅπως ἂν αὐτὸ κάλλιστα κτήσαιο;

ΛΑ. Οὐδένα, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Φαμὲν ἄρα, ὦ Λάχης, εἰδέναι αὐτὸ ὅ τι ἔστιν.

ΛΑ. Φαμὲν μέντοι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅ γε ἴσμεν, κὰν εἴποιμεν δήπου τί ἔστιν.

ΛΑ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄριστε, περὶ ὅλης ἀρετῆς εὐθέως σκοπώμεθα—πλέον γὰρ ἴσως ἔργον—, ἀλλὰ μέρους τινὸς πέρι πρῶτον ἴδωμεν, εἰ ἰκανῶς ἔχομεν
D πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι· καὶ ἡμῖν, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, | ῥάων ἢ σκέψεις ἔσται.

ΛΑ. Ἄλλ' οὔτω ποιῶμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς σὺ βούλει.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ἂν προελοίμεθα τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μερῶν; ἢ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι τοῦτο εἰς ὃ τείνειν δοκεῖ ἢ ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις μάθησις; δοκεῖ δέ που τοῖς πολλοῖς εἰς ἀνδρείαν. ἢ γάρ;

ΛΑ. Καὶ μάλα δὴ οὔτω δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν πρῶτον ἐπιχειρήσωμεν, ὦ 190 D
 Λάχης, εἰπεῖν, ἀνδρεία τί ποτ' ἐστίν· ἔπειτα μετὰ
 τούτο σκεψόμεθα καὶ ὄτῳ ἂν τρόπῳ τοῖς νεανίσκοις
 | παραγένοιτο, καθ' ὅσον οἶόν τε ἐξ ἐπιτηδευμάτων E
 τε καὶ μαθημάτων παραγενέσθαι. ἀλλὰ πειρῶ
 εἰπεῖν ὃ λέγω, τί ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία.

XVII. ΛΑ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ
 χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν· εἰ γάρ τις ἐθέλοι ἐν τῇ τάξει
 μένων ἀμύνεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ μὴ φεύγει, εὖ
 ἴσθι ὅτι ἀνδρείος ἂν εἴη.

ΣΩ. Εὖ μὲν λέγεις, ὦ Λάχης· ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐγὼ
 αἴτιος, οὐ σαφῶς εἰπὼν, τὸ σὲ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὴ
 τοῦτο ὃ διανοούμενος ἠρόμην, ἀλλ' ἕτερον.

ΛΑ. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ φράσω, | εἰάν οἶός τε γένομαι. ἀνδρείός 191 A
 που οὗτος ὃν καὶ σὺ λέγεις, ὃς ἂν ἐν τῇ τάξει μένων
 μάχηται τοῖς πολεμίοις.

ΛΑ. Ἐγὼ γοῦν φημί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ τί αὖ ὅδε, ὃς ἂν
 φεύγων μάχηται τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀλλὰ μὴ μένων;

ΛΑ. Πῶς φεύγων;

ΣΩ. Ὡσπερ που καὶ Σκύθαι λέγονται οὐχ ἠττον
 φεύγοντες ἢ διώκοντες μάχεσθαι, καὶ Ὀμηρός που
 ἐπαινῶν τοὺς τοῦ Αἰνείου ἵππους κραιπνὰ μάλ'
 ἔνθα καὶ | ἔνθα ἔφη αὐτοὺς ἐπίστασθαι διώ- B
 κειν ἠδὲ φέβεσθαι. καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν Αἰνείαν
 κατὰ τοῦτ' ἐνεκωμίασε, κατὰ τὴν τοῦ φόβου
 ἐπιστήμην, καὶ εἶπεν αὐτὸν εἶναι μήστωρα
 φόβοιο.

191 B ΛΑ. Καὶ καλῶς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες· περὶ ἀρμάτων γὰρ ἔλεγε. καὶ σὺ τὸ τῶν Σκυθῶν ἰππέων πέρι λέγεις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἰππικὸν τὸ ἐκείνων οὕτω μάχεται, τὸ δὲ ὀπλιτικὸν τό γε τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω.

ΣΩ. Πλήν γ' ἴσως, ὦ Λάχης, τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων
C Λακεδαιμονίους | γὰρ φασιν ἐν Πλαταιαῖς, ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τοῖς γεβρόφοροις ἐγένοντο, οὐκ ἐθέλειν μένοντας πρὸς αὐτοὺς μάχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ φεύγειν, ἐπειδὴ ὃ ἐλύθησαν αἱ τάξεις τῶν Περσῶν, ἀναστρεφόμενους ὥσπερ ἰππέας μάχεσθαι καὶ οὕτω νικῆσαι τὴν ἐκεῖ μάχην.

ΛΑ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

XVIII. ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν αἴτιον ἔλεγον, ὅτι ἐγὼ αἴτιος μὴ καλῶς σε ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι οὐ καλῶς ἠρόμην. βουλόμενος γὰρ σου πυθέσθαι μὴ
D μόνον | τοὺς ἐν τῷ ὀπλιτικῷ ἀνδρείους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τῷ ἰππικῷ καὶ ἐν ξύμπαντι τῷ πολεμικῷ εἶδει, καὶ μὴ μόνον τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν κινδύνοις ἀνδρείους ὄντας, καὶ ὅσοι γε πρὸς νόσους καὶ ὅσοι πρὸς πενίας ἢ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πολιτικὰ ἀνδρείοί εἰσι, καὶ ἔτι αὖ μὴ μόνον ὅσοι πρὸς λύπας ἀνδρείοί εἰσιν ἢ φόβους, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἐπιθυμίας ἢ ἡδονὰς δεινοὶ μάχεσθαι, καὶ μένοντες ἢ ἀναστρέφοντες—
E εἰσὶ γὰρ πού | τινες, ὦ Λάχης, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνδρείοι.

ΛΑ. Καὶ σφόδρα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀνδρείοι μὲν πάντες οὗτοί εἰσιν, ἀλλ'

οἱ μὲν ἐν ἡδοναῖς, οἱ δ' ἐν λύπαις, οἱ δ' ἐν ἐπιθυμίαις, 191 E
οἱ δ' ἐν φόβοις τὴν ἀνδρείαν κέκτηνται· οἱ δέ γ',
οἶμαι, δειλίαν ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις.

ΛΑ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Τί ποτε ὄν ἐκάτερον τούτων, τοῦτο ἐπυνθαν-
νόμην. πάλιν οὖν πειρῶ εἰπεῖν ἀνδρείαν πρῶτον, τί
ὄν ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ταῦτόν ἐστιν. ἢ οὐπω κατα-
μανθάνεις ὃ λέγω;

ΛΑ. Οὐ πάνυ τι.

XIX. ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ὧδε λέγω, | ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ 192 A
τάχος ἡρώτων τί ποτ' ἐστίν, ὃ καὶ ἐν τῷ τρέχειν
τυγχάνει ὄν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ κιθαρίζειν καὶ ἐν τῷ
λέγειν καὶ ἐν τῷ μανθάνειν καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις πολλοῖς,
καὶ σχεδόν τι αὐτὸ κεκτήμεθα, οὐ καὶ περί ἄξιον
λέγειν, ἢ ἐν ταῖς τῶν χειρῶν πράξεσιν ἢ σκελῶν ἢ
στόματός τε καὶ φωνῆς ἢ διανοίας. ἢ οὐχ οὕτω καὶ
σύ λέγεις;

ΛΑ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Εἰ τοίνυν τίς με ἔροιτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, τί
λέγεις τοῦτο ὃ ἐν πᾶσιν ὀνομάζεις ταχυτῆτα εἶναι;
εἶποιμ' ἂν | αὐτῷ ὅτι τὴν ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ πολλὰ B
διαπραπτομένην δύναμιν ταχυτῆτα ἔγωγε καλῶ
καὶ περὶ φωνὴν καὶ περὶ δρόμον καὶ περὶ τᾶλλα
πάντα.

ΛΑ. Ὅρθῶς γε σύ λέγων.

ΣΩ. Πειρῶ δὴ καὶ σύ, ὦ Λάχης, τὴν ἀνδρείαν οὐ-
τως εἰπεῖν, τίς οὐσα δύναμις ἢ αὐτὴ ἐν ἡδονῇ καὶ ἐν
λύπῃ καὶ ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν αὐτὴν εἶναι,
ἔπειτα ἀνδρεία κέκληται.

192 B ΛΑ. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι καρτερία τις εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, εἰ τό γε διὰ πάντων περὶ ἀνδρείας πεφυκὸς δεῖ εἰπεῖν.

C ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ | μὴν δεῖ, εἴ γε τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρινοῦμεθα ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔμοιγε φαίνεται· οὐ τι πᾶσά γε, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, καρτερία ἀνδρεία σοι φαίνεται. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐνθένδε· σχεδὸν γάρ τι οἶδα, ὦ Λάχης, ὅτι τῶν πάνυ καλῶν πραγμάτων ἡγεῖ σὺ ἀνδρείαν εἶναι.

ΛΑ. Εὐ μὲν οὖν ἴσθι ὅτι τῶν καλλίστων.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἢ μὲν μετὰ φρονήσεως καρτερια καλὴ καγαθὴ.

ΛΑ. Πάνυ γε.

D ΣΩ. Τί δ' | ἢ μετ' ἀφροσύνης; οὐ τοῦναντίον ταύτῃ βλαβερὰ καὶ κακοῦργος;

ΛΑ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καλὸν οὖν τι φήσεις σὺ εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὃν κακοῦργόν τε καὶ βλαβερόν;

ΛΑ. Οὐκουν δίκαιόν γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα τὴν γε τοιαύτην καρτερίαν ἀνδρείαν ὁμολογήσεις εἶναι, ἐπειδήπερ οὐ καλὴ ἐστίν, ἢ δὲ ἀνδρεία καλὸν ἐστίν.

ΛΑ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἡ φρόνιμος ἄρα καρτερία κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον ἀνδρεία ἂν εἴη.

ΛΑ. Ἐοικεν.

E ΧΧ. ΣΩ. Ἰδῶμεν | δὴ, ἢ εἰς τί φρόνιμος; ἢ ἢ εἰς ἅπαντα καὶ τὰ μεγάλα καὶ τὰ σμικρά; οἷον εἴ τις καρτερεῖ ἀναλίσκων ἀργύριον φρονίμως, εἰδὼς

ὅτι ἀναλώσας πλεονεκτήσεται, τοῦτον ἀνδρείον 192 E
καλοῖς ἄν.

ΛΑ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οἶον εἴ τις ἰατρὸς ὦν, περιπλευμονία
τοῦ υἱέος ἐχομένου ἢ ἄλλου τινός καὶ δεομένου πιεῖν
ἢ φαγεῖν δοῦναι, μὴ κάμπτοιτο ἀλλὰ | καρτεροῖ; 193 A

ΛΑ. Οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν οὐδ' αὐτή.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐν πολέμῳ καρτεροῦντα ἄνδρα καὶ
ἐθέλοντα μάχεσθαι, φρονίμως λογιζόμενον, εἰδότα
μὲν ὅτι βοηθήσουσιν ἄλλοι αὐτῷ, πρὸς ἐλάττους δὲ
καὶ φανλοτέρους μαχεῖται ἢ μεθ' ὧν αὐτός ἐστιν,
ἔτι δὲ χωρία ἔχει κρείττω —, τοῦτον τὸν μετὰ τῆς
τοιαύτης φρονήσεως καὶ παρασκευῆς καρτεροῦντα
ἀνδρειότερον ἂν φαίης ἢ τὸν ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ στρατο-
πέδῳ ἐθέλοντα ὑπομένειν τε καὶ καρτερεῖν;

| ΛΑ. Τὸν ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώ- B
κρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ μὴν ἀφρονεστέρα γε ἢ τούτου ἢ ἢ
τοῦ ἐτέρου καρτερία.

ΛΑ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τὸν μετ' ἐπιστήμης ἄρ' ἰππικῆς καρτε-
ροῦντα ἐν ἰππομαχίᾳ ἦττον φήσεις ἀνδρείον εἶναι ἢ
τὸν ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης.

ΛΑ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ τὸν μετὰ σφενδονητικῆς ἢ τοξικῆς ἢ
ἄλλης τινὸς τέχνης καρτεροῦντα.

| ΛΑ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅσοι ἂν ἐθέλωσιν εἰς φρέαρ κατα-
βαίνοντες καὶ κολυμβῶντες καρτερεῖν ἐν τούτῳ C

193 C τῷ ἔργῳ, μὴ ὄντες δεινοί, ἢ ἔν τινι ἄλλῳ τοιούτῳ, ἀνδρειότερους φήσεις τῶν ταῦτα δεινῶν.

ΛΑ. Τί γὰρ ἂν τις ἄλλο φαίη, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οὐδέν, εἶπερ οἷοιτό γε οὕτως.

ΛΑ. Ἄλλὰ μὴν οἶμαί γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν που ἀφρονεστέρως γε, ὦ Λάχης, οἱ τοιοῦτοι κινδυνεύουσί τε καὶ καρτεροῦσιν ἢ οἱ μετὰ τέχνης αὐτὸ πράττοντες.

ΛΑ. Φαίνονται.

D | ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν αἰσχροὶ ἢ ἀφρων τόλμα τε καὶ καρτέρησις ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἐφάνη ἡμῖν οὔσα καὶ βλαβερά;

ΛΑ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δέ γε ἀνδρεία ὠμολογεῖτο καλὸν τι εἶναι.

ΛΑ. Ὄμολογεῖτο γάρ.

ΣΩ. Νῦν δ' αὖ πάλιν φαμὲν ἐκείνο τὸ αἰσχρόν, τὴν ἀφρονα καρτέρησιν, ἀνδρείαν εἶναι.

ΛΑ. Ἐοίκαμεν.

ΣΩ. Καλῶς οὖν σοι δοκοῦμεν λέγειν;

ΛΑ. Μὰ τὸν Δί', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐμοὶ μὲν οὔ.

XXI. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα που κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον
E δωριστὶ | ἡρμόσμεθα ἐγὼ τε καὶ σύ, ὦ Λάχης· τὰ γὰρ ἔργα οὐ ξυμφωνεῖ ἡμῖν τοῖς λόγοις. ἔργῳ μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἔοικε, φαίη ἂν τις ἡμᾶς ἀνδρείας μετέχειν, λόγῳ δ', ὡς ἐγῶμαι, οὐκ ἂν, εἰ νῦν ἡμῶν ἀκούσειε διαλεγομένων.

ΛΑ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι οὕτως ἡμᾶς διακεῖσθαι;

ΛΑ. Οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν.

193 E

ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν ᾧ λέγομεν πειθόμεθα τό γε τοσοῦτον;

ΛΑ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ τοῦτο, καὶ τίνι τούτῳ;

ΣΩ. Τῷ λόγῳ ὃς καρτερεῖν κελεύει. | εἰ οὖν 194 A
βούλει, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τῇ ζητήσῃ ἐπιμείνωμέν τε
καὶ καρτερήσωμεν, ἵνα καὶ μὴ ἡμῶν αὐτῇ ἡ ἀνδρεία
καταγελάσῃ, ὅτι οὐκ ἀνδρείως αὐτὴν ζητοῦμεν, εἰ
αρα πολλάκις αὐτῇ ἡ καρτέρησις ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία.

ΛΑ. Ἐγὼ μὲν ἕτοιμος, ᾧ Σώκρατες, μὴ προαφί-
στασθαι. καί τοι ἀήθης γ' εἰμὶ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων,
ἀλλὰ τίς με καὶ φιλονεικία εἴληφε πρὸς τὰ εἰρημένα,
καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγανακτῶ εἰ οὕτωςι | ἅ νοῶ μὴ οἶός 195 B
τ' εἰμὶ εἰπεῖν· νοεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἔμοιγε δοκῶ περὶ
ἀνδρείας ὃ τι ἐστὶν, οὐκ οἶδα δ' ὅπῃ με ἄρτι
διέφυγεν, ὥστε μὴ ξυλλαβεῖν τῷ λόγῳ αὐτὴν καὶ
εἰπεῖν ὃ τι ἐστὶν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ᾧ φίλε, τὸν ἀγαθὸν κυνηγέτην
μεταθεῖν χρὴ καὶ μὴ ἀνιέναι.

ΛΑ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν καὶ Νικίαν τόνδε παρακαλῶμεν
ἐπὶ τὸ κυνηγέσιον, εἴ τι ἡμῶν εὐπορώτερός ἐστίν;

ΛΑ. Βούλομαι· πῶς γὰρ | οὔ;

C

XXII. ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ, ᾧ Νικία, ἀνδράσι φίλοις
χειμαζομένοις ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἀποροῦσι βοήθησον, εἴ
τινα ἔχεις δύναμιν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἡμέτερα ὀρᾷς
ὡς ἄπορα· σὺ δ' εἰπὼν ὃ τι ἡγεῖ ἀνδρείαν εἶναι,
ἡμᾶς τε τῆς ἀπορίας ἔκλυσαι καὶ αὐτὸς ἅ νοεῖς τῷ
λόγῳ βεβαίωσαι.

194 C ΝΙ. Δοκεῖτε τοίνυν μοι πάλαι οὐ καλῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀρίζεσθαι τὴν ἀνδρείαν· ὃ γὰρ ἐγὼ σοῦ ἤδη καλῶς λέγοντος ἀκήκοα, τούτῳ οὐ χρῆσθε.

ΣΩ. Ποίῳ δῆ, ὦ Νικία;

D | ΝΙ. Πολλάκις ἀκήκοά σου λέγοντος ὅτι ταῦτα ἀγαθὸς ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, ἄπερ σοφός, ἃ δὲ ἀμαθής, ταῦτα δὲ κακός.

ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ μέντοι νῆ Δία λέγεις, ὦ Νικία.

ΝΙ. Οὐκοῦν εἶπερ ὁ ἀνδρείος ἀγαθός, δῆλον ὅτι σοφός ἐστιν.

ΣΩ. Ἦκουσας, ὦ Λάχης;

ΛΑ. Ἔγωγε, καὶ οὐ σφόδρα γε μανθάνω ὃ λέγει.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἐγὼ δοκῶ μανθάνειν, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ σοφίαν τινὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν λέγειν.

ΛΑ. Ποίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοφίαν;

E ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τόνδε | τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς;

ΛΑ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δῆ, αὐτῷ εἶπέ, ὦ Νικία, ποία σοφία ἀνδρεία ἂν εἴη κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον. οὐ γάρ που ἢ γε ἀλητική.

ΝΙ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ μὴν ἢ κιθαριστική.

ΝΙ. Οὐ δῆτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τίς δῆ αὕτη ἢ τίνος ἐπιστήμη;

ΛΑ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ εἰπέτω γε τίνα φησὶν αὐτὴν εἶναι.

ΝΙ. Ταύτην ἔγωγε, ὦ Λάχης, τὴν τῶν δεινῶν καὶ

195 A θαρράλεων ἐπιστήμην | καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν.

ΛΑ. Ὡς ἄτοπα λέγει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Πρὸς τί τούτ' εἶπες βλέψας, ὦ Λάχης;

195 A

ΛΑ. Πρὸς ὅ τι; χωρὶς δήπου σοφία ἐστὶν ἀνδρείας.

ΣΩ. Οὐκὸν φησί γε Νικίας.

ΛΑ. Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία ταῦτά τοι καὶ ληρεῖ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διδάσκωμεν αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ λοιδορῶμεν.

ΝΙ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, Λάχης ἐπιθυμεῖν καμὲ φανῆναι μηδὲν λέγοντα, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρτι τοιοῦτος | ἐφάνη.

B

ΧΧΙΙΙ. ΛΑ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Νικία, καὶ πειράσομαί γε ἀποφῆναι· οὐδὲν γὰρ λέγεις· ἐπεὶ αὐτίκα ἐν ταῖς νόσοις οὐχ οἱ ἰατροὶ τὰ δεινὰ ἐπίστανται; ἢ οἱ ἀνδρείοι δοκοῦσί σοι ἐπίστασθαι; ἢ τοὺς ἰατροὺς σὺ ἀνδρείους καλεῖς;

ΝΙ. Οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν.

ΛΑ. Οὐδέ γε τοὺς γεωργοὺς οἶμαι. καί τοι τά γε ἐν τῇ γεωργίᾳ δεινὰ οὗτοι δήπου ἐπίστανται, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοὶ ἅπαντες τὰ ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν τέχναις δεινὰ τε καὶ θαρράλεια ἴσασιν· ἀλλ' οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον οὗτοι | ἀνδρείοί εἰσιν.

C

ΣΩ. Τί δόκει Λάχης λέγειν, ὦ Νικία; ἔοικε μέντοι λέγειν τι.

ΝΙ. Καὶ γὰρ λέγει γέ τι, οὐ μέντοι ἀληθές γε.

ΣΩ. Πῶς δῆ;

ΝΙ. Ὅτι οἶεται τοὺς ἰατροὺς πλέον τι εἰδέναι περὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας ἢ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν εἰπεῖν οἷόν τε καὶ νοσῶδες. οἱ δὲ δῆ τοι τοσοῦτον μόνον ἴσασιν·

195 C εἰ δὲ δεινον τῷ τούτῳ ἐστὶ τὸ ὑγιαίνειν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ κάμνειν, ἡγεῖ σὺ τουτί, ὦ Λάχης, τοὺς ἰατροὺς ἐπίστασθαι; ἢ οὐ πολλοῖς οἶε ἐκ τῆς νόσου ἄμεινον εἶναι μὴ ἀναστῆναι ἢ ἀναστῆναι; τούτο | γὰρ εἰπέ· σὺ πᾶσι φῆς ἄμεινον εἶναι ζῆν καὶ οὐ πολλοῖς κρεῖττον τεθνάναι;

ΛΑ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε τούτῳ γε.

ΝΙ. Οἷς οὖν τεθνάναι λυσιτελεῖ, ταῦτ᾽ αἰεὶ δεινὰ εἶναι καὶ οἷς ζῆν;

ΛΑ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΝΙ. Ἄλλὰ τούτο δὴ σὺ δίδως τοῖς ἰατροῖς γινώσκειν ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ δημιουργῷ πλὴν τῷ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἐπιστήμονι, ὃν ἐγὼ ἀνδρεῖον καλῶ;

ΣΩ. Κατανοεῖς, ὦ Λάχης, ὅ τι λέγει;

E ΛΑ. Ἐγωγε, ὅτι γε τοὺς μάντις | καλεῖ τοὺς ἀνδρεῖους· τίς γὰρ δὴ ἄλλος εἴσεται ὅτῳ ἄμεινον ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι; καίτοι σὺ, ὦ Νικία, πότερον ὁμολογεῖς μάντις εἶναι ἢ οὔτε μάντις οὔτε ἀνδρεῖος;

ΝΙ. Τί δαί; μάντις αὖ οἶε προσήκει τὰ δεινὰ γινώσκειν καὶ τὰ θαρράλεια;

ΛΑ. Ἐγωγε· τίτιν γὰρ ἄλλῳ;

XXIV. ΝΙ. Ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω, πολὺ μᾶλλον, ὦ βέλτιστε· ἐπεὶ μάντιν γε τὰ σημεῖα μόνον δεῖ γινώσκειν τῶν ἐσομένων, εἴτε τῷ θάνατος εἴτε νόσος εἴτε ἀποβολὴ χρημάτων ἔσται, εἴτε νίκη | **196 A** | εἴτε ἥττα ἢ πολέμου ἢ καὶ ἄλλης τινὸς ἀγωνίας· ὅτι δὲ τῷ ἄμεινον τούτων ἢ παθεῖν ἢ μὴ παθεῖν, τί μᾶλλον μάντις προσήκει κρῖναι ἢ ἄλλῳ ὄτῳ;

ΛΑ. Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ τούτον οὐ μαθάνω, ὦ Σώκρατες,

ὅ τι βούλεται λέγειν· οὔτε γὰρ μάντιν οὔτε ἰατρὸν 196 A
οὔτε ἄλλον οὐδένα δηλοῖ ὄντινα λέγει τὸν ἀνδρείον,
εἰ μὴ εἰ θεόν τινα λέγει αὐτὸν εἶναι. ἐμοὶ μὲν
οὖν φαίνεται Νικίας οὐκ ἐθέλειν γενναίως | ὁμολο- B
γεῖν ὅτι οὐδὲν λέγει, ἀλλὰ στρέφεται ἄνω καὶ κάτω
ἐπικρυπτόμενος τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀπορίαν. καίτοι καὶ
ἡμεῖς οἴοί τε ἡμεῖν ἄρτι ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ τοιαῦτα
στρέφεσθαι, εἰ ἐβουλόμεθα μὴ δοκεῖν ἐναντία ἡμῖν
αὐτοῖς λέγειν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἡμῖν οἱ
λόγοι ἦσαν, εἶχεν ἄν τινα λόγον ταῦτα ποιεῖν. νῦν
δὲ τί ἄν τις ἐν ξυνουσίᾳ τοιαῦδε μάτην κενοῖς λόγοις
αὐτὸς αὐτὸν κοσμοῖ;

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ὦ Λάχης· ἀλλ' ὀρώμεν
| μὴ Νικίας οἶεται τι λέγειν καὶ οὐ λόγου ἕνεκα C
ταῦτα λέγει. αὐτοῦ οὖν σαφέστερον πυνθώμεθα
τί ποτε νοεῖ· καὶ ἐάν τι φαίνεται λέγων, ξυγχωρη-
σόμεθα, εἰ δὲ μή, διδάξομεν.

ΛΑ. Σὺ τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ βούλει πυνθάνε-
σθαι, πυνθάνου· ἐγὼ δ' ἴσως ἰκανῶς πέπυσμαι.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐδέν με κωλύει κοινὴ γὰρ ἔσται ἡ
πίστις ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ.

ΛΑ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

XXV. ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ μοι, ὦ Νικία, μᾶλλον δ'
ἡμῖν· κοινούμεθα γὰρ ἐγώ τε καὶ Λάχης τὸν λόγον·
τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἐπιστήμην φῆς | δεινῶν τε καὶ θαρρά- D
λέων εἶναι;

ΝΙ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δὲ οὐ παντὸς δὴ εἶναι ἀνδρὸς γινῶναι,
ὁπότε γε μήτε ἰατρὸς μήτε μάντις αὐτὸ γινώσεται

196 D μηδὲ ἀνδρείος ἔσται, ἐὰν μὴ αὐτὴν ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην προσλάβῃ. οὐχ οὕτως ἔλεγες;

ΝΙ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἄρα τῷ ὄντι οὐκ ἂν πᾶσα ὕς γνοιή οὐδ' ἂν ἀνδρεία γένοιτο.

ΝΙ. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

E ΣΩ. Δῆλον δὴ, ὦ Νικία, ὅτι οὐδὲ | τὴν Κρομμυϊάν ἔν πιστεύεις σύ γε ἀνδρείαν γεγενῆσθαι. τοῦτο δὲ λέγω οὐ παίζων, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον οἶμαι τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι μηδενὸς θηρίου ἀποδέχεσθαι ἀνδρείαν, ἢ ξυγχωρεῖν θηρίον τι οὕτω σοφὸν εἶναι, ὥστε ἂ ὀλίγοι ἀνθρώπων ἴσασι διὰ τὸ χαλεπὰ εἶναι γινῶναι, ταῦτα λέοντα ἢ πάρδαλιν ἢ τινα κάπρον φάναι εἰδέναι· ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ὁμοίως λέοντα καὶ ἔλαφον καὶ ταῦρον καὶ πίθηκον πρὸς ἀνδρείαν φάναι πεφυκέναι τὸν τιθέμενον ἀνδρείαν τοῦθ' ὅπερ σὺ τίθεσαι.

197 A | ΛΑ. Νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, καὶ εὐ γε λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ ἡμῖν ὡς ἀληθῶς τοῦτο ἀπόκριναι, ὦ Νικία, πότερον σοφώτερα φῆς ἡμῶν ταῦτα εἶναι τὰ θηρία, ἂ πάντες ὁμολογοῦμεν ἀνδρεία εἶναι, ἢ πᾶσιν ἐναντιούμενος τολμῆς μηδὲ ἀνδρεία αὐτὰ καλεῖν;

ΝΙ. Οὐ γάρ τι, ὦ Λάχης, ἔγωγε ἀνδρεία καλῶ οὔτε θηρία οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν τὸ τὰ δεινὰ ὑπὸ ἀγνοίας μὴ φοβούμενον, ἀλλ' ἄφοβον καὶ μωρόν.

B ἢ καὶ τὰ παιδία πάντα οἶε με | ἀνδρεία καλεῖν, ἂ δι' ἀγνοίαν οὐδὲν δέδοικεν; ἀλλ' οἶμαι, τὸ ἄφοβον καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον οὐ ταῦτόν ἐστιν. ἐγὼ δὲ ἀνδρείας μὲν καὶ προμηθείας πάνυ τισὶν ὀλίγοις οἶμαι μετεῖναι,

θρασύτητος δὲ καὶ τόλμης καὶ τοῦ ἀφόβου μετὰ 197 B
ἀπρομηθείας πάνυ πολλοῖς καὶ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν
καὶ παίδων καὶ θηρίων. ταῦτ' οὖν ἅ σὺ καλεῖς
ἀνδρεία καὶ οἱ πολλοί, ἐγὼ θρασέα καλῶ, ἀνδρεία
δὲ τὰ | φρόνιμα περὶ ὧν λέγω. C

XXVI. ΛΑ. Θέασαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς εἶ ὅδε
ἑαυτὸν δῆ, ὡς οἶεται, κοσμεῖ τῷ λόγῳ· οὓς δὲ
πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν ἀνδρείους εἶναι, τούτους ἀπο-
στερεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ ταύτης τῆς τιμῆς.

ΝΙ. Οὐκουν ἔγωγε, ὦ Λάχης, ἀλλὰ θάρρει· φημί
γάρ σε εἶναι σοφόν, καὶ Λάμαχόν γε, εἴπερ ἔστε
ἀνδρείοι, καὶ ἄλλους γε συχνούς Ἀθηναίων.

ΛΑ. Οὐδὲν ἐρῶ πρὸς ταῦτα, ἔχων εἰπεῖν, ἵνα μὴ
με φῆς ὡς ἀληθῶς Αἰξωνέα εἶναι.

ΣΩ. | Μηδέ γε εἶπης, ὦ Λάχης· καὶ γάρ μοι D
δοκεῖς οὐδὲ μὴ ἠσθῆσθαι ὅτι ὅδε ταύτην τὴν σοφίαν
παρὰ Δάμωνος τοῦ ἡμετέρου ἐταίρου παρείληφεν,
ὁ δὲ Δάμων τῷ Προδίκῳ πολλὰ πλησιάζει, ὃς δὲ
δοκεῖ τῶν σοφιστῶν κάλλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀνόματα
διαιρεῖν.

ΛΑ. Καὶ γὰρ πρέπει, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοφιστῇ τὰ
τοιαῦτα μᾶλλον κομψεύεσθαι ἢ ἀνδρὶ ὃν ἡ πόλις
ἀξιοῖ αὐτῆς προΐστάναι.

ΣΩ. Πρέπει μέντοι, ὦ | μακάριε, τῶν μεγίστων E
προστατοῦντι μεγίστης φρονήσεως μετέχειν. δοκεῖ
δέ μοι Νικίας ἀξίος εἶναι ἐπισκέψεως, ὅποι ποτὲ
βλέπων τοῦνομα τοῦτο τίθησι, τὴν ἀνδρείαν.

ΛΑ. Αὐτὸς τοίνυν σκόπει, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μέλλω ποιεῖν, ὦ ἄριστε· μὴ μέντοι

197 E οἴου με ἀφήσειν σε τῆς κοινωνίας τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλὰ πρόσεχε τὸν νοῦν καὶ συσκόπει τὰ λεγόμενα.

ΛΑ. Ταῦτα δὲ ἔστω, εἰ δοκεῖ χρῆναι.

ΧΧVII. ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ. σὺ δέ, Νικία, λέγε

198 A ἡμῖν πάλιν | ἐξ ἀρχῆς. οἶσθ' ὅτι τὴν ἀνδρείαν κατ' ἀρχὰς τοῦ λόγου ἐσκοποῦμεν ὡς μέρος ἀρετῆς σκοποῦντες;

ΝΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ τοῦτο ἀπεκρίνω ὡς μόριον, ὄντων δὴ καὶ ἄλλων μερῶν, ἃ ξύμπαντα ἀρετὴ κέκληται;

ΝΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἄπερ ἐγώ, καὶ σὺ ταῦτα λέγεις; ἐγὼ δὲ καλῶ πρὸς ἀνδρεία σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἄλλ' ἄττα τοιαῦτα. οὐ καὶ σύ;

B ΝΙ. Πάνυ | μὲν οἶν.

ΣΩ. Ἐχε δὴ ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ ὁμολογοῦμεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρράλεων σκεψώμεθα, ὅπως μὴ σὺ μὲν ἄλλ' ἄττα ἠγῆ, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἄλλα. ἃ μὲν οἶν ἡμεῖς ἠγούμεθα, φράσομέν σοι σὺ δὲ ἂν μὴ ὁμολογῆς, διδάξεις. ἠγούμεθα δ' ἡμεῖς δεινὰ μὲν εἶναι ἃ καὶ δέος παρέχει, θαρράλεα δὲ ἃ μὴ δέος παρέχει. δέος δὲ παρέχει οὐ τὰ γεγονότα οὐδὲ τὰ παρόντα τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰ προσδοκώμενα· δέος γὰρ εἶναι προσδοκίαν μέλλοντος κακοῦ. ἢ οὐχ οὔτω καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ, ὦ Λάχης;

C ΛΑ. Πάνυ | γε σφόδρα, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν ἡμέτερα τοίνυν, ὦ Νικία, ἀκούεις ὅτι δεινὰ μὲν τὰ μέλλοντα κακά φαμεν εἶναι,

θαρράλεια δὲ τὰ μὴ κακὰ ἢ ἀγαθὰ μέλλοντα· σὺ 198 C
δὲ ταύτη ἢ ἄλλη περὶ τούτων λέγεις;

ΝΙ. Ταύτη ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τούτων δέ γε τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀνδρείαν
προσαγορεύεις;

ΝΙ. Κομιδῆ γε.

XXVIII. ΣΩ. Ἔτι δὴ τὸ τρίτον σκεψώμεθα
εἰ ξυνδοκεῖ σοί τε καὶ ἡμῖν.

| ΝΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ τοῦτο;

D

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ δὴ φράσω. δοκεῖ γὰρ δὴ ἐμοί τε καὶ
τῷδε, περὶ ὧν ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, οὐκ ἄλλη μὲν
εἶναι περὶ γεγονότος, εἰδέναι ὅπῃ γέγονεν, ἄλλη
δὲ περὶ γιγνομένων, ὅπῃ γίνεται, ἄλλη δὲ ὅπῃ
ἂν κάλλιστα γένοιτο καὶ γενήσεται τὸ μήπω
γεγονός, ἀλλ' ἢ αὐτή. οἷον περὶ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν εἰς
ἅπαντας τοὺς χρόνους οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ ἡ ἰατρική,
μία οὔσα, ἐφορᾶ καὶ γιγνόμενα καὶ γεγονότα καὶ
γενησόμενα, ὅπῃ γενήσεται. καὶ περὶ τὰ | ἐκ E

τῆς γῆς αὐτὴ φύομενα ἢ γεωργία ὡσαύτως ἔχει.
καὶ δήπου τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον αὐτοὶ ἂν μαρ-
τυρήσαιτε ὅτι ἡ στρατηγία κάλλιστα προμηθεῖται
τά τε ἄλλα καὶ περὶ τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι, οὐδὲ
τῇ μαντικῇ οἶεται δεῖν ὑπηρετεῖν, ἀλλὰ ἄρχειν,
ὡς εἰδυῖα κάλλιον τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον καὶ γιγνό-
μενα καὶ γενησόμενα· | καὶ ὁ νόμος οὕτω τάττει, 199 A
μὴ τὸν μάντιν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ἄρχειν, ἀλλὰ τὸν
στρατηγὸν τοῦ μάντεως. φήσομεν ταῦτα, ὦ
Λάχης;

ΛΑ. Φήσομεν.

199 A ΣΩ. Τί δέ; σὺ ἡμῖν, ὦ Νικία, ξύμφησ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἐσομένων καὶ γιγνομένων καὶ γεγονότων ἐπαΐειν;

ΝΙ. Ἐγωγε· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ ἄριστε, καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία τῶν δεινῶν ἐπιστήμη | ἐστὶ καὶ θαρράλέων, ὡς φῆς. ἦ γάρ;

ΝΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὰ δὲ δεινὰ ὠμολόγηται καὶ τὰ θαρράλέα τὰ μὲν μέλλοντα ἀγαθὰ, τὰ δὲ μέλλοντα κακὰ εἶναι.

ΝΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δέ γ' αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ μελλόντων καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων εἶναι.

ΝΙ. Ἐστί ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐ μόνον ἄρα τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρράλέων ἡ ἀνδρεία ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ μελλόντων μόνον πέρι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν ἐπαΐει, ἀλλὰ καὶ **C** γιγνομένων καὶ | γεγονότων καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων, ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι ἐπιστήμαι.

ΝΙ. Ἐοικέ γε.

XXIX. ΣΩ. Μέρος ἄρα ἀνδρείας ἡμῖν, ὦ Νικία, ἀπεκρίνω σχεδόν τι τρίτον· καίτοι ἡμεῖς ἠρωτῶμεν ὅλην ἀνδρείαν ὃ τι εἴη. καὶ νῦν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον οὐ μόνον δεινῶν τε καὶ θαρράλέων ἐπιστήμη ἡ ἀνδρεία ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν τι ἡ περὶ πάντων ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων, **D** ὡς νῦν αὖ ὁ σὸς λόγος, ἀνδρεία | ἂν εἴη. οὕτως αὖ μετατίθεσθαι ἢ πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Νικία;

ΝΙ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

199 D

ΣΩ. Δοκεῖ οὖν σοι, ὦ δαιμόνιε, ἀπολείπειν ἄν τι ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀρετῆς, εἴπερ εἰδείη τά τε ἀγαθὰ πάντα καὶ παντάπασιν ὡς γίγνεται καὶ γενήσεται καὶ γέγονε, καὶ τὰ κακὰ ὡσαύτως; καὶ τοῦτον οἶει ἄν σὺ ἐνδεᾶ εἶναι σωφροσύνης ἢ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ὀσιότητος, ὧ γε μόνῳ προσήκει καὶ περὶ θεοῦς καὶ περὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐξευλαβεῖσθαι τε τὰ δεινὰ καὶ τὰ | μῆ, καὶ τὰγαθὰ πορίζεσθαι, **E** ἐπισταμένῳ ὀρθῶς προσομιλεῖν;

ΝΙ. Λέγειν τι, ὦ Σώκρατές, μοι δοκεῖς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα, ὦ Νικία, μόνιον ἀρετῆς ἄν εἴη τὸ νῦν σοι λεγόμενον, ἀλλὰ σύμπασα ἀρετῆ.

ΝΙ. Ἐοικεν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἔφαμέν γε τὴν ἀνδρείαν μόνιον εἶναι ἐν τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς.

ΝΙ. Ἐφάμεν γάρ.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ γε νῦν λεγόμενον οὐ φαίνεται.

ΝΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα εὐρήκαμεν, ὦ Νικία, ἀνδρεία ὅ τι ἔστιν.

ΝΙ. Οὐ φαίνόμεθα.

ΛΑ. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε, ὦ φίλε Νικία, ὧμην σε εὐρήσειν, | ἐπειδὴ ἐμοῦ κατεφρόνησας Σω- 200 A κράτει ἀποκριναμένου· πάνυ δὴ μεγάλην ἐλπίδα εἶχον ὡς τῇ παρὰ τοῦ Δάμωνος σοφία αὐτὴν ἀνευρήσεις.

XXX. ΝΙ. Εὖ γε, ὦ Λάχης, ὅτι οὐδὲν οἶει σὺ ἔτι πράγμα εἶναι, ὅτι αὐτὸς ἄρτι ἐφάνης ἀνδρείας

200 A πέρι οὐδὲν εἰδώς, ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ ἐγὼ ἕτερος τοιοῦτος ἀναφανήσομαι, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέπεις, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι διοίσει, ὡς ἔοικε, σοὶ μετ' ἐμοῦ μηδὲν εἰδέναι ὦν προσήκει ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν ἀνδρὶ οἰομένῳ τι εἶναι.

B σὺ μὲν | οὖν μοι δοκεῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀνθρώπειον πρᾶγμα ἐργάζεσθαι, οὐδὲν πρὸς αὐτὸν βλέπεις ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους· ἐγὼ δ' οἶμαι ἐμοὶ περὶ ὦν ἐλέγομεν νῦν τε ἐπιεικῶς εἰρῆσθαι, καὶ εἴ τι αὐτῶν μὴ ἰκανῶς εἴρηται, ὕστερον ἐπανορθώσεσθαι καὶ μετὰ Δάμωνος, οὗ σύ που οἶε καταγελᾶν, καὶ ταῦτα οὐδὲ ἰδὼν πρόποτε τὸν Δάμωνα, καὶ μετ' ἄλλων· καὶ ἐπειδὴν βεβαιώσωμαι αὐτά, διδάξω καὶ σέ, καὶ οὐ φθονήσω· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι καὶ μάλα

C | σφόδρα δεῖσθαι μαθεῖν.

ΛΑ. Σοφὸς γάρ τοι σὺ εἶ, ὦ Νικία. ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐγὼ Λυσιμάχῳ τῷδε καὶ Μελησίᾳ συμβουλεύω σὲ μὲν καὶ ἐμέ περὶ τῆς παιδείας τῶν νεανίσκων χαίρειν εἶναι, Σωκράτη δὲ τουτονί, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλεγον, μὴ ἀφιέναι· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐν ἡλικίᾳ ἦσαν οἱ παῖδες, ταῦτ' ἂν ταῦτ' ἐποίουν.

ΝΙ. Ταῦτα μὲν καὶ γὰρ ξυγχωρῶ, ἐάνπερ ἐθέλῃ Σωκράτης τῶν μεираκίων ἐπιμελείσθαι, μηδένα **D** ἄλλον ζητεῖν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐγὼ | τὸν Νικήρατον τούτῳ ἡδιστα ἐπιτρέπομι, εἰ ἐθέλοι οὗτος· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἄλλους μοι ἐκάστοτε ξυνίστησιν, ὅταν τι αὐτῷ περὶ τούτου μνησθῶ, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλει. ἀλλ' ὄρα, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, εἴ τι σοῦ ἂν μᾶλλον ὑπακούοι Σωκράτης.

ΛΥ. Δίκαιόν γέ τοι, ὦ Νικία, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐγὼ

τούτῳ πολλὰ ἂν ἐθελήσαιμι ποιεῖν, ἃ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλοις **200 D**
 πάνυ πολλοῖς ἐθέλοιμι. πῶς οὖν φῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες;
 ὑπακούσει τι καὶ ξυμπροθυμήσει ὡς βελτίστοις
 γενέσθαι τοῖς μειρακίοις;

XXXI. | ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν δεινὸν εἶη, ὦ Λυσί- **E**
 μαχε, τοῦτό γε, μὴ ἐθέλειν τῷ ξυμπροθυμείσθαι
 ὡς βελτίστῳ γενέσθαι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς διαλόγοις
 τοῖς ἄρτι ἐγὼ μὲν ἐφάνην εἰδώς, τῷδε δὲ μὴ εἰδότε,
 δίκαιον ἂν ἦν ἐμὲ μάλιστα ἐπὶ τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον
 παρακαλεῖν· νῦν δ' ὁμοίως γὰρ πάντες ἐν ἀπορίᾳ
 ἐγενόμεθα· τί οὖν ἂν τις ἡμῶν τινὰ προαιροῖτο;
 ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δὴ αὐτῷ δοκεῖ οὐδένα. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ
 ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, | σκέψασθε, ἂν τι δόξω ξυμ- **201 A**
 βουλεύειν ὑμῖν. ἐγὼ γάρ φημι χρῆναι, ὦ ἄνδρες,
 — οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἔκφορος λόγος — κοινῇ πάντας
 ἡμᾶς ζητεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς διδάσκαλον
 ὡς ἄριστον, δεόμεθα γάρ, ἔπειτα καὶ τοῖς μειρακίοις,
 μήτε χρημάτων φειδομένους μήτε ἄλλου μηδενός·
 εἴαν δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ὡς νῦν ἔχομεν, οὐ ξυμ-
 βουλεύω. εἰ δέ τις ἡμῶν καταγελάσεται, ὅτι
 τηλικοῖδε ὄντες εἰς διδασκάλων | ἀξιούμεν φοιτᾶν, **B**
 τὸν Ὅμηρον δοκεῖ μοι χρῆναι προβάλλεσθαι, ὃς
 ἔφη οὐκ ἀγαθὴν εἶναι αἰδῶ κεχρημένῳ
 ἀνδρὶ παρεῖναι. καὶ ἡμεῖς οὖν εἴσαντες
 χαίρειν εἴ τίς τι ἐρεῖ, κοινῇ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν
 μειρακίων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιησώμεθα.

ΛΥ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀρέσκει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἃ λέγεις
 καὶ ἐθέλω, ὅσῳ περ γεραίτατός εἰμι, τοσοῦτῳ προ-
 θυμότατα μανθάνειν μετὰ τῶν νεανίσκων. ἀλλά

201 B μοι οὕτωςι ποιήσον· αὔριον ἔωθεν ἀφίκου οἴκαδε,
C καὶ μὴ | ἄλλως ποιήσης, ἵνα βουλευσώμεθα περὶ
 αὐτῶν τούτων. τὸ δὲ νῦν εἶναι τὴν συνουσίαν
 διαλύσωμεν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο ποιήσω, ὦ Λυσίμαχε, ταῦτα, καὶ
 ἤξω παρὰ σέ αὔριον, εἰάν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ.

NOTES.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ.

LYSIMACHUS and Melesias are two old men who live together. Lysimachus is the son of Aristides the Just, who was himself the son of a Lysimachus ; and Melesias is the son of Thucydides the statesman, who was himself the son of a Melesias. (Thucydides the historian was the son of Olorus.)

Nicias and Laches are two Athenians, who have had experience in the command of armies. Of Nicias, who is perhaps the most conspicuous character in the history of Thucydides, it need only be said that he had apparently far too little energy and vigilance and far too much hesitation to be a successful general, that he was exceedingly superstitious, but of great personal courage, and up to the time of his death probably the most highly esteemed man at Athens. Plato perhaps introduces him here as the type of a soldier whose courage was spoilt by the preponderance of the cautious element.

Of Laches, the son of Melanopus, we learn from this dialogue that he was of the deme Aexone, and was engaged at the battle of Delium (B.C. 424). Thucydides (iii. 86) tells us that he in conjunction with Charoeades was sent to Sicily in command of a fleet of twenty ships in B.C. 427 to help Leontini against Syracuse, that in the next year he (being now sole commander, as Charoeades had fallen in battle) forced the Messenians to capitulate and become allies of Athens, and met with other successes, but some reverses. He fell at Mantinea in B.C. 418, where he commanded the Athenian contingent in the Argive army. He may possibly have had the reputation of being an officer of more dash than caution, as he seems never to have been employed as general in any operation of first-rate importance. However this may be, it is obvious that Plato intends to mark a contrast between

the characters of Laches and Nicias as military men. The two were no doubt friends, and Nicias certainly, and Laches probably, belonged to the aristocratical and philo-Laconian party at Athens. Thus Laches was the proposer of the truce with the Lacedaemonians in B.C. 423, and was associated with Nicias two years afterwards in negotiating the peace called by the name of the latter.

The sons of Lysimachus and Melesias are two boys called respectively Aristides and Thucydides after their grand-fathers.

For Socrates, see Introduction.

CAP. I.

178 A **Τεθέασθε μὲν.** The *μὲν* is answered by the *δέ* in *οὐ δ' ἔνεκα*. These two particles may mark almost any degree of contrast in Greek, from the strongest to the weakest, and their force has to be rendered in English in different ways according to the circumstances. Here leave *μὲν* untranslated and render *δέ* by 'but.' Below translate *τότε μὲν οὐκ εἶπομεν, νῦν δ' ἐροῦμεν* by 'though we did not tell you then, we will tell you now.'

τὸν ἄνδρα μαχόμενον ἐν ὅπλοις. We are subsequently told that the man's name was Stesilaus. The art which he practised and taught seems to have been that of fighting in the full equipment of a hoplite, and if it was complete must have included the use of the sword as well as of the spear, though the latter was the main weapon of the heavy-armed soldier. Most however, if not all, of the parrying would be done with the shield. Athenian soldiers at this time probably underwent very little drilling, but there may have been a spear and shield exercise taught in the palaestrae. In that case, no doubt, no other armour would be used, and the bodies of the combatants would be naked.

Aristotle mentions spears with rounded heads (*ἑσφαιρωμένα*) instead of points, which in his time at any rate must have been used in such exercises. It would seem from what Nicias says in this dialogue (p. 182) that men like Stesilaus taught not only this military exercise, but tactics and strategy, and this is confirmed by a comparison of Plato's *Euthydemus* 271 D foll. and Xen. *Mem.* iii. 1.

πρὸς γε ὑμᾶς. The *γε* of course qualifies *ὑμᾶς* and not *πρὸς τῶν τοιοῦτων*, neuter.

αὐτοῖς συμβουλευέσθαι, 'asks their advice.' 'Gives them 178 A
advice' would be αὐτοῖς συμβουλεύσῃ.

οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν, 'will not say,' *i.e.* 'do not wish to say.'
The optative with ἂν must here be regarded as a milder way
of expressing οὐ θέλουσιν εἰπεῖν. For its conditional form is
not a result of its being the apodosis of εἰάν τις . . . συμβουλευέσθαι,
but exists in spite of it. The continuation in the indicative
ἄλλα λέγουσι is regular enough. The construction of the
following lines from the *Alcestis*

ἦν δ' ἐγγὺς ἔλθῃ θάνατος, οὐδεὶς βούλεται
θνήσκειν, τὸ γῆρας δ' οὐκέτ' ἔστ' αὐτοῖς βαρὺ (671, 672)

would be an exact parallel if ἂν θάνοι were substituted for
βούλεται θνήσκειν. Of course the *present* indicative will be
found in the apodosis after εἰάν in the protasis only in the case
of general statements.

ἀλλὰ στοχαζόμενοι, κ.τ.λ., lit. 'but guessing at their con-
sultor say other things contrary to their own opinion,' *i.e.*
'but make a guess at their friend's wishes, and in consequence
give advice which is contrary to their own opinion.'

ὑμᾶς δὲ ἡμεῖς, κ.τ.λ., 'but in your case it is precisely **B**
because we thought that you were able to form a decision, and
having formed it would tell us your opinion honestly, that we
called you to a consultation on the matter of which we will
now speak.'

ἔστιν οὖν τοῦτο, κ.τ.λ., 'well, the question about which I
have been all this time making this long preface is as follows.'
πάλαι, like *jamdudum* and *jampridem* in Latin, and phrases
like *il y a longtemps que* in French, gives to a present the
force of the English perfect and to an imperfect the force of
an English pluperfect.

τοῦδε, 'of my friend here,' *i.e.* Melesias. **179 A**

πάππου ἔχων ὄνομα, Θουκυδίδης. We should say, 'called
Thucydides after his grandfather.' Notice the omission of
the article before the familiar word πάππου. A reference to
the note on the Persons of the Dialogue will show that in
these two families one out of two names (Melesias and Thucy-
dides in the one case, Lysimachus and Aristides in the other)
was given in turn to the first-born of each generation. This
was the usual, but not the universal, custom at Athens.

ἐπιμεληθῆναι, a deponent form.

καὶ μὴ ποιῆσαι, κ.τ.λ., 'and not to do what most fathers
do; that is, let our sons do what they like now that they

179 A have ceased to be children, but rather to make this the very time for beginning to look after them to the best of our power.'

μειράκια γέγονεν. The neut. plur. predicate here attracts the verb into the singular, the more easily, perhaps, because the subject is understood and not expressed.

B μεμεληκέναι, impersonal. Supply ὑμῖν. (Strictly the ὑμῖν in the sentence is constructed both with ὄντας and μεμεληκέναι.)

εἴπερ τισὶν ἄλλοις, a common Greek phrase. Cf. such English expressions as 'I saw fifty *if* I saw one.' Here translate, 'We thought you as likely as any men' (meaning 'more likely than any other men') 'to have considered.'

πὼς ἂν θεραπευθέντες γένοιτο ἄριστοι, lit. 'being how trained they would become best,' *i.e.* 'what sort of training would make the best men out of them.' There is a stiffness and cumbrousness about interrogative sentences in English which makes their management difficult, especially in translation.

εἰ δ' ἄρα πολλάκις, 'but if by any chance.' ἄρα conveys the idea of a result discovered, πολλάκις implies that the result is within the bounds of possibility: cf. 194 A.

ὑπομνήσοντες and παρακαλοῦντες. These participles are (as Jacobs says) used as if ἤλθομεν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἡγησάμενοι had occurred in the preceding paragraph. Anacoluthon is unfortunately frequent in Plato, but this instance is particularly harsh. παρακαλοῦντες is fut. here.

CAP. II.

δή, 'you must know that.'

C παρασιτεῖ. This verb and the substantive παράσιτος had not yet acquired a bad sense at the time when Plato wrote.

ὅπερ. It may be said that the antecedent to this is the clause παρῆρσιασόμεθα πρὸς ὑμᾶς. Translate 'As.'

ἡμέτερα ... αὐτῶν, 'nostra ipsorum.'

ταῦτα δὴ ὑπαισχυνόμεθά τε τούσδε. The verb is constructed with a double accusative. 'Well, we feel rather ashamed of this before them.'

ὅτι ἡμᾶς μὲν εἶων τρυφᾶν, κ.τ.λ., 'because they allowed us to take life easily, as soon as we were out of our boyhood, while

they devoted themselves to the affairs of other people,' *i.e.* to public life. Lysimachus means no more than that Aristides and Thucydides never made their sons take any part in war or politics; for in other subjects they gave them an excellent education. Plato says in the *Μενο*, p. 94 A, ἄλλον δὲ δὴ σκεψόμεθα, Ἀριστείδην τὸν Λυσιμάχου ... οὐκοῦν καὶ οὗτος τὸν υἱὸν τὸν αὐτοῦ Λυσίμαχον, ὅσα μὲν διδασκάλων εἶχετο, κάλλιστα Ἀθηναίων ἐπαίδευσεν; 'Let us take another,—Aristides, the son of Lysimachus: ... did not he train his son Lysimachus better than any other Athenian in all that could be done for him by the help of masters?' (Jowett); and in the same dialogue, 94 C, he says, Θουκυδίδης αὐτὸν δύο υἱεῖς ἔθρεψε, Μελησίαν καὶ Στέφανον, καὶ τούτους ἐπαίδευσεν ἅ τε ἄλλα εὖ καὶ ἐπάλαισάν κάλλιστα Ἀθηναίων. This training would however cease with their boyhood. That education should extend through life is an idea that runs through the whole of the *Laches*.

οὔτοι μὲν οὖν, κ.τ.λ. 'Well, they say that they will comply with our wishes, but we, as I was saying (δὴ),' etc. **D**

τί ἂν οὔτοι μαθόντες ἢ ἐπιτηδεύσαντες ὅ τι ἄριστοι γένοιτο. The form of the sentence is exactly like that of πῶς ἂν θεραπευθέντες γένοιτο ἄριστοι above, 179 B, on which see note.

εἰσηγήσατο οὖν τις ἡμῖν, κ.τ.λ. 'Well, somebody recommended to us this course of instruction, (telling us) that it was a good thing for a young man to learn to fight in heavy armour.' For the irregularity of the construction see note on the Language of the Dialogue.

ἐπιδεικνόμενον, 'displaying his art.'

ἐκέλευε, 'advised us.' When a man is said κελεύειν in Greek, it merely implies that he used, as it were, the imperative mood, not necessarily that he adopted an authoritative tone. The person in question might have said, 'You go and see Stesilaus, and judge for yourselves.'

ἔδοξε δὴ, 'so we thought.'

συμβούλους τε καὶ κοινωνούς, 'advisers and fellow-inquirers.'

ὑμέτερον μέρος. Supply ἐστίν.

καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. Lysimachus does not wish to confine the inquiry to the ὄπλομαχία; yet he has no notion of determining scientifically what the best training for his sons would be, but is content with the empirical method of collecting opinions on the value of this or that exercise. In other words, he has formed no definite ideas of the qualities he would like to see developed, or of the nature of the subjects in which he would have them developed, and consequently has no data

179 C

E

180 A

- 180 A** upon which to determine what sort of means he is to employ. We shall see afterwards (p. 184D foll.) that it has hardly occurred to him and Melesias (who is his counterpart) to examine what special competency their counsellors may have to give advice upon the particular question at issue. In the course of the dialogue they are taught that the question cannot be settled so easily, because (i.) it happens to concern the human soul, and is therefore of great importance; (ii.) only those who know what is best for the soul can give an opinion that is worth anything; (iii.) our ordinary ideas of any good quality (*e.g.* courage, the quality that such training may be supposed to cultivate) are vague, and often contradict each other.

CAP. III.

οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Λάχητα τόνδε. Sc. ἔτοιμον εἶναι κοινωνεῖν.

B Ἄληθῆ γὰρ οἶει. 'Indeed you are right.'

ὡς, 'for.'

ὅ γε, 'the thing at least which.'

εἰς ἐκείνους, 'in regard to them' (Aristides and Thucydides).

ὅτι αὐτοῖς σχεδόν τι ταῦτα, κ.τ.λ. σχεδόν τι (lit. 'somewhat nearly') qualifies the whole statement, and means that it is to be taken as generally, but not universally true. If the words *ὀλιγωρεῖσθαι τε καὶ ἀμελῶς διατίθεσθαι* are taken as epexegetical of *ταῦτα*, we may translate, 'For as a rule what he says of them is really the case, both with regard to their sons and all their private affairs, that they are neglected and carelessly managed.' If, however, we take *ταῦτα συμβαίνει ὀλιγωρεῖσθαι, κ.τ.λ.*, together as 'these things happen to be neglected,' etc., we may translate, 'For as a rule it happens in their case that what he speaks of—both sons and their private affairs—are disregarded and carelessly managed.' The last rendering makes the sentence more complete, but the first is more in accordance with Platonic usage. *καὶ περὶ τᾶλλα ἴδια* is meant to be an addition made by Laches, who does not imply that Lysimachus spoke of any other neglect than that of the education of sons.

ὅτι δ' ἡμᾶς μὲν, κ.τ.λ., 'but I am astonished that you ask us to give you advice about the education of the young men, and yet do not ask Socrates here.'

C πρῶτον μὲν ὄντα δημότην, 'in the first place, because he is of your own deme.' Plutarch tells us that the

families of Thucydides and Aristides were both of the deme of Alopeece, to which Socrates also belonged. The demes were local divisions of Attica, something like parishes, and of great antiquity. See Grote's *History of Greece*, part II., ch. xxxi. 180 C

τὰς διατριβὰς ποιούμενον, 'spending his time.'

Πῶς λέγεις; 'What?' or 'Indeed!' The words express surprise, or slight incredulity.

γάρ, 'can it be the case that?' *i.e.* 'do you mean that?'

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 'Most certainly he has.'

καὶ γὰρ αὐτῷ, κ.τ.λ., 'for he recommended to me lately a music-master for my son.'

Ἀγαθοκλέους μαθητὴν Δάμωνα. This Damon is always spoken of with great respect by Plato. He was professedly a teacher of μουσική, not in the wide sense in which the word included all mental training that was not merely elementary, but in our sense of music. He showed, however, great ability not only in explaining the theory of his profession, but in political and ethical speculations. Socrates himself was a hearer and admirer of Damon, and so was Pericles. It is not certain whether Damon was actually music-master to the latter—Plutarch thinks that he was—but there is no doubt that they were intimate. Plutarch suggests that Damon's profession of music-master was used as a cloak for the instruction that he gave in other matters, and that he was really Pericles' 'trainer and master' in politics. Plutarch calls Damon a sophist (though Plato does not), and the passage in which he speaks of him reads like a reminiscence of *Protagoras* 316 E, where Agathocles, Damon's teacher, is spoken of in very similar language. The whole speech there put into Protagoras' mouth by Plato (316 c-317 c) should be read by those who wish to know what a 'sophist' was. More will be said on the subject in commenting on p. 186 c. D

ἀνδρῶν χαρίεστατον, κ.τ.λ., lit. 'the most accomplished of men not only in music, but also in other respects worth as much as you like for young men of such an age to spend their time with.' The addition of ὅπόσου βούλει, κ.τ.λ., spoils the exact logical correspondence that we should expect between οὐ μόνον τὴν μουσικὴν and ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰλλα. Literary English does not now tolerate even such mild anacolutha as this. Translate therefore, 'Who is not only the most accomplished of men in music, but in all other respects as good a companion as you could wish for young men of that age.'

For the construction of ἀξίον here cf. p. 182 c, μαθήματα
... πολλοῦ ἄξια ἀνδρὶ μαθεῖν τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεῦσαι.

CAP. IV.

180 D οἱ ἡλίκοι ἐγώ, 'people at my time of life.' ἡλίκοι is put for τηλικούτοι ἡλίκος ἐγώ εἰμι, the plural number being due to what is called attraction. Cf. Aristoph. *Eccles.* 465—

ἐκεῖνο δεινὸν τοῖσιν ἡλίκοισι νῶν.

ἄτε κατ' οἰκίαν, κ.τ.λ., 'since we are compelled by old age to live most of our lives in-doors.' For the construction of ὑπὸ cf. 187 A, ἀν μὴ ὑμῶν σχολὴ ἦ ὑπὸ τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων.

τῶδε τῷ σαυτοῦ δημότῃ. He means himself. (For δημότῃ see above, 180 c). The figure of speech is here used with the condescending playfulness of age. It could hardly be used seriously in prose. But in tragedy it is common enough, without, of course, any idea of playfulness. Cf. Soph. *Ajax* 445-6—

νῦν δ' αὐτ' Ἀτρεΐδαι φωτὶ παντουργῶ φρένας
ἐπραξαν, ἀνδρὸς τοῦ δ' ἀπώσαντες κράτη.

E δίκαιος δ' εἶ, sc. τοῦτο ποιεῖν, 'and you are bound to do it.' The phrase—a common one—might mean in a different context 'and you have a right to do it.'

καὶ πρότερον ἐκεῖνος, κ.τ.λ. 'And he died without ever having had a quarrel with me.'

περιφέρει δέ τις με καὶ μνήμη, κ.τ.λ. 'And now that they mention it I remember something'; lit. 'a memory takes me back.' Cf. Herod. vi. 86. 2, οὔτε μέμνημαι τὸ πρῆγμα, οὔτε με περιφέρει (sc. μνήμη) οὐδὲν εἰδέναι τούτων τῶν ὑμεῖς λέγετε. (τῶνδε λεγόντων might however be taken as a genitive depending on μνήμη, 'of them saying,' i.e. 'of something these boys said.')

τὰ γὰρ μειράκια τάδε. The γὰρ merely serves to show that Lysimachus is explaining what he means by his μνήμη τις.

ἀλλήλους, διαλεγόμενοι, and ἐπιμένηνται are used as agreeing in sense though not in form with μειράκια. Yet in 179 A, where the word came next to a verb, we have seen that Plato regarded μειράκια as sufficiently neuter to attract the verb into the singular number (ἐπειδὴ μειράκια γέγονεν).

ἐπαινοῦσιν, sc. αὐτόν.

εἰ τὸν Σωφρονίσκου λέγοιεν, 'if they meant the son of Sophroniscus.'

181 A ὅδ' ἐστὶ Σωκράτης, κ.τ.λ., 'is this the Socrates whom you mentioned on those occasions?' For the form of the expression cf. Eur. *Orestes* 380—

ὅδ' εἴμ' Ὀρέστης, Μενέλεως, ὃν ἱστορεῖς,

'I (here) am the Orestes, Menelaus, about whom you inquire.' 181 A
 ὅδ' ἐστὶν ὁ Σωκράτης, κ.τ.λ., would mean, 'Is this Socrates the man whom?' etc.

πάνυ μὲν οὖν, κ.τ.λ., 'certainly, father, he is.' Lysimachus had put the question to both the boys, but only one, his own son Aristides, makes reply. They take no further part in the conversation. Melesias, again, does not speak twenty words in the whole dialogue, and Lysimachus himself takes no part in the real discussion, which is carried on by three persons only, Socrates, Laches, and Nicias.

ὀρθοῖς, 'you maintain the name of' (Jowett).

καὶ ἄλλως. This qualifies the εἶ (ἐστί).

καὶ δὴ καὶ ὅτι, 'and above all because.' The whole phrase καὶ ἄλλως καὶ δὴ καὶ is a more forcible form of the ordinary ἄλλως τε καὶ. Cf. 187 c.

οἰκεία τά τε σά, κ.τ.λ., i.e. 'there will be intimacy between us.'

μὴ ἀφίεσό γε τάνδρός, 'do not in any case give him up.'

ἐν γὰρ τῇ ἀπὸ Δηλίου φυγῇ. This was in B.C. 424. Laches B
 was not general at Delium, but apparently serving as a hoplite. In the *Symposium*, 220 E and 221 A-B, Plato makes Alcibiades say of Socrates, "Ἐτι τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἄξιον ἦν θεάσασθαι Σωκράτη, ὅτε ἀπὸ Δηλίου φυγῇ ἀνεχώρει τὸ στρατόπεδον· ἔτυχον γὰρ παραγενόμενος ἵππου ἔχων, οὗτος δέ ὄπλα. ἀνεχώρει οὖν ἐσκεδασμένων ἤδη τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὗτός τε ἅμα καὶ Λάχης· καὶ ἐγὼ περιτυγχάνω, καὶ ἰδὼν εὐθὺς παρακελεύομαι τε αὐτοῖν θαρρῆν καὶ ἔλεγον, ὅτι οὐκ ἀπολείψω αὐτῷ. ἐνταῦθα δὴ καὶ κάλλιον ἐθεασάμην Σωκράτη ἢ ἐν Ποτιδαίᾳ· αὐτὸς γὰρ ἦττον ἐν φόβῳ ἢ διὰ τὸ ἐφ' ἵππου εἶναι· πρῶτον μὲν ὅσον περιῆν Λάχητος τῷ ἔμφρων εἶναι (in presence of mind). He goes on to describe how Socrates marched along, 'rolling his eyes, calmly contemplating enemies as well as friends, and making very intelligible to anybody, even from a distance, that whoever attacked him would be likely to meet with a stout resistance.' (Jowett's translation.) How far the story here related is true we have no means of judging; but that Socrates and Laches were together in the retreat, being mentioned as it is in two dialogues, is not likely to be due to Plato's invention. The mention of the battle of Delium in the *Laches* helps us, as has been said, to fix approximately the date of the occurrence of the imaginary dialogue. For an account of the battle see Thuc. iv. 91-96.

ὀρθὴ ἂν ἡμῶν, κ.τ.λ., 'our country would have been pre-

181 B served and would not then have met with such a disaster,' etc. Laches means the defeat would never have occurred had all Athenians behaved in the battle as Socrates did in the retreat.

οὗτος ... ὁ ἔπαινος ... ὄν σὺ νῦν ἐπαινεῖ, 'the praise which you are now receiving.'

καὶ εἰς ταῦτα εἰς ἅ, κ.τ.λ., 'and for the things for which they praise you.' Two reasons are given for thinking the praise given to Socrates valuable—(1) the high character of Nicias and Laches who give it, (2) the excellence of the qualities to which it testifies.

χρῆν μὲν οὖν καὶ πρότερόν γε, κ.τ.λ., 'therefore you ought to have visited us long ago of your own accord' (αὐτόν).

C νῦν δ' οὖν, 'but as things are.'

σύνισθι, from σύνειμι, not σύνοιδα. It would properly be followed by a dative, but γνώριζε, which is joined to it, determines, as being the nearer verb, the case of the objects.

ἡμεῖς, *i.e.* Socrates and young Aristides.

ἡμετέραν, *i.e.* that of Lysimachus and Sophroniscus.

περὶ ... ὧν ἡρξάμεθα, for περὶ τούτων περὶ ὧν ἡρξάμεθα.

τί φατε; Of course addressed to Nicias and Laches as well as to Socrates. The plural of the second person, whether in verb or pronoun, is never used for the singular in classical Latin or Greek.

CAP. V.

D 'Ἀλλά, 'Well.' The word is used in the same reassuring sense by Nicias at the beginning of the next speech.

καὶ αὖ ἃ προκαλεῖ πάντα ποιεῖν. This refers to Lysimachus' desire to be intimate with Socrates.

τῶνδε, masc., referring to Nicias and Laches.

τούτων, neuter, referring to the subject under discussion.

ἄλλο παρά, 'different from': cf. ἄλλα παρά, 178 B.

τότ' ἤδη has the force of 'then and not till then.'

διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν. διδάσκειν is not so strong a word as our *teach*, and both it and πείθειν are strictly imperfect presents: 'to explain it and try to convince.'

πότερος ὑμῶν, 'one of you two.'

'Ἄλλ' οὐδὲν κωλύει, 'Well, there is no reason why I 181 D should not.'

τὸ μὴ ἄλλοθι διατρίβειν. These words, together with the rest of the clause down to ἄλλ' ἐν τούτῳ form the subject of εὖ ἔχει, and the clause ὅθεν ... ἀνάγκη is a continuation of that subject. ὅθεν is equivalent to ὑφ' οὗ, and the antecedent to it is τούτῳ. Translate, 'For it is an excellent thing for young men not to spend their leisure in the other diversions in which you know they are so apt to spend it, but in this exercise, especially (καί) as it is one which cannot fail to make them in better condition.'

τὸ σῶμα βέλτιον ἴσχειν ἀνάγκη, lit. 'it is necessary for their body (bodies) to be better,' taking βέλτιον as an adverb; or we might understand αὐτοὺς as the subject to ἴσχειν, and take τὸ σῶμα as the accusative of respect, or as an ordinary accusative after it. In the last case βέλτιον must be taken as an adjective.

καὶ ἅμα, 'and at the same time.' This introduces 182 A Nicias' second reason for thinking well of the exercise. The first reason was a double one: it kept boys out of mischief, and, besides, kept them in good condition. He now says that it is truly a free man's exercise, as it teaches him how to fight.

καὶ ἡ ἱππική, sc. τέχνη. This addition does not add anything to the logical weight of the sentence, but it adds to its rhetorical force by putting the ὀπλομαχία on a level with another art, which was confessedly a fashionable one.

οὗ γὰρ ἀγῶνος ἀθληταὶ ἔσμεν, κ.τ.λ. This sentence in full would be οὗ γὰρ ἀγῶνος ἀθληταὶ ἔσμεν καὶ ἐν οἷς ἡμῖν ὁ ἀγὼν πρόκειται, τοῦτον τὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ ἐν τούτοις (under those conditions) μόνοι οὗτοι γυμνάζονται οἱ ἐν, κ.τ.λ. 'For that sport in which we are the players is properly practised, and the conditions under which we have to play it are fulfilled by those only who exercise themselves in this apparatus of war.'

μόνον πρὸςμόνον, 'in single combat.'

ἐπιτιθεμένου ἄλλου, genitive absolute.

ἀμύνασθαι αὐτόν, 'to make resistance oneself.'

οὗτ' ἂν ὑπό γε ἐνὸς εἰς ὃ τοῦτ' ἐπιστάμενος οὐδὲν ἂν πάθοι. Nicias here claims too much for the art. Cf. Molière, *Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme*, act II. sc. iii.: "*Mons. Jourdain*. De cette façon donc, un homme, sans avoir du coeur, est sûr de tuer son homme et de n'être point tué? *Le Maître d'Armes*. Sans doute; n'en vites vous pas la démonstration?" This is

182 B of course burlesque, but there is something of the same humour in Plato's words. Nicias is as extravagant in overrating the accomplishment as we shall find Laches to be in underrating it.

ἐπιθυμήσειε καὶ τοῦ ἐξῆς, κ.τ.λ., 'would be desirous to learn the science of tactics which comes next in the course.' Stesilaus, like Dionysodorus (see Plato's *Euthydemus*, p. 271 D, and Xenophon's *Memorabilia* III. 1), seems to have taught tactics and the whole art of generalship as well as the use of his weapons.

καὶ ταῦτα λαβών, κ.τ.λ., 'and having learned this, and become proud of his learning.'

ἐπὶ πᾶν ἂν τὸ περὶ τὰς στρατηγίας ὀρμήσειε, 'would pass on to the study of all that concerns the conduct of campaigns.' The plural τὰς στρατηγίας is used because generalship is here looked upon as manifested on several different occasions. στρατηγία meant the general's art in the widest sense, and, unlike our word 'strategy,' included tactics. This we see from Xen. *Mem.* III. 1, 6, where Socrates speaks of τὰ τακτικά as being a part, though a very small one, of στρατηγία.

C καὶ ἤδη δῆλον, 'and you will now allow.'

τούτων ἐχόμενα, 'which are connected with these,' viz., with τακτικά and στρατηγία.

καὶ καλὰ καί.... These words begin the predicate to μαθήματα πάντα καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα πάντα. ἐστί must be supplied. 'Are (both) good and ...'

πολλοῦ ἄξια ἀνδρὶ μαθεῖν, κ.τ.λ. Cf. ὅποσον βούλει ἄξιον συνδιατρίβειν τηλικούτοις νεανίσκοις above, p. 180 D.

ὧν καθηγῆσαι' ἂν τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα. This clause at first sight seems superfluous; but Nicias, having said before that ὄπλομαχία would probably lead to στρατηγία in all its branches, and that the μαθήματα, etc., connected with στρατηγία are confessedly good, now adds his conclusion that ὄπλομαχία would probably lead to good μαθήματα and ἐπιτηδεύματα.

αὐτῷ, i.e. τῷ μάθηματι.

αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ, 'than he was before,' or 'than he would be otherwise.'

εἰ καί, 'even though.'

ὅτι καὶ εὐσχημονέστερον. Supply ποιήσειεν ἂν.

D Λάχητος δέ, κ.τ.λ., 'but I should be glad in my turn to hear what Laches has to say, if his views on the question are different from mine' (lit. 'if he says anything different from this')

CAP. VI.

εἰ μὲν ἔστι μάθημα, 'if it is a true art.' By μάθημα, thus **182 E** used emphatically, Plato means an art which has rules and can be taught, and for this we have no single word.

ὑπερ φασίν, κ.τ.λ., 'as its teachers allege it to be, and as good an art as Nicias makes it out.'

οἱ ὑπισχνούμενοι, 'those who profess to teach it as such.'

Λακεδαιμονίους. Laches was no doubt well disposed to that nation. See note on the Persons of the Dialogue under his name.

εἰς τάδε ἀποβλέψας, 'because of the following considerations.'

τί καὶ δέοι ἂν αὐτὸ μαθάνειν : for the irregular apodosis cf. ἂν εἴποιεν (178 A).

εἴ τι ἦν, 'if it were any good.'

ὅ τι ἂν μαθόντες, κ.τ.λ. This dependent question (of the same form as that in 179 B, πῶς ἂν θεραπευθέντες, κ.τ.λ., and that in 179 D, τί ἂν οὗτοι μαθόντες, κ.τ.λ.) depends on ζητεῖν, not on ἐπιτηδεύειν. The interposition of καὶ ἐπιτηδεύειν makes it impossible to translate the passage οἷς οὐδὲν ... τὸν πόλεμον literally. Jowett renders it as follows, 'Whose whole life is passed in finding out and practising the arts which give them an advantage over other nations in war.'

ἐλελήθει, sc. τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα.

183 A

ἀλλ' οὐ τούτους γε τοὺς διδασκάλους, κ.τ.λ., 'at any rate, the following truth has not escaped the teachers of the art.'

ἐκεῖνοι, the Lacedaemonians.

παρ' ἐκείνοις ἂν τις τιμηθεῖς. The ἂν is pleonastic, and serves only to anticipate the one that follows. τιμηθεῖς forms the protasis to ἂν ἐργάζοιτο, and is equivalent to εἰ τιμηθείη. For the double ἂν cf. above, 182 B, οὐτ' ἂν ὑπὸ γε ἐνὸς εἰς ὁ τοῦτ' ἐπιστάμενος οὐδὲν ἂν πάθοι.

καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων. These words begin the apodosis. καὶ contrasts τῶν ἄλλων with ἐκείνοις, not however so strongly as our word 'too,' as it is not implied that the teacher would make much money in Lacedaemon. It is therefore better left untranslated.

ὥσπερ γε καὶ τραγωδίας, κ.τ.λ., 'just as a tragic writer would who was honoured at Athens.' Notice the suggestion that the military pre-eminence of Sparta was as incontestable as the literary supremacy of Athens.

183 A τοιγάρτοι, 'and that is the reason why ...'

B τοὺς δὲ ἐν ὅπλοις, κ.τ.λ. The argument is not conclusive. The Lacedaemonians were so well trained that men like Stesilaus would have nothing to teach them; and they were, besides, most intolerant towards foreigners.

πάσι μᾶλλον ἐπιδεικνυμένους, 'displaying their art to anybody rather than to the Lacedaemonians.'

CAP. VII.

οὐ πάνυ ὀλίγοις, 'not so very few.' Riddell says that πάνυ here goes closely with ὀλίγοις. But see note on ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιλανθάνομαι, κ.τ.λ., 189 c.

C ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἔργῳ. The character of Laches is drawn with much skill. He is a man of strong prejudices, but he thinks that he has none; and he now with a great appearance of candour, appeals, as many people do, to 'facts' which have really no bearing on the question. The story of the awkward situation in which Stesilaus was seen on board ship while employing an unusual weapon—though effective enough as tending to throw ridicule on the man—goes no way to prove either the uselessness of ὅπλομαχία or his inability to teach it.

ἔξεστι δὲ καὶ αὐτόθεν ἡμῖν σκέψασθαι, 'and we may as well consider the subject now.' Laches half apologizes for the story he is about to tell, as if he had meant to end his speech with οἰοί εἰσιν.

ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐπίτηδες οὐδεὶς, κ.τ.λ. The force of the γὰρ seems to be, 'I may, I say, as well put the facts before you, because Stesilaus is no exception to the rule that none of these professionals are any good in real warfare.' ὥσπερ ... ἐπίτηδες means 'as if on purpose.' Jacobs aptly compares Cicero *de Orat.* i. 20, "nam primum, quasi *dedita opera*, neminem scriptorem artis (writer of a treatise on rhetoric) ne mediocriter quidem disertum fuisse dicebat," which is obviously an imitation of the passage before us.

τὰ ὀπλιτικά, *i.e.* the art of fighting in armour.

καίτοι εἷς γε τᾶλλα πάντα, κ.τ.λ. 'Now, in all other cases those who win renown for anything are to be found among those who make it their business; but in this case, it would seem, the professors of the art have been so very unfortunate in it as compared with other men.'

ἐτέρωθι ἐγὼ κάλλιον, κ.τ.λ., 'I once saw to better purpose elsewhere, really making an exhibition of himself—though he did not mean to—in actual warfare.' ἀληθεία is here opposed to the mimic fighting which Stesilaus displayed in the palaestra. In Polybius the word has the technical sense of active service. ὡς intensifying ἀληθῶς and other positive adverbs is common in Plato. 183 D

προσβαλούσης, intr., 'having attacked.'

ἐπεβάτευε, 'he was serving as a marine.' The ἐπιβάται were usually drawn from the θῆτες, the lowest of the four classes of Athenian citizens (Thuc. vi. 43). What follows may have been a real incident in Laches' Sicilian expedition, but is quite as likely to have happened on a different occasion, or to have been invented by Plato.

δορυδρέπανον. The weapon was like a halbert, and is described by Caesar, *Bell. Gall.* iii. 14, "Una erat magno usui res praeparata a nostris, falces praeacutae insertae adfixaeque longuriis (poles), non absimili forma muralium falcium. His cum funes, qui antemnas ad malos destinabant, comprehensi adductique erant, navigio remis incitato praerumpebantur. Quibus abscisis antemnae necessario concidebant." One would imagine that Stesilaus' weapon had a like object, but that missing the cordage it stuck in the mast. If it was used for cutting the rigging it would be of no value except against transports or merchantmen, for Greek ships of war never went into action with their masts standing.

διαφέρον δὴ ὄπλον is in apposition to δορυδρέπανον and αὐτὸς is in apposition to the subject of ἐμάχετο.

τὸ δὲ σόφισμα ... οἷον ἀπέβη. Supply ἄξιον (ἐστὶ) λέγειν, and for the construction cf. *Gorgias* 448 D, δηλὸς γὰρ μοι Πῶλος ... ὅτι τὴν καλουμένην ῥητορικὴν .. μεμελέτηκεν. In both of these cases the subject of the dependent sentence is disengaged from it and becomes the subject of the principal sentence. Often it becomes the object of the principal sentence, e.g. 188 C, Λάχητα δὲ τόνδε ὄρα ὅπως ἔχει περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου. Cf. Plato's *Euthydemus* 294 C, οἶσθα Εὐθύδημον, ὀπίσους ὀδόντας ἔχει; Hom. *Od.* xvii. 373, αὐτὸν δ' οὐ σάφα οἶδα, πόθεν γένος εὐχεται εἶναι; and St. Mark i. 24, οἶδά σε τίς εἶ, where our version has preserved the Greek idiom, "I know thee who thou art."

ἡ δὲ ναῦς τὴν ναῦν παρήει, 'meanwhile the ships were passing each other.' E

παρημείβετο. This must mean more than παρήει above, and imply 'was clearing.'

184 A *στύρακος*, the pointed cap of bronze that enclosed the butt end of the spear, and by which the weapon could be stuck in the ground like a fishing-rod.

ἀσπίσι κεκλιμένοι, παρὰ δ' ἔγχεα μακρὰ πέπηγεν.

—Hom. *Il.* iii. 135.

“Defigunt tellure hastas et scuta reclinant.”

—Verg. *Aen.* xii. 130.

The *στύραξ* had another use, it served as a weapon of offence if the spear-head broke off. The Romans, seeing the advantage of this, copied the Greek form of spear for their cavalry, their own spears having originally had no spikes at the butt ends. (Polybius vi. 25. He calls the spike by the Ionic name *σαυρωτήρ*.)

ἦν ... ὑπό, ‘was raised by.’

ἐπὶ τε τῷ σχήματι αὐτοῦ. The *τε* suggests that another dative with *ἐπὶ* will follow, but instead of it we have the clause *καὶ ... ἐκεῖνο*.

βαλόντος ... λίθῳ. This is quite a usual construction of *βάλλω*. We must translate however, ‘having thrown a stone.’

παρὰ τοὺς πόδας, κ.τ.λ., ‘on to the deck close by his feet.’

ἴσως μὲν οὖν, κ.τ.λ. ‘Now possibly there may be some good in this exercise, as Nicias says; but however, my experience has been pretty much as I have told you.’ *οὖν* has almost exactly the same force in both clauses. In the first it makes a show of setting aside Laches’ experience in view of the possibility of Nicias being right; in the second clause it sets aside conjecture for fact. ‘Of course, in spite of all of this, Nicias may be right; but for all that, I have told you the result of my experience.’

CAP. VIII.

Ὁ οὖν καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, κ.τ.λ., ‘So as I said at first, whether it is an art with such very little use, or whether they falsely assert and pretend that it is an art, it is not worth while to try to learn it.’ The construction is illogical, but need offer no difficulty. It is commonly explained by an ellipse of *ἐστὶ τοῦτο*, ‘what I said at the beginning is this, that’.... It would be simpler to say that *ὅτι* is pleonastic; in reality we have two clauses each depending on the other, though not simultaneously. The construction of the first is forgotten by the speaker as soon as the second is reached.

καὶ γὰρ οὖν μοι δοκεῖ. After this we have first *ἀν ...* 184 B γένοιτο and then *ἀν ... ἴσχειν*. The latter verb depends on *δοκεῖ*, which is however parenthetical in relation to the former. Strictly both verbs should be in the same mood. Cf. Thuc. i. 3, *δοκεῖ δέ μοι οὐδὲ τοῦνομα τοῦτο ξύμπασά πω εἶχεν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πρὸ Ἑλληνας τοῦ Δευκαλίωνος καὶ πάνυ οὐδὲ εἶναι ἢ ἐπίκλησις αὐτῆ.*

αὐτὸν ἐπίστασθαι, *sc.* τὸ μάθημα: "se istam artem callere." The insertion of the accusative reflexive pronoun is more rare in Greek than its omission is in Latin. Cf. however Herodotus i. 34, *μετὰ δὲ Σόλωνα οἰχόμενον, ἔλαβε ἐκ θεοῦ νέμεσις μεγάλην Κροῖσον ὡς εἰκάσαι, ὅτι ἐνόμισε ἑωυτὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἀπάντων ὀλβιώτατον*, and ii. 2, *οἱ δὲ Αἰγύπτιοι ... ἐνόμιζον ἑωυτοὺς πρῶτους γενέσθαι πάντων ἀνθρώπων*. Also Plato, *Symposium* 175 C, *μετὰ ταῦτα ἔφη σφᾶς μὲν δειπνεῖν, τὸν δὲ Σωκράτη οὐκ εἰσείναι. τὸν οὖν Ἀγάθωνα πολλάκις κελεύειν μεταπέμψασθαι τὸν Σωκράτη, ἔ δὲ οὐκ εἶναι*. See *Gorg.* 474 B for a similar reflexive use of the accusative of the first person as the subject of an infinitive. The ordinary practice when the subject of the infinitive needs to be expressed and is the same as that of the principal verb is to insert *αὐτός* in the nominative, and in the number and gender required as in the famous instance *Κλέων ... οὐκ ἔφη αὐτὸς ἀλλ' ἐκείνον στρατηγεῖν*. *αὐτός* would of course be quite out of place in the passage before us, but *αὐτόν* is not much more satisfactory in Plato. *ἐπίστασθαι* requires an object much more than a subject; accordingly *αὐτό* used to be read, but on no good authority.

θρασύτερος ἂν δι' αὐτό, *κ.τ.λ.*, 'he would become more venturesome on account of it, and so more clearly display his real character,' *i.e.* the man would venture into danger which he would otherwise have avoided, and when the moment of peril came be overwhelmed by fear and show what a coward he really was. The word *θρασύς* has often a bad sense. Aristotle (*Nic. Eth.* iii. 7, 8) says, *δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἀλαζῶν εἶναι ὁ θρασύς καὶ προσποιητικὸς ἀνδρείας. ὡς οὖν ἐκεῖνος (the really brave man) περὶ τὰ φοβερὰ ἔχει οὕτως οὗτος βούλεται φαίνεσθαι ἐν οἷς οὖν δύναται, μιμείται*. Below (§ 12) he says, *οἱ μὲν θρασεῖς προπετεῖς, καὶ βουλόμενοι πρὸ τῶν κινδύνων ἐν αὐτοῖς δ' * ἀφίστανται, οἱ δ' ἀνδρείοι ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ὀξεῖς, πρότερον δ' ἡσύχιοι*. For Aristotle's treatment of the whole subject of *ἀνδρεία* see Appendix.

φυλαττόμενος, 'being watched.'

μεγάλας ἂν διαβολὰς ἴσχειν, '(that) he would be subjected to very ill-natured criticism.'

* The *δέ* is pleonastic.

184 B ἐπίφθονος γάρ, κ.τ.λ.. ἐπίφθονος is of course here used in the passive sense, 'liable to be disliked,' and the remark is an extremely true one. Laches however does not see that it really makes against his main argument, for he is prejudiced himself.

C ὥστε, 'so that.' The word may be followed by the indicative (as here) or the infinitive.

εἰ μή τι θαυμαστὸν ὅσον διαφέρει, κ.τ.λ., 'if he does not to a remarkable degree excel other men in valour.' There is some difficulty about the phrase θαυμαστὸν ὅσον. It is commonly explained as short for θαυμαστὸν ἐστὶν ὅσον ('it is wonderful how much'), and the same explanation would apply to ἀμηχάνως ὡς (*Rep.* 527 E; *Phaedr.* 263 D), and to the Latin "mirum quantum." On the other hand ὅσος, unlike *quantus*, is not an interrogative word, and though it is used in dependent questions (e.g. *Soph. Aj.* 118, ὀρᾶς, Ὀδυσσεῦ, τὴν θεῶν ἰσχὺν, ὅση;) this explanation cannot possibly apply to the idiom ἐδῶκεν αὐτῷ πλεῖστα ὄσα or to the expression in Herodotus iv. 194, ἄφθονοι ὄσοι. Much more satisfactory is the explanation (and this seems to be Riddell's) which explains the ὅσον, etc., as a condensation of a strictly relative clause. Thus τι θαυμαστὸν ὅσον will be put for τι θαυμαστὸν ὅσον ἐστὶ, 'something wonderful in its extent,' ἄφθονοι ὄσοι, 'unlimited in number,' πλεῖστα ὄσα, 'very many in number,' and so on. Cicero's "nimium quantum" and Horace's "Vino et lucernis Medus acinaces *Immane quantum* discrepat," cannot be easily explained in any other way, and "mirum quantum" at least admits of this explanation. The words ὄσος or οἶος in this idiom are attracted into the case of the adjective that they qualify. Where that adjective is in the nominative the attraction of course cannot take place, and where the adjective is accusative neuter (as in the passage before us) the attraction will not be noticeable. A good instance of the attraction is found in *Rep.*, p. 350 c, ὁ δὴ Θρασύμαχος ὠμολόγησε μὲν πάντα ταῦτα ... μετὰ ἰδρώτος θαυμαστοῦ ὄσου. It must be admitted that in Plato's time the idiom may have been to a certain extent a mechanical one, and misunderstood by the Greeks themselves, and also that the Latin idiom may be no more than a reproduction of the Greek idiom, possibly misunderstood. See Riddell's edition of the *Apology*, pp. 193, 194.

φάσκων ἔχειν, κ.τ.λ., 'if he professed to be a master of this art.'

τοιαύτη τις, κ.τ.λ., 'such is my opinion, Lysimachus, about studying this art.'

ὥσπερ ἔτι. The first of these words ('as it were') warns us **184 C** that a metaphorical expression is to follow. It may belong either to τοῦ διακρινούντος or to the whole sentence that depends on δοκεῖ. ἔτι belongs to δεῖν, and is put out of its place as in the *Cratylus* 399 A, κινδυνεύσω, εἰ μὴ εὐλαβῶμαι, ἔτι τήμερον σοφώτερος τοῦ δέοντος γενέσθαι, where ἔτι belongs to σοφώτερος.

νῦν δέ ... γάρ. The passage in which these words occur is usually printed thus, νῦν δέ—τὴν ἐναντίαν γάρ, ὡς ὀρᾶς, Λάχης Νικία ἔθετο—εὖ δὲ ἔχει But Riddell has well observed that νῦν δέ ... γάρ, like ἀλλὰ γάρ, forms one phrase. He says that "this combination is always preceded by a hypothesis of something contrary to facts, and is parallel to the Protasis of that sentence, which it contradicts. The δέ and the γάρ exercise a simultaneous force; δέ represents that the condition stands differently in fact from what it is in the supposed case" (here the condition in the supposed case was the agreement of Nicias and Laches), "and γάρ further represents that the inference must be different We are not to look to a sentence beyond to supply a clause to the νῦν δέ" (Riddell's *Digest of Idioms* in his edition of Plato's *Apology*, p. 176). Riddell quotes, together with the present passage and others, p. 200 E of our dialogue, νῦν δ' ὁμοίως γὰρ πάντες ἐν ἀπορίᾳ ἐγενόμεθα, and *Apology* 38 A, εἰ μὲν ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησάμην ἄν ... νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν. 'If I had money I would have assessed my penalty ... but as it is I have none.' The force of the γάρ cannot be given in English.

τὴν ἐναντίαν, sc. ψῆφον.

δή, 'so.'

CAP. IX.

Τί δαί, κ.τ.λ. 'What! Lysimachus, do you intend to adopt whatever opinion the majority of us maintains?'

Τί γὰρ ἄν τις καὶ ποιοί. 'Why (γάρ) what would you have a man do?' The καὶ implies that Lysimachus does not acknowledge that he ought to do anything else than decide by a majority; without the καὶ the phrase would be an appeal for advice.

κἂν εἴ τις. This ἄν prepares the way for the one that follows. We have already had instances of this, pp. 182 B and 183 A.

ἄρα τοῖς πλείοσιν ἄν ἡμῶν πείθοιο, κ.τ.λ. These and **E** the following words contain one of the main lessons of the

184 E dialogue, which is this, that on any given subject a consensus of uneducated opinion is worth nothing against the judgment of those who are by their training qualified to decide upon the subject. Bacon (*Nov. Org.* i. 77) goes so far as to say, "Pessimum enim omnium est augurium, quod ex consensu capitur in rebus intellectualibus," which is, of course, an exaggeration. On the other hand, in so far as educated opinion means the opinion of a class or clique, it is liable to contain special errors. The opinion of the lay public is valuable as tending to criticise and counteract these errors.

ὑπό, as we say 'under.'

ἡσκηκώς. The word is used absolutely: '(who happens ...) to have practised.'

185 A τοὺς δ' ἄλλοὺς εἶν, 'and leave the others alone.' The phrase is a common one. It is sometimes varied by the addition of χάλρειν, as in p. 201 B.

ἢ περὶ μικροῦ οἴεσθε, κ.τ.λ., 'or do you and Lysimachus imagine it to be a small matter that you have now at stake, and not rather that possession which, as it happens, is the most important of all you have? For, I imagine, according as a man's sons become good or bad, so will the character of his whole household correspond in each case to that of his children.' οὕτως οἰκῆσεται is literally 'will be inhabited in such a way,' οἰκῆσεται being passive. The verb is often used with πόλις and οἶκος in this colourless way.

B δ' ἐγὼ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, 'with regard to the thing that I spoke of just now.' The allusion is to 184 D foll., κὰν εἴ τις περὶ ἀγωνίας τοῦ νείεος, κ.τ.λ.

ἄρ' οὐχ ὁ μαθών, κ.τ.λ., 'will it not be the man,' etc. Socrates does not answer the question, πῶς ... ἐσκοποῦμεν ἄν, κ.τ.λ., in the form in which he asked it.

οὐκοῦν ἔτι πρότερον, κ.τ.λ. Supply ἄν ἐσκοποῦμεν, 'but should we not first ask what the thing was whose instructors we were trying to find?' Here, as if almost by accident, Socrates hints that it is not the professional warrior who will know most about exercise, but a man of higher qualifications. For the important question, as we shall see below, is the effect of the exercise on the mental and moral character. There is a mixture of two constructions, τίνος ζητοῦμεν τοὺς διδασκάλους and τί ἐστι τοῦτο οὐ ζητοῦμεν τοὺς διδασκάλους.

πῶς λέγεις; Whenever Socrates' interlocutor asks him to explain himself it must be taken to mean that Plato feels that the subject is one of difficulty. The subject is generally

started by a somewhat obscure sentence (as οὐκοῦν ἔτι πρότερον, 185 B κ.τ.λ.) with the purpose of arresting the reader's attention; then follows the πῶς λέγεις (cf. 190 E), or the οὐκ ἔμαθον ('I don't understand'), which gives an opportunity for further explanation. (See *Rep.* 438 A and B.) It should be observed that many points are thought difficult by Plato that are not difficult to us; while, on the other hand, we often find in his dialogues what seem unwarrantable assumptions; but in the latter case we are to understand that where a point is passed over without discussion there is *as a rule* nothing that would have been controverted by Plato's contemporaries. In 189 E Socrates *volunteers* an explanation of an obscure sentence.

CAP. X.

ᾧδε ἴσως μᾶλλον, κ.τ.λ. 'Perhaps it will be clearer if I put it thus. It does not seem to me that we have begun by determining what the subject of our deliberation and inquiry is, when we ask which of us has skill to deal with it, and has had masters to teach him about it, and which has not.'

φαρμάκον, 'ointment.'

C

ὑπαλείφεισθαι, med., 'to apply it to himself.'

περὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν, *i.e.* it is considered what effect the ointment will have on the eyes, not what effect the eyes will have on the ointment. So also of the horse and bridle below.

τότε που, 'then, I imagine.'

D

ἕνεκά του, 'for the sake of something else.'

δεῖ ἄρα καὶ τὸν σύμβουλον σκοπεῖν. σύμβουλον is the object not the subject of σκοπεῖν.

οὗ ἕνεκα σκοπούμενοι σκοποῦμεν, 'which is the object of the inquiry we are making.'

τῆς ψυχῆς ἕνεκα. Here it is assumed as the most natural thing in the world that the exercise is intended as a training to the moral character rather than to the physical frame. In the *Republic* (iii. p. 410 B and C) Plato says, "'Neither are the two arts of music and gymnastic really designed, the one for the training of the soul, and the other for the training of the body.'

E

'But what is their real object?'

'I believe,' I said, 'that the teachers of both have in view chiefly the improvement of the soul.'

'How can that be?' he asked.

185 E ‘Did you never observe,’ I said, ‘the effect on the mind of exclusive devotion to gymnastic, or the opposite effect of an exclusive devotion to music?’

‘In what way shown?’ he said.

‘In producing a temper of hardness and ferocity, or again of softness and effeminacy,’ I replied.” (Jowett’s Translation.)

Englishmen do not talk of athletics being good for the ‘soul,’ but they obviously regard them as good for the character. ‘Gymnastics’ or even ‘athletics’ in the narrow sense are not nearly so useful in this way as any thing in the nature of a game or contest, which is less fatiguing—“*molliter austerum studio fallente laborem*”—and a much better relaxation for the mind.

Εἰ τις ἄρα ἡμῶν, κ.τ.λ. ‘We must consider then if any of us is an expert in the treatment of the soul, and is able to manage it well, and which of us has had good masters.’

Τί δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὐπω ἑώρακας, κ.τ.λ. Supply *τινάς*. Here again, as in 183 c foll., we find Laches, true to his character, appealing to what he thinks is proof, but what is really prejudice. What he says is true enough as far as it goes, but the fact proves nothing, as it is extremely rare compared with the vast number of instances to the contrary. If A without learning to box can beat B who has learnt, it does not prove that B has not improved by the training, or that A would not improve by it.

Ἔγωγε, ὦ Δάχης, κ.τ.λ. ‘Indeed, Laches, I have; but I am sure you would not take their word that they were good workmen, unless they could show you at least one piece of good work produced by their own skill.’

186 A Τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ‘There you speak the truth.’ ἀληθῆ, which is plural, cannot of course agree with *τοῦτο*. That word is an accusative governed by ἀληθῆ-λέγεις.

CAP. XI.

Καὶ ἡμᾶς ἄρα δεῖ. ἐπιδειῖξαι a few lines below completes the construction of these words.

εἰ μὲν φαμεν ἔχειν, *sc.* ἐπιδειῖξαι, ‘if we say that we can.’ The words are ordinarily taken to mean ‘if we say that we have had teachers,’ a sense that they cannot easily bear.

B ἢ εἴ τις ..., ... ἔχει εἰπεῖν. We should have expected to find εἴ δέ τις to correspond to εἰ μὲν above, and ἔχειν εἰπεῖν to carry out the construction of δεῖ, especially as that construction is

resumed below with *κελεύειν*. If however we regard the sentence from *ἢ εἴ τις* to *γεγόνασιν* as simply parenthetical, the irregularity need not present any difficulty. 186 B

καίτοι ἐπιθυμῶ. The present here receives, as it were, from *ἐκ νέου ἀρξάμενος* (as it would from *πάλαι*) the force of a perfect. C

σοφισταῖς. The Sophists were paid teachers of rhetoric and what they called *ἀρετή*, meaning by this that they imparted general improvement or 'culture.' They were not a philosophical sect or school, and there was no system of morals taught by them *as a class*. Further, there were many eminent and virtuous men among their numbers. On the other hand, since they taught rhetoric they were bound to teach the nature of fallacy for the purpose of refuting it, and were apt—partly from a confusion of thought—to teach not only its nature but its use. Hence the name 'Sophist' began soon to acquire a bad sense, and thus Aristotle draws a distinction between the Sophist and the true rhetorician. The former, he says, uses fallacies as well as fair arguments; the latter understands both, but uses fair arguments only.

The Sophists had a bad reputation with the mass of Athenian citizens. This was, no doubt, in part due to their being mostly foreigners, but there were other reasons for their unpopularity:—

- (i.) They taught for money.
- (ii.) They were very clever men.
- (iii.) They taught young men to be wiser than their fathers either actually or in their own opinion, and thus made them less amenable to authority.
- (iv.) There were no doubt bad men among them who disgraced the profession by boldly teaching the use of specious fallacy.

It will be clear that the second and third reasons here given would account equally for the unpopularity of Socrates and Plato. And no doubt Socrates and Plato would often by their enemies be called 'Sophists.' This could be the more easily done as the word had the older and more honourable meaning of philosopher lingering on by the side of its more usual modern application in which it was used in a neutral sense of a particular class of men, though that neutral sense was fast passing into a bad one. The Platonic Socrates speaks of the Sophists in the passage before us with gentle irony, and he is not always so indulgent; but we see that the real Socrates had a high opinion of many of these teachers, especially Damon, and he often recommended them to others. (See 180 c for the case of Damon, and cf. 200 D and Xen.

186 C *Mem.* iii. 1.) But both he and Plato were markedly distinguished from this class of professional teachers by the fact that they never took pay for their teaching, nor attempted to give anything like a technical education. Yet young men—like Critias and Alcibiades—went to Socrates in the hopes of gaining from his dialectic such argumentative skill as might be useful in the law courts and the Ecclesia, and this gave colour to many misrepresentations of Socrates—notably that by Aristophanes in the *Clouds*—as the teacher of “how to make the worse appear the better cause.”

καλόν τε κάγαθόν, ‘a good man.’ To understand this phrase we must remember that *ἀγαθός* did not necessarily convey an idea of moral excellence any more than *καλός*. R. L. Nettleship in *Hellenica* (p. 172) well observes—‘The word “good” has so many meanings and associations in English that it is important to be clear as to the particular sense in which its Greek equivalent was used by Plato. That sense is perhaps most simply and most clearly illustrated in the familiar expressions, “What is the good of a thing?” and “What is a thing good for?”’ It was therefore quite as easy to a Greek to use ‘beautiful’ in a moral sense as to use ‘good’ in a moral sense. In many phrases we use ‘beautifully’ as a synonym for ‘very well.’

εἰ δὲ Νικίας ... εὔρηκεν, ... οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι. So we say, ‘I shouldn’t be surprised if Nicias has discovered it,’ meaning, ‘If I were told that Nicias had discovered it.’ Cf. *Cratylus*, p. 428 B, εἰ μέντοι ἔχεις τι σὺ κάλλιον τούτων λέγειν, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι, and for another form of irregularity in the apodosis see the beginning of this dialogue, 178 A, εἰάν τις αὐτοῖς συμβουλευέσθαι, οὐκ ἂν εἴποιεν ἃ νοοῦσιν.

δῆ, ‘so.’

D τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα, κ.τ.λ. Notice the delicate way in which Socrates hints that Nicias and Laches cannot both be right.

τοῦτο οὖν σου ἐγὼ ἀντιδέομαι, ‘Therefore I make this request of you in my turn.’

καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν παρακελεύομαι. These words are added as if the speaker had forgotten that he had said at the beginning of his sentence *τοῦτο ... σου ἐγὼ ἀντιδέομαι*. Such irregular redundancy is extremely common in real conversation.

λέγοντα ὅτι. The *ὅτι* is, of course, redundant as Socrates proceeds to give the actual words that he would have Lysimachus say.

E οὔτε γὰρ εὔρετῆς ... γεγονέναι. The clause depends on *φησὶν* above.

σὺ δ', ὦ Δάχης καὶ Νικία, κ.τ.λ. The σὺ is justified by the 186 E
ἐκάτερος. Since modern Englishmen do not use the word
 'thou' the exact form of the Greek can hardly be given except
 in some such way as follows: 'But, sir, Nicias as well as
 Laches, you must tell us each of you,' etc.

ἂν μὴ ὑμῖν σχολὴ ἢ ὑπό, κ.τ.λ., 'if your time is quite 187 A
 taken up by public affairs.' For the construction of ὑπό
 as if after a passive verb cf. 180 D, κατ' οἰκίαν τὰ πολλὰ
 διατρίβοντες ὑπὸ τῆς ἡλικίας.

ἢ ἀμφοτέρα, 'or in both ways.' For this adverbial use of
 the word cf. *Gorgias* 525 B. εἴ τινος μέγα ἦν τὸ σῶμα φύσει ἢ
 τροφῇ ἢ ἀμφοτέρα.

γεγονότε ... δότε. Notice the combination (by no means an
 unusual one) of dual and plural. With γεγονότε repeat ἐπί-
 στασθον.

εἰ γὰρ νῦν ... ἄρξεσθε. This future, followed by an apodosis
 in the present, must be translated by an English future,
 "For if you are going to start their education now."

σκοπεῖν χρὴ μὴ οὐκ ἐν τῷ Καρί, κ.τ.λ. The μὴ and the οὐκ B
 have each a separate force here, the words οὐκ ἐν τῷ Καρί...
 ἀλλά being as it were parenthetical. Translate 'You must
 beware lest you make a dangerous experiment, not on
 the proverbial Carian, but on your sons and the children of
 your friends.' 'To run the risk in the person of a Carian'
 was a proverbial expression for risking anything that was
 comparatively worthless. It apparently arose from the fact
 that the Carians often served as mercenaries, the loss of whom
 would be but little considered as compared with that of citizen
 soldiers. Cf. Euripides, *Cyclops* 654—

δράσω τάδ' ἐν τῷ Καρί κινδυνεύσομεν,

and Plato, *Euthydemus* 285 B and C, ὥσπερ ἐν Καρί ἐν ἐμοὶ
 ἔστω ὁ κίνδυνος.

ἀτεχνῶς, 'precisely.'

ἐν πίθῳ ἢ κεραμεία γιγγομένη. Another proverb. Plato
 gives it at greater length in the *Gorgias* 514 E, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ
 τοῦτο, ἐν τῷ πίθῳ τὴν κεραμείαν ἐπιχειρεῖν μανθάνειν, so that the
 meaning would be to begin a study at the wrong end ('to
 learn to run before you can walk,' as we somewhat inaptly
 put it). The πίθος was the largest kind of wine jar, and it
 would of course be usual to begin learning pottery on small
 vessels where breakage would be less costly.

οὐ φατε, 'negetis.'

CAP. XII.

187 B βουλομένοις ὑμῖν ἐστί. Cf. 187 C, ἐμοὶ ... καὶ Μελησίᾳ ... ἡδομένοις ἂν εἶη, and *Phaedo* 78 B, εἴ σοι ἡδομένῳ ἐστίν.

C καὶ διδόναι λόγον, 'and to answer.'

αὐτοὺς δῆ. The δῆ gives emphasis to the pronoun.

ἐμοὶ μὲν γάρ, κ.τ.λ. The natural order would be δῆλον γάρ (ἐστίν) ὅτι ἐμοὶ μὲν καὶ Μελησίᾳ τῷδε ἡδομένοις ἂν εἶη. The δέ that should answer the μὲν never comes.

καὶ ἄλλως καί. For the more usual ἄλλως τε καί. Cf. 181 A.

ὀλίγου ... ἡλικίαν ἔχουσι παιδεύεσθαι, 'are nearly old enough to be educated,' i.e. to be educated for political life and military service. The boys were probably about fourteen years old, and it is to be supposed that they had already been well trained in the ordinary music and gymnastic.

D εἰ οὖν ὑμῖν μὴ τι διαφέρει, 'So if you do not mind.'

διδόντες τε καὶ δεχόμενοι λόγον, κ.τ.λ. Cf. διδόναι λόγον above (187 C).

πατρόθεν, 'from your knowledge of his father.'

ἀλλ' ἢ παιδί ὄντι, 'except when he was a boy.'

ἐν τοῖς δημόταις. Cf. 180 C, πρῶτον μὲν ὄντα δημότην and note.

E δῆλος ἔτι εἶ. The ἔτι belongs to the οὐκ ἐντετυχηκῶς.

Τί μάλιστα, lit., 'Why especially?' i.e. 'what makes you say that?'

CAP. XIII.

ὥσπερ γένοι. It is impossible to translate these words as they stand with any tolerable result; and, if we may go against the authority of the MSS. here, it is simpler to reject them altogether than to alter them, especially as the rhythm of the sentence is much improved by their omission, and they are precisely what may have been added by a commentator who thought the phrase ἐγγύτατα ... ἢ λόγῳ ('is closely connected with Socrates in talk') too metaphorical. If we retain them we must suppose that Nicias is represented as explaining his own metaphor. But to explain one's own metaphors is to confess them inadequate.

ἐὰν ἄρα καί. For the force of the ἄρα see note on εἰ δ' ἄρα 187 E πολλάκις, 179 B.

ἐμπέση, 'he is forced.'

τὸ διδόναι ... λόγον *here* means 'giving an account.'

ὄντινα τρόπον, κ.τ.λ. A dependent question explanatory of περὶ αὐτοῦ. With the second ὄντινα we must supply a second τρόπον.

βασανίση, 'examines.' There is not necessarily any allusion to torture, which is not implied in the primary meaning of βάσανος. 188 A

ἄλλ' εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα βίον, κ.τ.λ. On the practical good thus done to men by Socrates, Xenophon is constantly insisting in his *Memorabilia*. B

τὸν ταῦτα μὴ φεύγοντα. ταῦτα means cross-examination by Socrates.

κατὰ τὸ τοῦ Σόλωνος. The line referred to is this—

γηράσκω δ' αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος.

νοῦν ἔχον, 'bringing sense with it.'

ἄηθες οὐδ' αὖ ἀηδές. This is probably a play upon words.

πάλαι ... τι ἠπιστάμην. Here, as there is no reference to a continued state, πάλαι does *not* give to the imperfect—as it otherwise would—the force of a pluperfect.

τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει, κ.τ.λ. The construction is οὐδὲν κωλύει τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν συνδιατρέβειν, κ.τ.λ., 'there is nothing to prevent me, for my part, conversing with Socrates in the way that he wishes.' For the use of τὸ ἐμὸν, which is nearly equivalent to ἐμέ, cf. 'Ἀπλοῦν τό γ' ἐμὸν below at the beginning of Laches' answer and οὐ τὰ ὑμέτερα, ὡς ἔοικεν, αἰτιασόμεθα, 189 B. Also τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν ἂν προθυμίας ἀπολίποι (*Rep.* p. 533 A). C

Δάχητα δὲ τόνδε ὄρα, κ.τ.λ. Cf. note on 183 D, τὸ δὲ σόφισμα ... οἶον ἀπέβη.

CAP. XIV.

'Ἀπλοῦν τό γ' ἐμὸν, κ.τ.λ. 'Well, for my part, Nicias, I have only one mind about conversation, or, if you like to put it so, two minds.'

ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντος ἀνδρός, 'who is really a man.' For ὡς ἀληθῶς see 183 D.

καὶ κομιδῇ μοι δοκεῖ, κ.τ.λ., 'and a man like that seems to me to be really musical, and to have tuned in the best D

188 D of scales not any lyre or pleasant instrument of music—no, but actually to live with his own life tuned so that his words make no discord with his deeds; tuned not in the Ionian, nor, I think, in the Phrygian or Lydian scale, but simply in the one Greek scale, the Dorian.’ The construction of the clause is somewhat interrupted by the insertion of τῶ ὄντι ζῆν, which spoils the grammar.

ἄρμονίαν. This word must not be translated ‘harmony,’ which it does not mean, and of which the Greeks were probably ignorant, but ‘scale’ or ‘mode.’ We recognise two genera of scales which we distinguish as (i.) the chromatic, and (ii.) the diatonic. The Greeks recognised three genera, the ‘chromatic,’ ‘diatonic,’ and ‘enharmonic.’* Further, while we divide the diatonic scale into two species or modes, called major and minor, which differ from each other in the arrangement of the tones and semitones, the Greeks divided it into seven such species or modes, viz. (i.) Mixolydian, (ii.) Lydian, (iii.) Phrygian, (iv.) Dorian, (v.) Hypolydian, (vi.) Ionian or Hypophrygian, (vii.) Aeolian or Hypodorian—differing from one another in pitch as well as in character. Of these the Lydian corresponded to our major, the Aeolian to our minor scale. They all would seem to have been of Asiatic origin except the Dorian. That mode may be represented on the piano by a scale of eight notes, which runs from E to E, but is played entirely on the white notes.

In the *Republic* (398 D foll.) Plato speaks very decidedly of the influence of the various modes on the moral character, and is for rejecting all the modes except the Dorian and the Phrygian. Aristotle too in his *Politics*, though he dissents from Plato, and thinks that every mode can be used appropriately on the right occasion, yet draws a sharp distinction between the Dorian and the others. Of the Dorian mode he says, *περὶ δὲ τῆς δωριστὶ πάντες ὁμολογοῦσιν ὡς στασιμωπάτης οὔσης καὶ μάλιστα ἦθος ἐχούσης ἀνδρείον.* He thinks it therefore especially suitable for the education of the young. The Phrygian mode was wild and rousing, the Mixolydian melancholy and suited for dirges, the Lydian and Ionian soft and convivial. It seems curious to us that it should have been natural to the Greeks to regard such differences as so obvious and so important. We must infer that the effect of music upon the Greeks was stronger and more definite than on an average it is upon us. Mahaffy (*Old Greek Life*, p. 55) says, “The modern Chinese

* The enharmonic scale admitted quarter tones, and was so far different, in theory at least, from anything in our music.

have the same beliefs" (as the Greeks) "about the moral effects of music." **188 D**

ἀλλ' ἤπερ μόνη Ἑλληνική ἐστιν ἄρμονία. The antecedent to ἤπερ ... ἄρμονία is δωριστί, which could even be used with the article, as seen in the passage of Aristotle quoted in the last note.

τῶν μὲν λόγων. Here μὲν should not be translated, as it merely gives emphasis to λόγων. It is followed by ἀλλά instead of δέ. The contrast between ἔργον and λόγος is one of which the Greeks seem never to have tired. **E**

πρότερον, 'first,' *i.e.* before I had experience of his words.

ἄξιον ὄντα λόγων καλῶν, κ.τ.λ., 'a man whom noble words and all boldness of speech would well become,' or 'who deserved to have a command of noble words and all boldness of speech.'

καὶ τοῦτο ἔχει. The τοῦτο means the noble words and boldness of speech. **189 A**

συμβούλομαι τάνδρῃ, 'I feel in sympathy with him.'

ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐγὼ τῷ Σόλωνι, κ.τ.λ., 'but I too agree with Solon, making one addition only to his verse.'

συγχωρεῖτω, *sc.* ὁ Σόλων.

σοὶ ... ἐγὼ ἐπαγγέλλομαι, 'I promise to allow you.'

μηδὲν τὴν ἡμετέραν ἡλικίαν, κ.τ.λ., 'and do not consider our ages in the least.' **B**

CAP. XV.

τὰ ὑμέτερα : cf. τὸ ἐμόν, 188 c.

μὴ οὐχ ἔτοιμα εἶναι. The οὐ is inserted because the verb αἰτιασόμεθα was preceded by a negative. 'When an infinitive would regularly be negatived by μή—either in the ordinary way or to strengthen a preceding negation—if the verb on which it depends has a negative, it generally takes the double negative μὴ οὐ. Thus δίκαιόν ἐστι μὴ τοῦτον ἀφεῖναι, *it is just not to acquit him*, becomes, if we negative the leading verb, οὐ δίκαιόν ἐστι μὴ οὐ τοῦτον ἀφεῖναι, *it is not just not to acquit him* Again, εἴργει σε μὴ τοῦτο ποιεῖν, *he prevents you from doing this*, becomes, with εἴργει negatived, οὐκ εἴργει σε μὴ οὐ τοῦτο ποιεῖν, *he does not prevent you from doing this*' (Goodwin's *Greek Grammar*, p. 309). **C**

189 C συμβουλεύειν καὶ συσκοπεῖν, 'to give advice and join in the inquiry.'

σκοπεῖ, 'inquire.' For this sense of the word cf. Soph. *O. T.* 285-286—

παρ' οὗ τις ἂν
σκοπῶν τὰδ', ὦναξ, ἐκμάθοι σαφέστατα.

συμβούλευε apparently here means 'join in giving (us) advice.' It would be more satisfactory if it could mean 'consult with,' but this meaning is confined to the middle voice.

ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιλανθάνομαι, κ.τ.λ. 'For I am so old that I forget most of the questions I mean to ask, and most of the things I hear; and if a new topic is started in the middle of a discussion, my recollection is not very perfect.' He means that he forgets every word, οὐ πάνυ by a litotes being really on occasions a very strong form of denial. But it is only by a litotes that it is so, its literal and proper meaning being 'not altogether.' (See Riddell's *Apology*, pp. 171, 172.)

D περὶ ὧν προϋθέμεθα, for περὶ τούτων ἃ προϋθέμεθα, 'on the subject we proposed for our discussion.'

ἐξετάζειν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. τὰ τοιαῦτα is not logically correct. Strict accuracy would require ταῦτα, unless οἷα instead of ἃ had preceded.

E ἄλλ' οἶμαι, καὶ ἡ τοιάδε σκέψις, κ.τ.λ. Here there is a transition—in reality somewhat an abrupt one—to a new subject. The question of the possession of knowledge about the soul, and of the proofs of possessing that knowledge, are shortly dismissed, and there is substituted for it the question, 'Do we know what goodness (or 'excellence') is?'

The questions that any one would have to answer before constructing a perfect system of education would be somewhat as follows:

(i.) What do we wish to make of human nature?

(ii.) What means are to be used to produce that effect?

or, in Plato's language,

(i.) τί ἐστὶν ἀρέτη; (190 B).

(ii.) πῶς τις αὐτὴν ῥᾶστα καὶ ἀριστ' ἂν κτήσαιο; (see p. 189 E and 190 A and B).

Any one who can answer these questions aright can train the soul; and further it is impossible for any one to answer question (ii.) without being able to answer question (i.) Hence the inquiry is to be, 'What is the nature of virtue or excellence in general?' Subsequently (190 c and d) it is further restricted to the question, 'What is the nature of courage in particular?'

σχεδὸν δέ τι καὶ μᾶλλον, κ.τ.λ., 'and will indeed be, if any- 189 E
thing, more fundamental.'

εἰ γὰρ τυγχάνομεν ἐπιστάμενοι, κ.τ.λ. Lit. 'For if we happen to know about anything, that, if added to something, it makes that thing to which it was added better, and if, further, we are able to cause it to be added to it, it is clear that we know the thing itself, about which we should be giving advice as to how any one might acquire it most easily and best,' *i.e.*, 'for if we happen to know that a thing is improved by acquiring a certain quality, and, further, are able to make it acquire that quality, it is obvious that we know the nature of the quality itself, since it is about it, and the best and easiest means of acquiring it, that we should, in the supposed case, be giving our advice.' The want of abstract and philosophical terms makes the Greek difficult. The use of technical language in questions of morals and logic was hardly thought of as yet. On the other hand, Plato probably intends to be somewhat obscure here. See next note.

ἴσως οὖν οὐ μανθάνετε μου ὅ τι λέγω. An indication (see note on πῶς λέγεις ; 185 B) that Plato thinks the subject difficult.

ὅτι ὅψιν γε ἴσμεν αὐτὴν ὅ τί ποτ' ἔστιν. The con- 190 A
struction by which the subject of the dependent clause is separated from it, and made a part (object or otherwise) of the main clause, has already been noticed. The expression 'to know what a thing is' means to be able to give an exact definition of it. According to Aristotle, in defining we have to show τὴν οὐσίαν ἢ τὸ τί ἐστίν, 'the essence or what a thing is,' that is to say, if we are defining a thing, and not merely explaining a name, we must mention the attributes which the thing has as such—not necessarily all its attributes, but those from which the others may be deduced. Thus Euclid finds it sufficient to define 'triangle' as 'a figure contained by three straight lines,' this being what constitutes a triangle, or the essential property from which all its other properties may be deduced. The word 'essence,' from the Latin 'essentia,' a translation of οὐσία, is unfortunately now popularly used to mean 'extract,' a sense in which it was employed by the alchemists. In philosophy it has no such meaning; 'the essence of courage' does not mean merely the important part of courage, but the whole of courage as it really is, stripped of all accidental circumstances which may accompany it, but which do not really belong to it.

CAP. XVI.

- 190 B** Ἄρ' οὖν τοῦτό γ' ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, τὸ εἰδέναι ... ; 'Ought not we then to start with knowing ... ?'
 τούτου σύμβουλοι, 'advisers on this point' (i.e. ὅπως ἀν... κτήσασαίτο).
- C** Φαμὲν μέντοι, 'Yes, we do.'
 ὃ γὰρ ἴσμεν, 'since we know it.'
 πλέον γὰρ ἴσως ἔργον, 'for that would, perhaps, be too long a business.'
- D** ἢ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι, κ.τ.λ., 'may I not say the one to which,' etc.
 ἢ ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις μάθησις is equivalent to ἡ μάθησις τοῦ ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις μάχεσθαι.
- E** πειρώ, 2nd sing. pres. imperat. med.

CAP. XVII.

οὐ χαλεπὸν εἰπεῖν. The οὐ is repeated. Notice that Laches finds the subject very easy, because he has never thought about it, and therefore overlooks its difficulties. Consequently (as is so often done by those who think questions easy) he does not, as Socrates says below, answer the question put to him, but another question that was not asked.

ἀλλ' ἴσως ἐγὼ αἴτιος, κ.τ.λ., 'but I daresay it is my fault, because I did not use clear language, that your answer was not about the thing which I meant in my question, but something else.' Observe the mock humility of Socrates, and also the obscurity of the sentence (cf. 185 B note, and 189 E). With regard to the construction Riddell says that the use of the accusative of the infinitive to express the result is common in *negative* clauses, but seems to be confined to them, p. 150.

- 191 A** Ἐγὼ γοῦν φημί. 'At any rate, I call him so.'
 Καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ, 'Yes, so do I.'
 ἀλλὰ τί αὖ ὅδε ... ; 'But what are we to say about the man that ... ?'
 ἀλλὰ μὴ μένων. We should say, 'and not standing his ground,' or 'instead of standing his ground.'
 Πῶς φεύγων; 'What do you mean by "who fights running away"?'

“Ομηρός που ... ἔφη. The quotations that follow are to be found in *Il.* viii. 105 foll., where Diomed says to Nestor— **191 A**

Ἄλλ' ἄγ', ἐμῶν ὀχέων ἐπιβήσαιο, ὄφρα ἴδῃαι
 Οἶοι Τρώϊοι ἵπποι, ἐπιστάμενοι πεδίοιο
 Κραιπνὰ μάλ' ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα διωκέμεν ἠδὲ φέβεσθαι,
 Οὓς ποτ' ἀπ' Αἰνείαν ἐλόμην, μήστρωα φόβοιο.

The first three of these lines occur also in *Iliad* v. 221 foll. The argument in the text is not to be taken seriously. There is no allusion to 'Parthian' tactics in φέβεσθαι, and μήστρωα φόβοιο ('contriver of fear') can only mean that Aeneas spread terror among his enemies. Plato is fond of these punning arguments from Homer, in which he probably meant to ridicule certain far-fetched interpretations that were fashionable at that day.

καὶ σὺ τὸ τῶν Σκυθῶν ἱππέων περί λέγεις, 'and what you say about the Scythians refers to cavalry.' **B**

πλήν γ' ἴσως ... τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων. There is a good deal of quiet irony in this remark, as Laches regards the Lacedaemonian practice as the standard of military excellence. See 182 E foll. The stratagem of which Plato here speaks is not related by any other writer, and is indeed not consistent with the account given in Herodotus ix. 61 foll., who represents the γέρρα of the native Persians as stuck in the ground for a barricade, and overthrown by a charge of the Lacedaemonians. By the γερρόφοροι Plato means the native Persians, who had adopted the wicker shield, and, in fact, the entire military equipment of the Medes. See Herodotus vii. 61 and 62. The γερρόφοροι are mentioned as forming part of Artaxerxes' army in Xenophon, *Anab.* i. 8. 9.

ὡσπερ ἱππέας is to be taken with ἀναστρεφόμενος and μάχεσθαι, 'returned to the charge like cavalry.' **C**

CAP. XVIII.

Τοῦτο τοίνυν αἴτιον ἔλεγον, ὅτι ἐγὼ αἴτιος, κ.τ.λ., lit. 'This then I called the reason (saying) that I was the reason you did not answer well, because I did not ask you well,' *i.e.* 'this then was the thing I meant when I said it was my fault that your answer was not to the point, because I put the question badly.' Without the αἴτιον, τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔλεγον ὅτι would quite naturally signify, 'This then was my meaning when I said,' and accordingly Jacobs rejects the αἴτιον, and other scholars substitute ἄρτι for it. But there

191 C is no warrant for either alteration—the sentence can be made to construe as it stands—and if anything has been inserted by a later hand than Plato's it is most likely to be the words *ὅτι ἐγὼ αἴτιος*, from the passage in 190 E, to which the present passage refers. It should be added that Riddell explains the words *τοῦτο τοίνυν αἴτιον ἔλεγον ὅτι ἐγὼ αἴτιος* (omitting the comma after *ἔλεγον*) as an instance of cognate accusative after an adjective. Accordingly, it may be presumed, he would have given the meaning somewhat as follows, 'This then I meant by the responsibility for your not answering to the point, which I said that I had incurred by putting my question badly.'

βουλόμενος γάρ. Socrates begins this sentence with a view of showing how he put his question badly, but he interrupts himself at the end of this speech by the words, *εἰσὶ γάρ πού τινες, ὧ Λάχης, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀνδρεῖοι*, and on resuming contents himself with showing how he ought to have put his question so as to make the meaning clear to Laches.

D *καὶ ὅσοι γε πρὸς νόσους.* It would have been more satisfactory if the enumeration of the circumstances in relation to which *ἀνδρεία* is possible had stopped here. On the other hand, we must not forget that we ourselves use 'brave' in two perfectly distinct senses. For instance, we call a man brave for bearing pain well when he has the pain, and therefore cannot fear it in itself; but we also call him brave if he cheerfully submits to an operation to rid him of the former pain. But the qualities praised in each of these cases are perfectly distinct. Secondly, *ἀνδρείος* corresponds to our word 'manly,' as well as to our word 'brave.' Nevertheless, the consideration of physical courage, in the sense of readiness to face coming pain or danger, would have been a subject quite wide enough for the dialogue. Aristotle would have said that the man who behaves well in the face of poverty and political difficulties, or resists desire and the incitements of pleasure, is only metaphorically *ἀνδρείος*. See Appendix.

E *Τί ποτε ὃν ἐκάτερον τούτων, κ.τ.λ.* Supply *κέκτηνται* from Socrates' previous question, and translate, 'Well, what is each of these qualities that they possess? that is what I meant to ask.'

ἀνδρείαν πρῶτον, i.e. *δειλία* is to be discussed afterwards. The subject is never reached, except in so far as it is treated by implication in the discussion about courage.

τί ὃν ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ταῦτόν ἐστιν. *ὃν* is, by so-called attraction, for *οὔσα*, lit. 'being what it is the same in all these things.' However, as *τί ὃν* is the interrogative part of the sen-

tence, and as literary English will not allow the interrogation **191 E** to be thus introduced, we must translate as if we read *τί ἐστιν ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ταύτων ὄν*, 'what is it in so far as it is the same quality in all these relations?' As shown by what follows (cf. note on *πῶς λέγεις*; 185 B, and 190 E), Plato thinks that his readers may find the subject a difficult one to understand.

CAP XIX.

'**ΑΛΛ' ὦδε λέγω**, κ.τ.λ., 'But my meaning is, just as if I were to ask what quickness is as a quality which we may display alike in running, playing music, speaking, learning, and in many other things; in fact, it may be said that we have the quality, as far as it is worth mentioning, either in the performances of our hands, our legs, our mouth and voice, or our mind. Do you not agree with me?'

Εἰ τοίνυν τίς με ἔροιτο. Socrates now represents the **192 A** question as put to him, not by him, which enables him to give the answer to it with greater rhetorical effect. The skilful method in which Plato manages this transition is worthy of study.

ὃ ἐν πᾶσιν ὀνομάζεις ταχυτήτα εἶναι. For *εἶναι* after *ὀνομάζειν*, cf. *Theaetetus* p. 160 B, *ὥστε εἴτε τις εἶναι τι ὀνομάζει*.

περί, 'in relation to.'

Ὅρθῶς γε σὺ λέγων. 'Quite right of you.' Cf. *Charmides* p. 156 A, and p. 162 E, *καλῶς γε σὺ... ποιῶν*, where we may translate, 'I am very glad that you do,' and *Rep.* 474 A, *καλῶς γ'... ἐγὼ ποιῶν*.

Πειρῶ δῆ, κ.τ.λ. 'So you must try now, Laches, to tell me in the same way what single faculty courage is, alike under the conditions of pain and pleasure and all the others that we enumerated just now, so as to be called by one name.' From *τὴν ἀνδρείαν* (put into the main clause by a common figure already commented on more than once) supply *ἡ ἀνδρεία* as the subject to *οὔσα*, which we must construe as a finite verb, making *κέκληται* subordinate to it. See note on *τί ὄν ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ταύτων ἐστιν* (191 E) where the construction is the same as here. *ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς* is for *ἐν ἅπασιν ἐν οἷς*. Lastly *ἔπειτα* has an inferential sense in reference to *τις οὔσα δύναμις*, κ.τ.λ.

καρτερία τις, 'a sort of endurance.'

εἰ τό γε διὰ πάντων, κ.τ.λ., 'if I am to say what is the nature of courage in all these cases.'

192 C εἴ γε τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρινόμεθα, κ.τ.λ., 'if at least we are to give ourselves an answer to our question.' τὸ ἐρωτώμενον is a cognate accusative. Stallbaum says that this construction is only possible with neuter participles (as here) or neuter pronouns, and that with τὸν λόγον, for instance, πρὸς would be required.

τοίνυν, 'further.' Socrates is of course about to overthrow Laches' definition. Yet he does not start as if he meant to overthrow it, but only as if he meant to add clearness to it. Laches had defined courage as a *sort* of resolution; Socrates asks *what sort*.

τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐνθένδε, lit. 'And I infer (it) from this' (from what is going to be stated), *i.e.* 'and this is my reason for thinking so.'

σχεδὸν γάρ τι οἶδα, 'I am pretty nearly sure.' The γάρ is not to be translated here, for it introduces the very subject which is indicated by ἐνθένδε, and is therefore not here inferential like our 'for.' It is more like our colloquial 'you know.' The τι of course belongs to σχεδόν, which it qualifies.

Οὐκοῦν ἢ μὲν μετὰ φρονήσεως, κ.τ.λ. The argument that follows is—As endurance combined with wisdom is noble, and endurance combined with folly is base, then since courage is noble, courage must be the former endurance and not the latter. Then Socrates goes on to point out (192 E foll.) that often endurance (or resistance) combined with prudence is not courage, and that often a man is more readily called brave for doing an action contrary to the dictates of discretion or unaided by knowledge than for doing an action which discretion commends or knowledge makes easy. Thus Socrates confronts Laches with the difficult question of the relation of the intellect to moral goodness—or in this special case to one particular virtue—and proves to him that he has never really thought over the question.

Τί δ' ἢ μετ' ἀφροσύνης, 'And what about the courage that is combined with a want of wisdom?'

D Οὐκοῦν δίκαιόν γε, ᾧ Σώκρατες, 'It would be wrong to do so, Socrates.'

CAP. XX.

E ἢ ἢ εἰς ἅπαντα, κ.τ.λ., 'Or shall we say that it is the endurance which is prudent in relation to all things both large and small?'

πλεονεκτήσεται, 'he will gain an advantage.' Rutherford 192 E (*New Phrynichus* p. 408) points out that this is the true reading, and consequently **πλεονεκτεῖν** must be added to the verbs that use indifferently the med. or act. form of the future. Bekker's reading **πλέον ἐκτήσεται** (fut. perf.), 'will possess more,' does not give a satisfactory sense here, though it has been adopted by most editors. **πλέον κτήσεται** (fut.), 'will get more,' would be preferable.

'**Ἄλλ' οἶον εἴ τις ἰατρὸς ὄν**, κ.τ.λ., 'But suppose that a man who was a doctor, when his son or some other patient was suffering from inflammation of the lungs and kept begging him to give him something to eat or drink, did not yield, but resisted?'

Οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν οὐδ' αὐτή, 'That wouldn't be courage either in the least.' We should have expected **οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν οὐδὲ τοῦτον** (*ἀνδρείον ἂν καλοῖμι*), but Plato is thinking of the quality *καρτερία*.

εἰδὸτα μέν. If the sentence is regular we must say that the μέν is out of place, and is to be translated as if it followed *βοηθήσουσιν*.

χωρία, 'positions' or 'fortresses.'

ἢ τὸν ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ στρατοπεδῷ. ἢ is here 'or' as shown by Laches' answer. The passage is a good instance of the way in which the meaning 'or' passes into the meaning 'than.'

ἐπιστήμης. Notice that this word is here used in the same sense as *τέχνης* at the end of the section. Diogenes Laertius says that Plato recognized three kinds of *ἐπιστήμη*—

B

(i.) *ποιητική*, which makes visible things, e.g. shipbuilding,

(ii.) *πρακτική*, which acts, but does not make visible objects, e.g. harp playing,

(iii.) *θεωρητική*, which reasons and knows, but does not make or act, e.g. geometry;

and three kinds of *τέχνη*—

- A { (i.) That which collects or fetches, but does not make new things, e.g. mining and wood cutting,
(ii.) That which makes the raw material into something new (*μετασκευαστική τέχνη*), e.g. carpentry,
B (iii.) That which uses things, e.g. the art of the musician.

Now, it is obvious that divisions A and B of *τέχνη* correspond to divisions (i.) and (ii.) of *ἐπιστήμη*; and the only *τέχνη* to which Plato would have refused the name of *ἐπιστήμη* would be such fetching of material as required no skill at all. Hence we have no word wide enough for all the senses of *ἐπιστήμη*, for science is strictly only *θεωρητική*, and such

193 B phrases as 'the appliances of surgical science' are inaccurate, for it is 'art,' not 'science,' that 'does' or 'makes.' Unfortunately 'art' is now seldom used in English, except in the sense of 'fine art' (music, painting, sculpture, etc.); and the word 'craft,' which is otherwise a very fair equivalent for *τέχνη*, is slightly archaic.

C *μη ὄντες δεινοί*, 'without being clever at it.'

Φαίνονται, 'Clearly they do.' Here one would have thought the argument might have ended. It is quite obvious that there is a contradiction in admitting that, while courage is a *φρόνιμος καρτερία*, the *ἀφρονῶς καρτεροῦντες* are braver than the *φρονίμως καρτεροῦντες*.

D *Ὁμολογεῖτο γάρ*. 'It was indeed (allowed to be so).'

CAP. XXI.

Οὐκ ἄρα πον, κ.τ.λ. 'Then we are not tuned, you and I, in the Dorian mode you talked of, Laches, for our deeds are not in tune with our words.' The allusion is, of course, to Laches' speech, ch. xiv.

E *ἔργω μὲν γάρ*, κ.τ.λ., *i.e.* Socrates and Laches were confessedly brave in action. It seems curious that Plato should make Socrates thus praise himself, but Socrates' valour was beyond all question, and he is besides identifying himself with Laches. Further, the assertion is not so direct as the co-ordinate structure with *μὲν* and *δέ* would at first sight make it appear. Translate, 'For though people might say, I believe, that we have discovered some courage in our actions, I don't think they would say that we have discovered it in our words, if they heard us conversing now.'

οὕτως ἡμᾶς διακεῖσθαι, 'that we should be in this condition.'

Βούλει οὖν ᾧ λέγομεν, κ.τ.λ. 'Shall we then believe in the truth of what we are saying up to this point? LACHES. Up to what point do you mean, and what is it that we are to believe? SOCRATES. Why, the principle that bids us have endurance.' The reference is probably to the statement that *ἡ μετὰ φρονήσεως καρτερία* is *καλὴ κάγαθή*. It is true that such a definition is not the same thing as an exhortation to *καρτερία*, but in morals the transition is easy from the statement of approval of certain actions to the command to perform them. For the idea that courage is necessary in philosophical speculation compare *Rep.*, bk. ii., p. 357 A, *ὁ γὰρ Γλαύκων ἀεὶ τε ἀνδρείωτατος ὢν τυγχάνει πρὸς ἅπαντα, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε τοῦ*

Θρασυμάχου τὴν ἀπόρρησιν οὐκ ἀπεδέξατο; and for the idea of showing in the discussion a quality akin to the quality discussed cf. *Rep.* 368 B, *δέδοικα γάρ, μὴ οὐδ' ὄσιον ἢ παραγενόμενον δικαιοσύνη κακηγορούμενη ἀπαγορεύειν καὶ μὴ βοηθεῖν ἔτι ἐμπνέοντα καὶ δυνάμενον φθέγγεσθαι*, 'for I fear there may be a sin, when justice is evil spoken of, in standing by and failing to offer help or succour while breath or speech remain to me' (Jowett). In this passage also there is the idea of holding out and not giving in, and it should be noticed that ἀπόρρησιν in the first passage is a substantive exactly corresponding to ἀπαγορεύειν in the second. In our dialogue we have kindred ideas expressed by *προαφίστασθαι* (194 A) and *ἀνιέναι* (194 B).

εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις, 'if after all we should find that.' 194 A It has already been said in the note on 179 B, *εἰ δ' ἄρα πολλάκις μὴ προσεσχίχασθε τὸν νοῦν τῷ τοιούτῳ*, that ἄρα suggests the discovery of a result, while *πολλάκις* hints at its possibility. Cf. *Phaedrus*, p. 238 C-D, where Socrates playfully says, *τῷ ὄντι γὰρ θεῖος ἕοικεν ὁ τόπος εἶναι, ὥστε, ἐὰν ἄρα πολλάκις νυμφόληπτος προῖόντος τοῦ λόγου γένωμαι, μὴ θαυμάσης*.

ἔτοιμος, sc. *εἰμί*.

μὴ προαφίστασθαι, 'not to abandon the inquiry prematurely.' Stallbaum quotes *Phaedo* p. 185 C, *τὸ μέντοι αὐτὰ λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτῶν μὴ οὐχὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι, πρὶν ἂν πανταχῆ σκοπῶν ἀπέιπη τις, πάνυ μαλθακοῦ εἶναι ἀνδρός*.

ἀλλὰ τίς με καὶ φιλονεικία, κ.τ.λ., 'but a love of controversy has come upon me on hearing (*πρός*) what you have said.'

ἀγανακτῶ εἰ. This is almost the same as *ἀγανακτῶ ὅτι*, but leaves the question of fact rather more doubtful.

εἰ οὕτως ἂν νοῶ μὴ οἶός τ' εἰμί εἰπεῖν, 'at being thus unable to express my meaning' (Jowett).

τὸν ἀγαθὸν κυνηγέτην. Socrates continues and makes more definite the metaphor that Laches has, unconsciously as it were, introduced in the words *διέφυγεν* and *ξυλλαβεῖν*. Everyone must have met with instances of metaphors thus developed in ordinary conversation.

ἀνιέναι, absol., 'to give up.'

CAP. XXII.

χειμαζομένοις ἐν λόγῳ. Here the difficulties of the discussion are described under a fresh metaphor, for which Jacobs compares *Philebus* p. 29 B, *χειμαζόμεθα γὰρ ὄντως ὑπ' ἀπορίας ἐν τοῖς νῦν λόγοις*.

194 C τὰ ... ἡμέτερα : cf. 188 C.

καὶ αὐτὸς ἂ νοεῖς τῷ λόγῳ βεβαίωσαι, 'and establish your own view by thus expounding it.'

D Πολλάκις ἀκήκόα σου λέγοντος, κ.τ.λ. Socrates probably overestimated the importance of the intellectual element in moral virtue as much as we now tend to underestimate it. Socrates' words however as given by Nicias are not 'wisdom is goodness,' but 'a man is good at just the things at which he is clever, and bad at just the things about which he is ignorant,' a maxim with which nobody could strongly disagree (see note on καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, 186 c). Xenophon, in his *Memorabilia* iv. 6, 11, relates that Socrates said, 'Those who know how to behave properly in reference to dangers and risks are brave, and those who have not this knowledge are cowards.' But when asked whether courage came by teaching or nature, he replied that one man was naturally braver than another, but that courage could be increased μαθήσει καὶ μελέτῃ (*Mem.* iii. 9. 1-3).

ταῦτα δὲ κακός. Notice the repetition of the δέ, which cannot be literally translated.

Ποῖαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοφίαν ; cf. *Charmides* 174 B, ποῖον, ἧ δ' ὄς, πεπτευτικόν (see next note) ; *Theaetetus* 180 B, ποίοις μαθηταῖς, ὦ δαιμόνιε ; and Aristophanes *passim* (e.g. *Ach.* 62, ποίου βασιλέως) for the scornful sense of ποῖος. Here, as Socrates takes it in his answer as being genuinely interrogative, we may translate, 'What sort of cleverness, Socrates, I should like to know?'

E οὐ γάρ που ἦ γε αὐλητική, 'I suppose, at any rate, it is not cleverness in playing on the pipe' (not 'flute'). The suggestion is ironical ; but such allusions to the arts, ironical or otherwise, were very characteristic of Socrates. See Xen. *Mem.* i. 2. 37. The angry ποῖον ... πεπτευτικόν ; quoted in the last note, is drawn from Critias in the *Charmides* by a question from Socrates whether the knowledge which according to Critias makes its possessor perfectly happy is a knowledge of the game of draughts.

Πάνν μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς, κ.τ.λ. 'Now, that is exactly the right way to question him, Socrates, and he must tell us what sort of knowledge it is that he calls it.'

Ταύτην ἔγωγε, ὦ Λάχης, 'This is what I call it, Laches, the science'....

195 A Πρὸς τί τοῦτ' εἶπες βλέψας, κ.τ.λ., 'What makes you say that, Laches?' (Jowett).

Πρὸς ὅ τι ; 'Do you ask what?'

χωρίς, 'different from.'

Οὐκουν φησί γε Νικίας. 'Well, Nicias says not.'

195 A

Οὐ μέντοι. Supply φησί: 'Yes, so he does, and that is just where his folly lies.'

CAP. XXIII.

ἀποφῆναι, 'to prove that you are so.'

B

ἀντίκα, 'for example.' "Nam ut statim exemplum afferam" (Stallbaum).

ἀλλ' οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον οὔτοι ἀνδρείοί εἰσιν. We may take this criticism as a statement of Plato's own opinion, for he makes Socrates commend the sentiment. Indeed, it corresponds with Socrates' criticism of Laches (p. 193), in so far as it means that when a man is courageous from having a skill that makes the danger less, though the fact helps him to feel confident, it yet diminishes the moral value of his confidence. Aristotle (see Appendix), no doubt with this dialogue in his mind, ranks the courage of experience among the spurious forms of courage. Nicias however is not thinking of the courage of experience, but has in his mind a more philosophical theory as to the nature of courage, which he is nevertheless unable so to expound as to be proof against Socrates' dialectic.

ἔοικε μέντοι λέγειν τι, 'there seems, you know, to be something in what he says.' Nicias replies with some humour: 'Yes, there is something in what he says, but it is not true.'

ἦ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν εἰπεῖν οἷόν τε, κ.τ.λ., *i.e.* ἦ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν τε εἰπεῖν οἷόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ νοσῶδες.

τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ὑγιαίνειν. The words τὸ ὑγιαίνειν are explanatory of τοῦτο.

σὺ δίδως, lit. 'do you assign?' *i.e.* in your theory.

D

τοὺς μάντις. This no doubt conveys a slight sneer at the superstitious nature of Nicias. See note on 199 A, ὁ νόμος οὕτω τάττει, μὴ τὸν μάντιν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ἄρχειν, κ.τ.λ.

τοὺς ἀνδρείους. The article with the predicate is justified by the consideration that (according to Laches) the two classes—prophets and brave men—would be exactly co-extensive. Cf. *Gorgias* 491 E. τοὺς ἡλιθίους λέγεις τοὺς σώφρονας, 'it is the silly whom you call the temperate.'

Τί δαί; 'What?'

CAP. XXIV.

195 E ὦτι ἐγὼ λέγω, *i.e.*, τούτῳ (προσῆκει) ὃν ἐγὼ λέγω.
ἐπεὶ, 'for do you think that ...?'

196 A τούτον οὐ μανθάνω ... ὅ τι βούλεται λέγειν, 'I don't know ... what he means.' The construction must be by this time familiar to the reader.

εἰ μὴ εἶ. Cf. the Latin 'nisi si.'

B ὅτι οὐδὲν λέγει, 'that he is wrong.'

στρέφεται ἄνω καὶ κάτω. Cf. Plat. *Ion.* p. 541 E, ἀλλ' ἀτεχνῶς ὡσπερ ὁ Πρωτεὺς παντοδαπὸς γίγνεται στρεφόμενος ἄνω καὶ κάτω, and *Rep.* p. 405 C, ἱκανὸς πάσας ... στροφὰς στρέφεσθαι ... ὥστε μὴ παρασχεῖν δίκην.

ἐπικρυπτόμενος. An imperfect present, 'trying to hide.'

εἶχεν ἂν τινα λόγον ταῦτα ποιεῖν, 'there might be some sense in doing this.' ταῦτα ποιεῖν is the subject to εἶχεν.

νῦν δέ, 'but as things are.'

Οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἐμοί, κ.τ.λ., 'Nor do I think there is any reason why he should, Laches.' Socrates answers as if Laches had said νῦν δὲ οὐδὲν ἐστὶ δι' ὃ τις ... αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ἂν κοσμοῖ.

C μὴ Νικίας οἴεται. When the objects of fear or caution are present or past, μὴ following verbs denoting fear or caution takes the present or past tenses of the indicative (see Goodwin's *Greek Grammar*, p. 262). Cf. ὄρα μὴ παίζων ἔλεγεν, *Theaetetus* 145 B.

CAP. XXV.

D Τοῦτο δέ, *i.e.* τὸ δεινὸν καὶ θαρράλειον.

παντὸς δῆ, 'cujusvis.'

ὁπότε γε, 'since you say that.'

μήτε ... μήτε ... μηδέ, 'neither ... nor ... or.'

Κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν, κ.τ.λ., 'So really not "any pig" (to quote the proverb) "could know that," or could become brave.' According to the Scholiast the proverb in question was κἂν κύων κἂν ὕς γνῶιη, 'any dog or pig could tell that.'

E τὴν Κρομμυωνίαν ἴν. This animal devastated Crommyon, and was killed by Theseus. Plutarch gives its name Ἡ δὲ Κρομμυωνία σὺς, ἣν Φαῖαν προσωνόμαζον, οὐ φαῦλον

ἦν θηρίον, ἀλλὰ μάχιμον καὶ χαλεπὸν κρατηθῆναι. Crommyon 196 E
was in the territory of Corinth.

ἀποδέχεσθαι, 'to admit.'

ἢ ξυγχωρεῖν θηρίον τι, κ.τ.λ., lit. 'or else to allow that some beast is so clever, that what few men know on account of the difficulty of learning it, he asserts that a lion,' etc. The sentence would be regular if the words from λέοντα to φάναι inclusive were omitted.

ὁμοίως λέοντα καὶ ἔλαφον καὶ ταῦρον καὶ πίθηκον. These substantives are in two groups, the sense of the passage being, 'But he who defines courage as you do is bound to say that in natural disposition for courage deer are on a level with lions, and monkeys on a level with bulls.'

ἢ πᾶσιν ἐναντιούμενος, κ.τ.λ., 'or do you venture, in 197 A
opposition to the opinion of everybody else, not to call them courageous at all?'

ἀλλ' ἄφοβον καὶ μωρόν. Thus the bird called 'the Booby' was so named on account of its absolute fearlessness. Darwin (*Naturalist's Voyage* p. 398 foll.) gives some interesting facts which show that fear of man is not found to exist in races of wild birds when they are first brought into contact with him, but, on the contrary, is acquired very slowly, and only as the result of inherited experience.

τὸ ἄφοβον καὶ τὸ ἀνδρείον οὐ ταῦτόν ἐστιν, 'fearless- B
ness and courage are different things.' The distinction is a real one; but see note on Prodicus, 197 D.

ἀνδρεία δὲ τὰ φρόνιμα. The neuter is used probably for the sake of conformity with the first part of the sentence.

CAP. XXVI.

ἑαυτὸν ... κοσμεῖ τῷ λόγῳ. Cf. τί ἂν τις ἐν ξυνοσίᾳ τοιαῦδε C
μάτην κενοῖς λόγοις αὐτὸς αὐτὸν κοσμοῖ, 196 B.

σοφόν, ... εἶπερ ἐστὲ ἀνδρείοι. ἀνδρείον ... εἶπερ ἐστὲ σοφοί would have been more satisfactory as a direct answer to Laches; but Nicias answers the thought rather than the words.

Λάμαχον. Subsequently Nicias' colleague in the Sicilian expedition. He was a brave and able general, and had he not so soon fallen in battle the fate of the Athenian armament might have been very different. Lamachus is the type of the

197 C warlike man in Aristophanes, who finds his name convenient for puns on μάχη, e.g.—

ὡς πόνου τε καὶ μάχαι καὶ Λάμαχοι. (*Acharn.* 1071.)

Cf. *Peace* 1291, where Trygaeus says to Lamachus' son on hearing who he is—

αἰβοῖ

ἦ γὰρ ἐγὼ θαύμαζον ἀκούων, εἰ σὺ μὴ εἴης

ἀνδρὸς βουλομάχου καὶ κλανσιμάχου τινὸς υἱός.

ἔχων εἰπεῖν, 'though I have something that I could say,'
i.e. 'though I could if I liked.'

Αἰξωνέα. The people of Laches' deme, Aexone, were noted, according to one Scholiast, for abusive language; according to another, for pride.

D οὐδὲ μὴ ἦσθησθαι, 'not to have perceived at all.' Stallbaum however, following Godf. Hermann, regards the negatives here as making an affirmative.

τῷ Προδίκῳ, κ.τ.λ. Prodicus of Ceos was one of the most famous Sophists of Plato's time. He published one or more treatises on the distinction between words apparently synonymous, and for this he is ridiculed by Plato here and also in the *Protagoras*, e.g. 337 A, where he is made to say that those present at an argument ought κοινοὺς μὲν εἶναι ἀμφοῖν τοῖν διαλεγομένοιν ἀκροατάς, ἴσους δὲ μὴ, ἔστι γὰρ (he explains) οὐ ταῦτόν· κοινῇ μὲν γὰρ ἀκούσαι δεῖ ἀμφοτέρων, μὴ ἴσον δὲ νεῖμαι ἑκατέρῳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν σοφωτέρῳ πλεον, τῷ δὲ ἀμαθεστέρῳ ἔλαττον... "to be impartial hearers of both the speakers; remembering however that impartiality is not the same as equality, for both sides should be impartially heard, and yet an equal meed should not be assigned to both of them; but to the wiser a higher meed should be given, and a lower to the less wise" (Jowett). He ends his speech by saying, "And thus we, who are the hearers, will be gratified and not pleased" (εὐφραινοίμεθα, οὐκ ἠδοίμεθα) "for gratification is of the mind when receiving wisdom and knowledge, but pleasure is of the body when eating or experiencing some other bodily delight" (Jowett). Subsequently we find (p. 358 D) Τί οὖν; ἔφην ἐγὼ, καλεῖτέ τι δέος καὶ φόβον; καὶ ἄρα ὅπερ ἐγὼ (πρὸς σὲ λέγω, ὦ Πρόδικε); προσδοκίαν τινὰ λέγω κακοῦ τοῦτο, εἴτε φόβον εἴτε δέος καλεῖτε. Ἐδόκει Πρωταγόρα μὲν καὶ Ἰππία δέος τε καὶ φόβος εἶναι τοῦτο, Προδίκῳ δὲ δέος, φόβος δ' οὐ. See also *Charmides* 163 D. Plato is probably unfair to Prodicus, and Grote well observes that "a teacher who took care, even punctilious care, in fixing the meaning of important words of his discourse must be considered as guiding the minds of his hearers in a salutary

direction ; salutary, we may add, even to Plato himself, **197 D** whose speculations would most certainly have been improved by occasional hints from such a monitor." Prodicus however should be better known as the author of the pretty fable known as the "Choice of Hercules," which should be read as related in Xenophon's *Mem.* ii. 1. 21-33.

τὰ τοιαῦτα ... κομψεύεσθαι, 'to make such refinements.'

ἀνδρὶ δὲν ἢ πόλις, κ.τ.λ. Laches, though still rather angry, is yet mollified enough by Nicias' praise to return the compliment. Nicias' silence during all this time while Socrates and Laches are discussing his behaviour is in accordance with the gentleness of his character.

Πρέπει ... τῶν μεγίστων προστατοῦντι, κ.τ.λ. Cf. *Rep.* p. 473 C-D, where Socrates is made to say that a perfect government is only possible if philosophers are made kings, or kings and rulers become philosophers, i.e. if those who possess political power have high speculative ability, and have undergone a training to develop that ability.

δοκεῖ δέ μοι Νικίας ἄξιός εἶναι, κ.τ.λ., 'and it seems to **E** me to be worth considering what is Nicias' point of view in his definition of this word "courage".'

CAP. XXVII.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ τοῦτο, κ.τ.λ. 'Then did you not also **198 A** imply in your answer that this was a portion of virtue,' etc. There is a similar construction below, p. 199 C, μέρος ἄρ' ἀνδρείας ἡμῖν, ὦ Νικία, ἀπεκρίνω σχεδόν τι τρίτον.

ἄντων δὲ καὶ ἄλλων, κ.τ.λ., 'thereby admitting that there were other elements, the combination of all the elements being called virtue.'

πρὸς ἀνδρεία σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην. The four 'virtues' of the *Republic* are σοφία, ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη. The first of these is an intellectual quality, but the other three can be made to embrace the whole of moral virtue without an undue extension of meaning. Notice however that the word ἀρέτη has not primarily a moral meaning any more than ἀγαθός has, and it is only in its application to the moral nature of man that it can strictly be translated by our word 'virtue.'

Ἐχε δὲ. 'Wait a moment.'

διδάξεις, "you shall set me right" (Jowett). **B**

198 B θαρράλεια, 'things not terrible.' We have no single word in English for this.

δέος γὰρ εἶναι προσδοκίαν μέλλοντος κακοῦ. This is a very inadequate definition of fear. Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* (ii. 5. 1) gives a more exact definition: "Ἐστω δὲ φόβος λύπη τις ἢ παραχῆ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ. See Appendix.

ἢ οὐχ οὕτω καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ, ᾧ Λάχης; Notice that Laches is never left out of the conversation.

C Τὰ ... ἡμέτερα means little more than *hêmâs* (see 188 c), and *hêmâs* ἀκούεις ὅτι φαμέν would of course be equivalent to ἀκούεις ὅτι ἡμεῖς φαμέν.

CAP. XXVIII.

D Ἐγὼ δὲ φράσω, κ.τ.λ. In the following speech nothing very difficult is propounded, though the phraseology is difficult, for the reason that Plato had not at his command any half-technical words like 'past,' 'present,' 'future,' 'science,' 'subject-matter,' and so forth. Socrates says that of any given subject-matter there will not be three separate sciences according as it is past, present, or future, but only one science under all these aspects.

Translate: 'Well, I will tell you. My friend and I, you must know, think that in all matters of which science is cognisant there is not one science of the past, whereby we know how it has been, and another of the present to say how it is, and another to tell us how what is still future can best be or will be, but one and the same for all. For instance, in reference to health with respect to any time, no other science but the single one of medicine considers both the present, the past, and the probabilities of the future.'

199 A μὴ τὸν μάντιν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ἄρχειν, κ.τ.λ. Here again as in 195 E we have a gentle sarcasm aimed at Nicias' superstitious character. For Plato's readers there is probably an allusion to Nicias' conduct after the eclipse of the moon on August 27th, 413 B.C., when he delayed the retreat from Syracuse in obedience to the soothsayers, and consequently sealed the doom of the Athenian armament. It was certainly a case of the prophet ruling the general. καὶ μελλόντων αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴ ἐτοῖμα ἦν, ἀποπλεῖν, ἢ σελήμη ἐκλείπει· ἐτύγχανε γὰρ πασσέληνος οὔσα. καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οἳ τε πλείους ἐπίσχειν ἐκέλευον τοὺς στρατηγούς, ἐνθύμιον ποιούμενοι, καὶ ὁ Νικίας (ἦν γὰρ τι καὶ ἄγαν θειασμῶ τε καὶ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ προσκείμενος) οὐδ' ἂν διαβουλευσασθαι ἔτι ἔφη, πρὶν, ὡς οἱ μάντις ἐξηγοῦντο, τρὶς ἐννέα ἡμέρας

μείναι, ὅπως ἂν πρότερον κινηθεῖη. καὶ τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις μελ- 199 A
λήσασι διὰ τοῦτο ἢ μονὴ ἐγεγένητο (Thuc. vii. 50, end).

καὶ ἐσομένων καὶ γιγνομένων, κ.τ.λ. These words qualify
τῶν αὐτῶν, 'whether past, present, or future.'

"Ἐγωγε, 'Yes, I do (agree).'

καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων, 'and indeed under all possible con- B
ditions.' Possibly these words were not Plato's, but added
from Socrates' next speech by a copyist.

CAP. XXIX.

Μέρος ἄρα ... ἀπεκρίνω σχεδόν τι τρίτον. Cf. 198 A, οὐκοῦν C
καὶ σὺ τοῦτο ἀπεκρίνω ὡς μόριον ... ;

ἢ περὶ πάντων ἀγαθῶν, κ.τ.λ. Sc. ἐπιστήμη.

καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων, 'and under any condition of time.'
The καὶ joins πάντως ἐχόντων to πάντων.

οὕτως αὖ μετατίθεσθαι, κ.τ.λ. 'Do you say that you D
make this change in your definition, Nicias, or what change?'
The αὖ marks a transition of thought which we seldom indi-
cate in English. We might represent it by 'now' in this
passage.

"Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, i.e. μετατίθεσθαι οὕτως.

καὶ παντάπασιν ὡς ... 'and exactly how' The construc-
tion here is *not* εἰδείη τὰ ἀγαθὰ ὡς γίγνεται, κ.τ.λ., but εἰδείη
τά τε ἀγαθὰ καὶ ὡς τὰ ἀγαθὰ γίγνεται, κ.τ.λ.

ὁ γὰρ μόνῳ προσήκει, κ.τ.λ., '(that man) who alone is in a
condition to distinguish with caution between things terrible
and the reverse in reference both to gods and men, and to
procure good for himself, because he knows how to behave
rightly towards them.'" Schanz and Badham reject καὶ τὰ μὴ,
Giltbauer rejects καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ. One or other of these correc-
tions seems almost necessary to avoid a very forced rendering
of ἐξευλαβεῖσθαι.

CAP. XXX.

Ἐὖ γε, ὦ Λάχης, κ.τ.λ., 'I congratulate you, Laches, 200 A
because you think it no longer any consequence that you
yourself were proved just now to know nothing about cour-
age, but are looking for my being proved to be in the same
case; and it would seem that you will not at all mind being
ignorant in my company, of things which a man who has any
opinion of himself ought to understand.'

200 B ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀνθρώπειον, κ.τ.λ., 'to be doing a thing that is very natural to all of us.'

ἐγὼ δ' οἶμαι ... ἐπιεικῶς εἰρησθαι, "I am of opinion that enough has been said" (Jowett).

οὐ σύ που οἶε καταγελᾶν, 'whom you, it seems, think you may deride.'

βεβαιώσωμαι αὐτά. Cf. 194 c, καὶ αὐτὸς ἂ νοεῖς τῷ λόγῳ βεβαιώσαι.

δοκεῖς γάρ μοι, κ.τ.λ., 'for you seem to me to be very much in need of learning.'

C Σοφὸς γάρ τοι σὺ εἶ. There is a slight sneer in this, but Laches soon recovers his good temper.

χαίρειν ἔαν. A very common phrase, 'to say good-bye to.' See below, 201 B.

ταῦτὰ ἂν ταῦτ' ἐποιοῦν, 'I should do the same' (as I advise them to do).

D Νικήρατον. Nicias' son, called after Nicias' father, according to the custom noticed in the note on 179 A.

ἀλλὰ γάρ, κ.τ.λ., 'but the truth is that he introduces other people to me on each occasion when I mention it to him.' So Socrates had introduced Damon to Nicias (180 c-d). In the phrase ἀλλὰ γάρ there is probably no ellipse, but both particles exert what Riddell calls a simultaneous force.

τούτῳ, *i.e.* for Socrates.

ξυμπροθυμήσει ... ; 'will you help ... ?'

CAP. XXXI.

E νῦν δ' ὁμοίως γάρ. See note on 184 D.

τί οὖν ἂν τις ἡμῶν τινα προαιροῖτο, κ.τ.λ., lit. 'why then should a man choose any one of us before (the others)? I think that (he ought to choose) none (of us).' There is not an exact correspondence between the question and the answer in the Greek.

201 A οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐκφορος λόγος. The general sense clearly is 'I don't mind making these humiliating admissions and suggestions), because my words will not be reported to anybody outside.' About the precise meaning of the words there is more difficulty. The ms. reading is that given in the text, and, if it is what Plato wrote, must mean, "for none of our conversation is likely to be reported outside." But οὐδεὶς ... λόγος is

awkward. Consequently Stallbaum, Schanz, and C. F. Hermann read οὐδεις γὰρ ἔκφορος λόγου (neque enim quisquam est qui sermonem efferat—Stallb.). Stallbaum refers to Ar. *Thesmophoriazusae*, 472, where the mss. have αὐται γὰρ ἐσμεν, κοῦδεμί' ἔκφορος λόγου, 'for we are alone, and no one of us is likely to divulge what I say.' For the passive signification of ἔκφορος may be quoted Eur. *Hipp.* 295, εἰ δ' ἔκφορός σοι συμφορὰ πρὸς ἄρσενας; for the active Aesch. *Eum.* 910, τῶν δυσσεβούντων δ' ἔκφορωτέρα πέλοις. Whether we read λόγος or λόγου, the words are probably a quotation from the drama. If so we might guess that the words are Euripides', and are parodied in Aristoph. *loc. cit.*

εἰς διδασκάλων, 'to (the house of) teachers.' Cf. 'ad Dianae.'

προβάλλεσθαι, lit. 'to put before ourselves' (as a shield or excuse), *i.e.* 'to plead the authority of.' **B**

οὐκ ἀγαθὴν .. αἰδῶ κεχρημένῳ ἀνδρὶ παρῆναι. The line occurs in *Od.* xvii. 347. Plato here puts it in *oratio obliqua*. He quotes it in its original form in *Charmides* 161 A—

Αἰδῶς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ κεχρημένῳ ἀνδρὶ παρῆναι.

ἔασαντες χαίρειν. See above, 200 c.

κοινη ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, κ.τ.λ., 'will attend to our own needs as well as those of the young men.'

ἀλλά μοι. 'But, I beg.'

οἴκαδε, 'to my house.'

τὸ δὲ νῦν εἶναι. 'But for the present.' **C**

ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλη. This use of θεός in the singular, without reference to any particular god, is by no means uncommon in Greek literature.

APPENDIX.

THE *Laches* is not meant to be an exhaustive treatise on the subject of courage, but rather to give suggestions towards an accurate consideration of the topic under the form of a natural conversation, where character is not subordinated to logic, and where the argument is developed by the free action of one man's mind upon another.

It is therefore unfair on the dialogue to take away from it its dramatic form. But it may nevertheless be of use to give here a short summary of the argument in a more modern shape.

“It is curious that great men should often take such little care of their son's education. Yet that education is most important on its physical as well as its moral side. We find however that even on the subject of physical education there is great diversity of opinion among sensible experienced men. A particular form of gymnastics is praised by some and blamed by others; one man thinks it will probably be useful, another suspects it to be altogether useless because it is useless at times. Hardly anyone considers that bodily exercise is at least as valuable to the mind as it is to the body; or attempts to base his theory of appropriate exercises, in part at any rate, on the constitution of the mind and the nature of the qualities he would cultivate in it. Indeed, as to the nature of those qualities many are altogether ignorant.

Take courage for instance—this being the quality which above all others manly sports should cultivate. Have we a clear idea what courage is? The man who does not run away in battle is (presumably) brave; but there are many brave men who have never seen a battle in their lives. Shall we say then that courage is a sort of resolution or endurance? If so, what sort of resolution is it? Resolution in investing money? Clearly not, but, if resolution, it ought to be some kind of sensible resolution, or resolution combined with prudence. Yet, if courage is defined thus, we must further ask who is the braver man of the two, the imprudent man who fights against odds, or the prudent man who fights with the advantage of numbers on his side?

It is true that in all courage, which is not mere brute courage, there must be an element of wisdom. But we must not therefore say that courage is a sort of wisdom. For instance, some people say that courage is wisdom as applied to the consideration of dangers. But dangers are coming evils, and the wisdom that judges of evil in the future cannot differ from the wisdom that judges of evil in the past and present, and no one would call such wisdom courage. So difficult is it to say what courage is, and so vague are our notions on the very elements of the science of morals."

Though there is a great deal more in the dialogue than the discussion of physical courage, it is only of that quality that we shall now speak. In the *Laches* then we learn that there is a physical element in courage and an intellectual element, but that there is great difficulty in determining the relation of these elements to each other. We learn that in a sense "discretion is the better part of valour," but we are not told what this means; on the contrary, we are shown that when the discretion is narrowly self-seeking it does not add to a man's courage, but detracts from it. Here it would be well to explain this contradiction, and attempt to give an account of courage that shall harmonise these conflicting views, which are entertained, we believe, as much by Englishmen as they were by Plato. For instance, no one reads the story of Nelson saying, "I never saw fear: what is it?" * without admiring the boy for his utter fearlessness; yet most of us would agree with Alan Breck Stewart that "to be feared of a thing and yet to do it, is what makes the prettiest kind of a man" † (*καλὸν κάγαθόν*).

The truth is that we give to constitutional fearlessness the same sort of admiration that we give to personal strength or personal beauty; whereas we admire courage that depends on principle in the same way as we admire any other moral virtue. The former kind of courage may exist without the latter; the latter perhaps never exists without some degree of the former. But it will be convenient to speak of it as so existing.

Accordingly we may analyse the courage of the man who from principle sacrifices or endangers his own life for the good of others into two elements—(i.) The wisdom of preferring a greater good to a smaller good: (ii.) The sacrifice of his own immediate desire.

* Southey's *Life of Nelson*, chap. 1.

† R. L. Stevenson's *Kidnapped*, p. 193

The same elements constitute the courage of a man who endures danger or pain for his own sake. He does what is wise and also does it by sacrificing his inclination of the moment, which does not necessarily in that particular instance tend towards his well-being even from a purely selfish point of view, for fear, which is on the whole an instinct tending to preserve, is yet so eminently unreasonable, and is so heedless of anything except the nearest danger, that on many occasions it has a tendency to destroy. Thus a man suffering from a dangerous disease to be cured only by a painful operation naturally shrinks from the operation; and is therefore praised for submitting to it, even though he should do so merely for his own sake.

On the other hand we blame, and justly blame, as rash a man who puts himself into situations which are clearly dangerous for him unless he do so with a fair prospect of obtaining a greater good either for himself or his fellow-men.

To repeat this distinction in a slightly different form, fear will, as a rule, tend to preserve an animal from destruction; on the other hand there are many occasions on which a want of fear will preserve an animal from destruction. Hence a due balance between fear and fearlessness will be the best quality for preserving an individual. This fact may be verified any day at a London crossing, where the over-timid and the careless equally put themselves in danger of being run over. Therefore we say that "discretion is the better part of valour," and we blame men who are "rash."

But as courage may also be a social virtue, that is, be exerted for the sake of saving the community, and not for the sake of saving the individual only, we praise it even when it brings manifest harm to him provided his action be one that tends to the good of society. It is the latter point to which we expect him to give his best attention; if it be once settled that he will benefit his friends, his country, or the world by exposing himself to danger, then the more careless a man is of his own safety the greater hero we think him.

In Plato's *Protagoras* Socrates forces Protagoras to admit that courage is the *σοφία τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν*, and that cowardice is the corresponding *ἀμαθία* (p. 360). In fact the doctrine is the same as that alluded to by Nicias in the *Laches*, and is given as that of the historic Socrates in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*. There Xenophon relates that Socrates said that "those who knew how to behave properly in reference to dangers and risks were brave, and those who had not this knowledge were cowards" (*Mem.* iv. 6. 11). Yet Socrates acknowledged a physical basis to courage, for when asked

whether that quality came by teaching or nature, he answered that one man was naturally braver than another, but that courage could be increased *μαθήσει καὶ μελέτῃ* (*Mem.* iii. 9. 1-3). There could hardly be a better or simpler statement of the case than this.

In Plato's other dialogues we find various unreconciled statements on the subject of *ἀνδρεία*. In the *Laws* i. p. 633, it is spoken of as a resistance not only to fear and pain, but to desire, pleasure, and flattery, in fact it is taken as manliness in its widest sense, and there is the same extension of view in the *Republic*, where it is defined as the power of keeping firm under all kinds of temptations the right opinion concerning things terrible and the reverse (*Rep.* pp. 429-430). And in the *Politicus* (p. 306) we find the word *ἀνδρεία* used as a term under which to include all the qualities of strength or activity in mind or body.

In the *Laws* (xii. p. 963) we have mention made of *ἀνδρεία* in the narrow sense, and there it is said that a courageous soul comes into existence by nature and without the help of reason. This view is much the same as that put into Protagoras' mouth (*Prot.* p. 351 A), *θάρσος μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ τέχνης γίγνεται ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἀπὸ θυμοῦ τε καὶ ἀπὸ μανίας, ὥσπερ ἡ δύναμις, ἀνδρεία δὲ ἀπὸ φύσεως καὶ εὐτροφίας τῶν ψυχῶν γίγνεται.*

On the other hand, in the *Gorgias* p. 495, it is said that some courage implies knowledge, though the two are distinct.

And lastly, in the *Phaedo* (p. 68) we find the suggestion of a higher courage where it is said that most brave men fear death from fear of evils worse than death (for example, slavery or disgrace), but that the philosopher will welcome it as a release from the body that impedes the free action of his mind.

We will conclude with Aristotle's account of courage. In his *Ethics* (iii. 6. foll.) he says that courage, like all the moral virtues, is a mean between two extremes, cowardice and fool-hardiness. It is concerned with matters of fear and their reverse, but more especially with the former. Matters of fear are all future evils, but with many of these courage has nothing to do. Thus, a man is not brave *because* he does not fear poverty, or *because* he does not fear shame, except in a metaphorical sense (here Aristotle clears the ground by a most useful distinction), nor is he brave for not fearing death from drowning at sea or death in disease, but only for not fearing death and dangers in war. (Here Aristotle makes an absurd distinction, which we see was natural to the Greek mind from what Laches says in our dialogue, where he defines courage in terms that can apply only to the courage of a

Greek hoplite, p. 190 E). Aristotle goes on to say that there are things terrible beyond man's power of courage to endure, and he considers that none but madmen, or men with no feelings, or Gauls could fail to fear earthquakes or waves. Such people show the extreme of fearlessness. He distinguishes from this an excess of over-boldness, but the distinction is of little importance; except in so far as he says that the overbold are often mere braggarts, but in that case they are not really bold.

The man who shows the extreme of fear and of want of confidence is the coward; but the brave man not only endures what he ought, but does it *τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα*.

Further that there are five spurious forms of courage—

- (i.) *πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία*, i.e. facing danger through obedience to the laws, or for the sake of the applause of society, or to avoid its censure.
- (ii.) Experience of the particular danger.
- (iii.) The courage of anger.
- (iv.) The courage of the sanguine man (or of the drunken man).
- (v.) The courage of ignorance.

In his *Rhetoric* he gives a more popular definition, which is meant to be good enough for ordinary purposes: "Courage is the quality by reason of which men are disposed to do noble actions in times of danger, and as the law commands, and in obedience to the law, and cowardice is its opposite" (i. 9. 8). And he says in the same treatise that fear is a grief or disturbance arising from the mental picture (*ἐκ φαντασίας*) of a painful or destructive evil about to come on us and that soon (ii. 5. 1).

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